






















Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
For the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy (Humanities – Arts and Science) at 
Concordia University 















This is to certify that the thesis prepared 
 
By:  Gwynne Fulton 
 
 Entitled: Taking Life: Sovereignty, Spectrality, and Images of Death 
 
and submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
 
Doctor Of Philosophy  (Humanities - Arts and Science) 
 
 
complies with the regulations of the University and meets the accepted standards with respect to 
originality and quality. 
 
Signed by the final examining committee: 
 
 
                                          Chair 
 Dr. Rebecca Duclos 
 
                                                                             External Examiner 
 Dr. David Wills 
 
                                                                              External to Program 
 Dr. Krista Lynes 
 
                                                                              Examiner 
 Dr. Kristina Huneault 
 
                                                                              Examiner 
 Prof. Raymonde April 
 
                                                               Thesis Supervisor 
 Dr. Matthias Fritsch 
 
   
 
Approved by                                                                                                                      
    Dr. Erin Manning, Graduate Program Director  
 
 
 April 30, 2019           
    Dr. Andre Roy, Dean 







Taking Life: Sovereignty, Spectrality, and Images of Death 
Gwynne Fulton, Ph.D. 
Concordia University, 2019 
 
Ever since Plato’s Republic banned the poetics of mourning from the ideal polis, political power has 
been thought in relation to images of death. In recent years, theorists such as Foucault, Mbembe, 
and Derrida have examined the inextricability of sovereign power and the field of the visible, yet, 
their specific linkages remain undertheorized. In response, Taking Life draws on intersecting fields of 
photographic, critical race and poststructural theory, as well as curatorial practice, to develop an 
account that connects sovereignty to images. I demonstrate that the concept of sovereignty we have 
inherited from political modernity is “phantasmatic” insofar as it imagines itself as pure life cut off 
from death. This phantasm is governed by a double logic that I aim to expose through an analysis of 
images of death circulating in contemporary art and media. My account shows that sovereignty is 
made possible by the alterity of death and time, which it nonetheless attempts to repress and control 
when it “takes life,” for example, by executing a death penalty or by representing death in spectral 
images. Yet, images also amplify death and finitude in ways that render sovereignty fragile and 
precarious. 
I formulate this double logic as general infrastructure that, following the work of Derrida, I 
call the “optic of spectrality.” I use this optic to read a series of discrete visual provocations, 
including death penalty photography in the analogue era and beyond; bystander recordings of 
antiblack police violence circulated on mobile platforms; and works by Harun Farocki that 
interrogate image operations in the context of global electronic warfare. These counter-histories of 
visuality agitate for an understanding of sovereignty that is exposed to death and spectral time. In 
exploring intersecting themes of sovereignty, spectrality, finitude, and technicity, I argue for the 
continued relevance of deconstruction for debates in visual cultures about visibility and violence, 
spectacle and surveillance, and the aesthetics of necropolitics. Focusing questions about the status 
and power of images in our post-photographic era of global media, Taking Life contributes to 
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PREFACE: CURATORIAL WORK 
This dissertation mobilizes curatorial practice alongside deconstructive, critical race, and visual 
theory. Curatorial practice has allowed me to the forge lateral formations that move outside 
academic contexts, while opening a heterogeneous space for reflection and speculation that 
accommodates new modes of public discourse. The curatorial component of Taking Life is 
comprised of a series of public film programs organized at Slought Foundation, a non-profit center 
associated with the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia that fosters dialogue around the arts 
and social justice. Between 2016-2017 I held a position as Curatorial and Research Fellow at Slought, 
during my tenure as a Fulbright Visiting Doctoral Researcher at Villanova University. During this 
time, I assisted with the development and launch of Slought’s Mediatheque space dedicated to 
weekly programming that critically engages the intersection of art, politics, and public life.1 Slought 
provided a locus for collaborative process-based engagement with an extended community of 
researchers, historians, theorists, scholars, activists, and artists. In the context of this unique 
institutional context, I developed a series of public film programs: about the geopolitics of oceans 
and the trajectories of illegalized migration in the Black Mediterranean (Sea of Images, 2017), the 
carceral state (The Prison in Twelve Landscapes, 2017), and the targeted killing of human rights and land 
defenders in Colombia (#NiUnMuerteMás; Nos están matando, 2018).2 Each of these programs 
examined the relation between social, civil, and/or corporeal death and various regimes of political 
and visual power. Addressing questions of violence, witnessing, spectatorship, and resistance, these 
interventions supplement the contextual engagements (with death penalty photography, the 
proliferating digital archive of antiblack police violence, and the post-digital circuit of drone warfare) 
examined in the written component of this dissertation. These two practices of knowledge 
 
1 “Mediatheque,” Slought Foundation, http://slought.org/resources/mediatheque. 
2 Gwynne Fulton and Ilona Jorkonyte, “Sea of Images: Forensic Oceanography, Emilija Škarnulytė, Ayesha Hameed, Filipa 
César and Louis Henderson,” September 14, 2017, http://slought.org/resources/mediatheque_sea_of_images; “The 
Prison in Twelve Landscapes: Brett Story,” Slought, September 29, 2018, 
https://slought.org/resources/prison_in_twelve_landscapes; Gwynne Fulton and Alejandro Jaramillo, “Nos Están 
Matando / They’re Killing Us,” Slought, September 29, 2018, https://slought.org/resources/nos_estan_matando; 
“#NiUnMuertoMás / #NotOneMoreDeath: Jorge Mario Betancourt, Yesid Campos, Edison Sánchez, Juan José 







production and dissemination intersect, overlap and inform one another, but are nonetheless, 
discreet activities.  
Slought is engaged in a long-standing deconstructive critique of its own institutionality; 
negotiating local and global borders, their projects perform a series of values across conceptual and 
spatial boundaries. Among these, three intersecting values have come to inform my practice of 
public programming: resistance, dialogue, publics. My film programming examines the resistant 
possibilities of imaging practices in the public sphere. Each of my interventions—which include 
documentary, fiction, and experimental media practices—elucidate different strategies of critical 
engagement with regimes of power, invisibility, and death, as they are differentially adjudicated in 
contemporary life. The practice that emerged from this collaborative work at Slought is as much 
about the film programs as the conversations that are borne from the context and the conditions 
they create. Dialogue is central to my event-based programming and each of the events I 
programmed, in following Slought’s emphasis on public conversations, were followed by 
interdisciplinary talks with invited artists, activists, and academics. These conversations are 
documented in Slought’s vast digital archive, which spans fifteen years and which includes past 
conversations with the likes of Martin Hägglund about radical atheism and the limits of democracy; 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak about geopolitics and mourning; as well as projects about Derrida’s own 
work, including “Unpacking Derrida’s Library,” a film screening and publication commemorating 
Derrida’s multiple legacies. Dialogues are accessible through Slought’s online platform, which serves 
as public resource for knowledge-sharing that aims to bridge academic and public cultures. Finally, 
these interventions aim to cultivate intersectional publics and participatory engagement with public 
life. For documentation and further information on my curatorial projects the reader is directed to 









Ever since Plato’s Republic banned the poetics of mourning from the ideal polis, political power has 
been thought in relation to images of death. In recent years, theorists such as Foucault, Mbembe, 
and Derrida have argued that sovereign power and the field of visual are inextricable, yet, their 
specific linkages remain undertheorized. Taking Life examines images of death circulating in 
contemporary art and media as a material locus from which to interrogate these shifting linkages. 
The territories of sovereignty are littered with corpses and their ghosts. Images of death 
open a space for the specters of state killing, illegalized migration, warfare, slavery and its afterlives, 
which haunt our present as much as our political futures. This dissertation responds to the 
injunction of the ghosts that haunt visual culture—from the blasted fields of Antietam through the 
ubiquity of violent images promulgated by contemporary media. It enjoins us to attend to the ghosts 
of history as well as the urgencies of a moment conditioned by heightened policing of the borders of 
the state and self, the living and the dead. How can images of death help us understand the shifting 
linkages between sovereign power and the visual field? What resources can they provide us in the 
project of re-visioning sovereignty? These guiding questions give way to a number of subsidiary 
questions: How do images live, die and survive? What is their status and power? Can images kill? 
Who gets to survive images? How are images mobilized to construct some deaths as visible, while 
invisibilizing others? How do images of death support the institution of sovereign power, while 
simultaneously leading to its undoing? What, moreover, is their efficacy as a locus of critical 
resistance? How have artists intervened in visual regimes of violence? How in short, do images of 
death deconstruct sovereignty?  
To answer to these questions, I draw on intersecting fields of photographic, critical race and 
poststructural theory, as well as curatorial practice. These tools help me develop an account of 
“spectrality” that articulates a series of shifting linkages between sovereign power, visibility, and 
death. Spectrality connects images of death in our current era of global media to the deconstruction 
of a “phantasmatic” historical formation of sovereignty, which attempts to assert its power over 







Deconstructing Sovereignty With Images Of Death 
Taking Life aims to think through the relation between sovereignty, death, and visibility, aided by 
Derrida’s poststructural critiques of sovereignty. I consider Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction of 
sovereignty through a close engagement with the Death Penalty Seminar. Between 1999 and 2002 
Derrida’s yearly seminar focused on the question of the death penalty and its relation to sovereignty. 
In the lectures, which were delivered first at l’École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS) 
in Paris and then subsequently for an American audience at the University of California, Irvine, 
Derrida considers the history and horizon of a certain understanding of sovereignty we have 
inherited from a political modernity, in the lineage reaching from Bodin through Schmitt.  
The focus on sovereignty and its deconstruction might sound anachronistic to the ear 
accustomed to the lexicon of biopolitics. Why return to the question of sovereignty after Foucault’s 
account of biopolitics? Foucault famously argues that multiple circuits of “disciplinary power” and 
“biopower” that operate through regulatory apparatuses—including institutional and social 
formations—that seize control over the administration and management of life have supplanted the 
old forms of  sovereignty that exercised power through spectacular public displays of  death in the 
classical era. Building on Foucault’s insights, Hardt and Negri advance a decentralized model of  
empire that operates under capillary power incompatible with the old centralized structures of  
sovereignty; Agamben argues that sovereignty has metamorphosed into a world-wide production 
and sacrifice of “bare life” captured by the state of exception; Mbembe coins the concept of 
“necropower” in order to articulate the racial lines that demarcate the sacrificial logic of power in the 
adjudication of bodies considered disposable to the nation-state; Povinelli offers “geontopower” as a 
new theory of  power in the age of  the Anthropocene that operates through the regulation of  clear 
distinctions between life and nonlife under late-liberalism.3 All this would seem to shut the door on 
the question of  sovereignty, which should no longer provide explanatory or diagnostic avenues for 
adequately revealing and critiquing the mechanisms of  power that govern contemporary life and 
death. Why, at a time of these new critical explanatory theories, need we have recourse to theories of 
 
3 See Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality (New York: Vintage Books, 1990); Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, 
Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007); Giorgio Agamben, The Omnibus Homo Sacer (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2017); Achille Mbembe, “Necropolitics,” trans. Libby Meintjes, Public Culture 15, no. 1 





sovereignty? Why does Derrida still insist in 2001 “the great question is indeed, everywhere, that of 
sovereignty”? (FWT 91). Why the deconstruction of sovereignty?  
This dissertation argues that western political thought has not substantively broken with an 
“onto-theological” concept of sovereignty inherited from political modernity, which is rooted in the 
heritage of Europe’s colonial projects. Even more strongly put, it argues that that we cannot, for 
reasons I will explain throughout, break with this heritage, however much we must wrestle to do so. 
While sovereignty, on Derrida’s reading, broadly refers to a theory of identity—of the state or the 
self—over time, which is constitutive of all life, the focus of Derrida’s interventions is a specific 
historically determined concept of sovereignty that Derrida associates with psychic mastery over 
death. The remains of  this specific understanding of  sovereignty continue to haunt the scene of 
contemporary politics; its tropes continue to possess political discourse. We hear it in the populist 
discourses sweeping across Europe and the United States today, for example in the televised 
broadcast of  US president’s September 19, 2017 “Speech to the United Nations General Assembly,” 
during which the words “sovereign” and “sovereignty” were invoked no less than twenty-one times 
by the current head of  state while invoking a return to isolationist stance.4 The talking head, cut and 
framed by the television screen, mutters away in the language of  sovereignty. What are we to make 
of  this phantasmatic survival? What ties and indebts us to the history and horizon of  sovereignty in 
the West? “Why,” as Catherine Malabou quips, “when we cut off  the king’s head are we still ruled by 
the phantasm of  the head?”5  
I argue that there is a general ontotheological structure and logic that persists across various 
mutations in sovereignty, while finding new historically and geopolitically specific expressions, as 
well as new visual manifestations at different historical moments. I aim to diagnose this 
understanding of sovereignty and its humanist heritage, while showing that there are certain 
phantasmatic dimensions that we can “deconstruct” through an analysis of images of death. My 
interrogations of images of death elucidate a general double logic at work in this concept of  
sovereignty, which imagines itself  as pure life, cut off  from death. Following Derrida, the 
deconstruction of  sovereignty I examine through images of  death involves showing that sovereignty 
is conditioned by the alterity of  death and time—or spectrality—which it nonetheless attempts to 
 
4 Mark Landler, “Trump Offers a Selective View of Sovereignty in U.N. Speech,” New York Times, September 19, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/19/world/trump-speech-united-nations.html.  





repress and control when it “takes life,” for example, by executing a death penalty or by representing 
death. Yet, images of  death also amplify spectrality in ways that render sovereignty fragile and 
precarious.  
Of all Derrida’s interlocutors in the Death Penalty Seminar, Foucault emerges as the pivotal 
figure for my interrogations of political power and the visible field. Whereas Foucault argues that 
biopower supersedes the sovereign taste for blood, giving rise to fundamental shift from sovereign 
power with its spectacular dominion over death, Derrida gives us resources to think about how 
mutations in scopic technologies of vision and visibility intersect with the continued deployment of 
death, for example, in an increasingly virtual warfare conducted by way of global satellite, in the 
visible field of the surviving juridical institution of the death penalty, and in construction of everyday 
living “death-worlds” including normalized racial violence disseminated through social media 
platforms. Engaging debates about aesthetics and the politics of  death, I explore different 
manifestations of  the double logic of  spectrality at work in a series of  historically and geopolitically 
specific manifestations of  sovereignty vis-à-vis visual provocations drawn from different historical 
archives, as well as different “scopic regimes” under which vision and visuality are organized.6 
 
 
6 The term “scopic regime” was first coined by the French psychoanalytic film theorist Christian Metz in The Imaginary 
Signifier. Drawing on Lacan’s account of the scopic drives and the gaze, Metz critically examines how the cinema 
structures and determines modes of identification in cinematic spectatorship into an organized field. Hal Foster defines 
scopic regimes as a desire to efface the difference between “visuality” (as social fact and historical technique) and 
“vision” (as the physical mechanism of sight). Refuting any facile opposition of vision and visuality (vision is also 
historical; visuality is always embedded in the body), Foster defines scopic regimes as a mode of seeing that seeks to 
establish its dominance by foreclosing the plethora of “social visualities” operative in a given historical moment. Martin 
Jay deploys the concept more broadly to capture the sense in which experience is mediated and even constituted by visual 
technologies including photography, television, etc. Jay catalogues dominant regimes of visuality that organize early 
Modernity, including “Cartesian perspectivism” and “baroque reason.” According to Jay, each regime of visuality 
disciplines the gaze and a specific organization of deploys “a cultural/technological/political apparatus” to mediate, 
unify, and naturalize a given construction of visuality. As such, scopic regimes are also regimes of visual power, or 
“opto-power,” to use Marie-Josee Mondzain’s term. In her pathbreaking article on cinematic voyeurism, Laura Mulvey 
politicizes Metz’s psycho-semiotics to demonstrate how narrative cinema deploys gendered structures of the gaze to 
systemically empower phallocentric privilege. See Christian Metz, Psychoanalysis and Cinema: The Imaginary Signifier, trans. 
Celia Britton, Annwyl Williams, Ben Brewster, and Allfred Guzzetti (Indianapolis, IL: Indiana University Press, 1977); 
Martin Jay, “Scopic Regimes of Modernity.” in Force Fields: Between Intellectual History and Cultural Critique (New York, NY: 
Routledge, 2016), 114–33; “Scopic Regime,” The International Encyclopedia of Communication. ed. Wolfgang Donsbach 
(Blackwell Reference, 2008); and Hal Foster, Vision and Visuality (Seattle: Bay Press, 2009); Laura Mulvey, “Visual 
Pleasure and Narrative Cinema,” in Film Theory and Criticism: Introductory Readings, ed. Leo Braudy and Marshall Cohen 





Towards a Political Hauntology of Photography 
I aim to develop a political hauntology of photography that explicates the linkages of sovereign 
power and the visual field through a close analysis of the production, circulation, and consumption 
of images of death in visual culture. In so doing, I aim to elucidate the role of images of death both 
as a condition of possibility for what Derrida calls the “phantasm of indivisible sovereignty and 
sovereign mastery.”7 I am concerned with the way images of death articulate power, but also how 
they render power unstable. Images of death are one of the preeminent sites for the deconstruction 
of sovereignty. Interrogating Derrida’s claim that the “juridical concept of the state’s sovereignty 
today has a relation—an essential relation—to the media,” the account of media spectrality I 
develop here brings visual analysis to bear on the deconstruction of sovereignty (E 35). Conversely, 
I argue for the continued import of deconstruction, and particularly the deconstruction of 
sovereignty, for contemporary image theory. The images of death interrogated in this dissertation 
bring poststructural resources to bear on two interrelated debates in visual cultures. I frame these 
two debates as questions: (1) What can images do? and (2) What is an image?  
  
In/Visibility & Violence 
The first debate, revolving around the question What can images do?, involves the status and power of 
images in relation to questions about in/visibility and violence. Spurred by the hyper-mediatized 
World Trade Center attacks and the circulation of images of tortured detainees at Abu Ghraib, the 
spectacle of violent images has been pivotal in discussions about the political effectivity of images.8 
These debates question the pragmatic use of images, as well as the relation of visual and political 
power. It is possible to identify two prominent, antithetical discourses. The antinomy between Susan 
Sontag and Judith Butler is instructive. On the one hand, Sontag, in Regarding the Pain of Others, argues 
that images of suffering deflect and undermine the political.9 She warns that images of warfare and 
torture aestheticize suffering, desensitize viewers, and invite a passive, narcissistic mode of 
 
7 Jacques Derrida, “University Without Condition,” in Without Alibi, trans. Kamuf Peggy (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2002), 235. 
8 See for example, Geoffrey Batchen, Picturing Atrocity: Photography in Crisis (London, UK: Reaktion Books, 2014); Nicolas 
Mirzoeff, “Invisible Empire: Visual Culture, Embodied Spectacle, and Abu Ghraib,” Radical History Review, no. 95 (2006): 
21–44, doi:10.1215/01636545-2006-95-21; W. J. T. Mitchell, “Picturing Terror: Derrida’s Autoimmunity,” Critical Inquiry 
33, no. 2 (2007): 277–90, doi:10.1086/511494. 





consumption that fragments the possibility of narrative apprehension. Images haunt us.10 Echoing 
Siegfried Kracauer’s early dystopian theory of photography—and presaging Saidiya Hartman’s 
incisive interrogation of the role of violent “scenes” in the constitution of black subjectivity—
Sontag argues that the media exploit images for sensational purposes.11 Severing death from the 
context of human suffering, violent images cloud our judgment and tarnish our critical perception. 
For Sontag, our condition as subjects affectively haunted by images disrupts our ability to mobilize 
politically. Violent images foreclose our understanding of the events they represent and undermine 
the possibility of political responsiveness. 
Countering Sontag’s pessimism, in Frames of War, Butler considers the intersection of power 
and political representation in order to show how violent images participate in producing the realm 
of the visible and the knowable, thus contributing to the formation of the public space of politics. 
Questioning Sontag’s split of sensibility/intelligibility, Butler advocates a deconstructive reading of 
photography’s normative functions: images “frame” the visual field of knowability, while 
simultaneously threatening to undo those epistemic claims. Photographs, she argues, can “be 
instrumentalized in radically different directions” depending on how they are “discursively 
framed.”12 Because of their intrinsic iterability and re-contextualizability, images of violence and 
death operate both (1) as mechanisms of state control that regulate which bodies are presented and 
which are jettisoned from presentation, thus serving to structure modes of recognition that effect 
the differential distribution of grievability and (2) as a site of new possibilities for critical resistance 
to state-violence. This study assumes that there is no way to position oneself definitively on either 
side of this debate “for” or “against” images of death, all the while one must in each specific 
instance do so. The task is thus to understand how they are mobilized to enframe death and what 
possibilities for breakage they make possible. In this regard, I follow Butler more so than Sontag, 
because her twofold approach allows for both a critical Foucauldian gesture that diagnoses how 
images of death function to circulate power, as well what I will call a Derridean “quasi-
transcendental” gesture, that shows how images of death are also and at the same time, exposing the 
inherent weaknesses that underwrite attempts at visual mastery.  
 
 
10 Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others, 89. 
11 Siegfried Kracauer, “Photography,” Critical Inquiry 19, no. 3 (Spring 1993): 421–36; Saidiya Hartman, Scenes of Subjection: 
Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2010). 




Image & Death 
The second (older and interrelated) debate revolves around the question: What is an image? Again, we 
can identify two basic and seemingly incommensurate positions that recall the historical stalemate in 
photographic theory between what Geoffrey Batchen calls “formalist” and “constructivist” 
approaches to the image.13 According to the first position, the image finds its meaning in death. 
Death has been central to answering this question from Ancient Greece through the era of analogue 
photochemical processes. As Phillipe Dubois notes in his recent reappraisal of the discipline of 
photographic theory for October, the first vital years of photographic theory particularly in France in 
the 1970s and 1980s “opened onto essentialist, phenomenological, and even ontological” lines of 
questioning that sought to invent photography as theoretical object.14 Theorists (notably, Roland 
Barthes, but also Susan Sontag, André Bazin, Pierre Shaefer etc.) aimed to distinguish the new 
medium from other modes of visual representation largely through recourse to Pierce’s semiology, 
with its concomitant notions of “trace,” “index,” and “imprint” that linked the photograph to death. 
The photograph was theorized as an indexical imprint on a light-sensitive surface caused by the 
object it represents. The category of index sutured the photograph to its absent referent “like the 
condemned man and the corpse in certain tortures,” proposing an alliance with death, while 
ballasting the photograph’s status as evidence.15 This is the meaning of Barthes famous assertion: 
“Death is the eidos of that photograph.”16 Metz and Dubois similarly argue that photography is a 
kind of writing of death, or “thanatography,” which I trace in greater depth in the next chapter.17  
 “Constructivists,” on the other hand (such as Alan Sekula and John Tagg) foreground a 
Foucauldian analysis of “apparatuses” (dispositifs), which they apply to explain the operation of 
images in the capture, framing, and determination of that which they claim to passively represent. 
The latter accuse the former of an over-reliance on the categories of “death” and “index” that 




13 Geoffrey Batchen, Burning with Desire: The Conception of Photography (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006), 5-21. 
14 Philippe Dubois, “Trace-Image to Fiction-Image,” October 158 (2016): 155–66, doi:10.1162/OCTO_a_00275. 
15 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 1981), 6. 
16 Barthes, Camera Lucida, 15. 
17 Barthes, Camera Lucida, 15; Philippe Dubois, L’acte Photographique et Autres Essais (Paris, France: Editions Labor, 1992); 





Figure 1. Unidentified photographer, Commune de Paris. Baricade, Rue de La Paix. Vue Prise de La Place Vendôme Vers 




Figure 2. Andre Adolphe Eugene Disderi, Communards in Their Coffins. 1871. Photograph. Photo courtesy of Musée 





Barthes’ melancholic text Camera Lucida.18 Pointing to the ways photography’s mortiferous power 
has been deployed to construct, discipline, regulate, and marginalize bodies, these theorists aim to 
demonstrate how representation has been instrumentalized to (re)produce power relations. This is 
strikingly evident for example, in the deployment of early photographs by Adolphe Thiers’ police to 
identify and subsequently capture and execute Communards who posed on the Barricades during 
the 1871 insurrections during the Haussmannization of Paris (Figure 1-2). As Adrien Huart quips in 
Le chaivari, “All of the arrests being made at the moment are owing to collodion.”19 As I will show, 
this operationalization of images in regimes of power is evident today, for example, in the military 
deployment of long-range thermal infrared imaging technologies in mobile border security in the 
E.U. and the lethal circuit of drone vision in the Greater Middle East. 
This runs us up against the “impasse” of photographic theory which Geoffrey Batchen 
describes as a response to the “fatigue” around the primacy of Camera Lucida. Batchen describes his 
anthology Photography Degree Zero as an attempt to either revive, or “better yet,” exorcise it 
altogether.20 Contemporary image theorists have abandoned the discourse on death in the wake of 
the digital turn and the so-called “death of photography,” which has further displaced categories of 
index and referentiality. 
I mobilize deconstructive resources to forge a tertiary path through this supposed 
“impasse.” We need to address the question that dominated the first wave of photographic theory to 
develop a critical response to the pragmatic question that dominates the second wave of image 
theory when, as Phillipe Dubois puts “The question ‘What is photography?’ gives way to the 
question ‘What can photography do?’”21 In other words, we need to develop a political ontology of 
photography in order to be able to respond to the profusion of violent images that circulates with 
 
18 For an analysis of photography as a means of surveillance, subjectification, and truth-making see Allan Sekula, 
Photography Against the Grain (Halifax, NS: Nova Scotia College of Art and Design, 2016) and John Tagg, The Disciplinary 
Frame: Photographic Truths and the Capture of Meaning (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2010).  
19 Adrien Huart, “Chronique Du Jour,” Le Charivari, July 21, 1871, 4. For an account of photography’s relation to the 
Commune see Jeannene M. Przyblyski, “Revolution at a Standstill: Photography and the Paris Commune of 1871,” 
Yale French Studies 101 Fragments of Revolution (2001): 54–78, doi:10.2307/3090606. Barthes evokes this same image 
in Camera Lucida, 11. 
20 Geoffrey Batchen, Photography Degree Zero: Reflections on Roland Barthes’s Camera Lucida (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2011), 4. Damian Sutton similarly describes the project of Photography, Cinema, Memory as “something of a quest” to 
determine why photographic theory “stalled” with the publication of Barthes’ work. Damian Sutton, Photography, 
Cinema, Memory: The Crystal Image of Time (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), ix. 





such effectivity across spatiotemporal and political boundaries. However, I add a deconstructive 
twist to this formulation: I aim to develop a political “hauntology” of images, rather than a political 
ontology that draws on Derrida’s concept of spectrality. This deconstructive revision of 
photographic ontology (ontologie)—as spectralized hauntology (hauntologie)—destabilizes a number of 
binary distinctions (life/death, present/absent, actual/virtual, visible/invisible) that underwrite the 
formalist/constructivist distinction.  
However, Derrida provides neither a new theory of images, nor a systematic treatment of 
media. Rather, his writings on images—as a mode of differential light-writing—consist of a series of 
discrete, regional engagements.22 From these heterogeneous texts emerge a constellation of themes: 
memory and mourning, haunting and spectrality, technicity and death as a locus of political power. I 
will not engage the wide angles of Derrida’s work on images, nor will I simply delineate the relation 
between technical media and the deconstructive trope of haunting, others have done so with great 
rigor.23 Rather, this dissertation offers a selective reappraisal of Derrida’s work on technical images 
and visuality as they connect to the deconstruction of sovereignty advanced in a number of texts, 
but specifically, in the Death Penalty Seminar. I pull on the thread of “spectrality” to connect the 
 
22 Derrida’s interventions include essays solicited to accompany photographic publications, conversations on technical 
media, and eulogies for Roland Barthes and Louis Marin posthumously collected in The Work of Mourning. See for 
example, Athens, Still Remains: The Photographs of Jean-François Bonhomme, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas 
(New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 2011); “Aletheia,” trans. Michael Naas, Oxford Literary Review 32, no. 2 
(2010): 169–88, doi:978-1-58093-018-5; Jacques Derrida and Marie-Françoise Plissart, Right of Inspection, trans. David 
Wills (New York, NY: Monacelli Press, 1998); Jacques Derrida, Hubertus von Amelunxen, and Michael Wetzel, Copy, 
Archive, Signature: A Conversation on Photography, trans. Gerhard Richter (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010); 
Jacques Derrida and Bernard Stiegler, Echographies of Television: Filmed Interviews, trans. Jennifer Bajorek (Cambridge, UK: 
Polity Press, 2007); and Jacques Derrida, Thierry Jousse, and Antoine de Baeque, “Le Cinéma et Ses Fantômes,” 
Cahiers du cinéma, avril 2001, 75–85; Trace et Archive, Image et Art (Paris, France: éditions INA, 2014); Work of Mourning, 
trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2017). Derrida also appeared 
in a number of films: Ken McMullen’s Ghost Dance (1983), Safaa Fathy’s D’ailleurs, Derrida (1999), and Kirby Dick and 
Amy Ziering Kofman’s Derrida (2002).  
23 On Derrida’s relation to photography see Michael Naas, “When It All Suddenly Clicked: Deconstruction after 
Psychoanalysis after Photography,” Mosaic 44, no. 3 (2011): 81–98, doi:10.3366/drt.2017.0140; “‘Now Smile’: Recent 
Developments in Jacques Derrida’s Work on Photography,” South Atlantic Quarterly 110, no. 1 (December 21, 2011): 
205–22, doi:10.1215/00382876-2010-029; and Kas Saghafi, Apparitions—Of Derrida’s Other (New York, NY: Fordham 
University Press, 2010). On Derrida’s relation to cinema, see Louise Burchill, “Derrida and the (Spectral) Scene of 
Cinema,” in Film, Theory and Philosophy: The Key Thinkers, ed. Felicity Coleman (London: Acumen Press, 2014); Peter 
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deconstruction of sovereignty and images. If the discourse on sovereignty has shadowed Derrida’s 
writings on images, images conversely haunt his texts on sovereignty, such that each can illuminate 
the other. The concept of spectrality co-articulates sovereignty and images of death. Spectrality 
provides an infrastructural logic that acts as a pivot, or hinge, that allows me to connect political 
power and the visual field vis-à-vis different dominant scopic regimes of images of death.  
On the one hand, spectrality allows me to rethink the meaning of the image and its linkages 
with death. Drawing on Derrida’s interventions in photographic and media theory, I link the 
question of images and tele-technologies to the “logic of spectrality” to interrogate the ways in 
which the increasingly virtual political space is constituted through contemporary media, which is 
neither present/absent, living/dead, visible/invisible. Promulgated by the media, phantoms, 
specters, or revenants infiltrate the fabric of the globalized world, obliging us to think other possible 
futures for sovereignty. In this regard, I argue for the relevance of a deconstructive account of 
infrastructural ontology both for political analysis and visual cultures.24 In developing a 
deconstructive account of the spectrality of the image, I aim to shake loose from traditional 
paradigms of the image by critically reassessing the image’s alliance with death and the Western 
metaphysics of presence codified in the first wave of photographic theorizing. Derrida’s account of 
spectrality aligns the image with the deconstructive figure of the ghost, while disclosing an 
actipassive structure that enables us to think images simultaneously as passive representation and 
active invention.25 This helps us to account for both the “constructivist” intuition that images 
generate effects, produce events, circulate and consolidate the operations of political power in the 
in/visible realm, as well as the “formalist” intuition that images testify to absence and death. 
On the other hand, spectrality functions as a critical lever that pries open our inherited 
concept of sovereignty, exposing its internal complications. Sovereignty—whether that of the 
individual subject or the nation-state—is only constituted by way of a logic of differential iterability 
or “spectrality” that entails a degree of exposure to alterity, to which images of death gives us access. 
Images of death expose the tensions in this specific understanding of sovereignty, which projects an 
 
24 Ariella Azoulay develops a political ontology of photography in Civil Imagination: A Political Ontology of Photography, trans. 
Louise Bethlehem (New York, NY: Verso, 2015). For a helpful discussion of political ontology see Colin Hay, 
“Political Ontology,” The Oxford Handbook of Political Science, ed. Robert E. Goodin, September 2013, 
http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199604456.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199604456-e-
023. 




image of itself as pure life, cut off from the alterity of death and time. By crystallizing the tensions 
within our thinking of sovereignty, images of death focus both the power of images as a site of 
archival violence in relation to authoritarianism and state control, while simultaneously serving as a 
site of resistance. In short, images of death give us a helpful way of thinking about the possibility of 
a sovereignty responsive to the aporetic structure. 
 
Images Of Death 
I frame my investigations as a double genitive. The “of” in the formulation “images of death” 
associates at least two different uses of the genitive: subjective and objective.  
1. The phrase “images of death” refers to a typology of images that depict or portray corpses, the 
dead, or the dying. Sontag comments on the long pedigree of the iconology of suffering and death, 
from the Laocoön and Goya’s Black Paintings through images of Southern lynchings.26 Here I signal 
the usual genitive (possessive) case, namely, to “death” as an empirical event and iconic object of 
representation that we “take,” distribute, and consume—both as spectators and witnesses.27 Barthes 
calls this “Flat death” (Mort plate); Heidegger as we will see in a moment, calls this “vulgar” or 
ordinary concept of death.28 I am concerned with death it its material facticity and with its iconic 
(re)presentation in technical images, always with an eye to their political effects. In this regard, I take 
historically specific images of death that circulate—or fail to circulate—in contemporary media as 
the empirical site from which to examine the shifting configurations of sovereignty in its attempts to 
“master” death by repressing an originary relation to “spectrality.” As a study of iconic media, 
specific images of death ground this analysis in material objects with a history that can be dated and 
visually analyzed within specific regimes of power.  
2. The phrase “images of death” also refers (less conventionally) to “death’s own images.” That is, 
to images that belong to death. Death, in this second sense, is understood as the subject of every image, 
 
26 Susan Sontag, “Looking at War,” The New Yorker, December 2, 2002, n.p. 
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27 Images of death have been the topic of a number of prior studies, see Stanley B Burns, Sleeping Beauty: Memorial 
Photography in America (Altadena, CA: Twelvetrees Press, 1990); Michael Lesy, Wisconsin Death Trip (Albuquerque, NM: 
University of New Mexico Press, 2000); Barbara P. Norfleet, Looking at Death (Boston, MA: Godine, 1993); Jay Ruby, 
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because the image announces the absence (and thus death) of what it re-presents. In this regard, I 
speak of the structural “deathliness” of images and of the way that death itself images. Images, as 
Derrida enigmatically suggests, give seeing from “the point of view of death.”29 Here, the “subject” 
doing the seeing is the dead who regard us from the spectral channels of the media. In this second 
sense, I am concerned with the structural alliance of images and death.  
The preposition “of” in the phrase “images of death” marks the central axis of a chiasmus: it 
indicates a shifting point of association between the terms “image” and “death” that will concern us 
throughout, as well as a genitive that is both subjective and objective. Images of death are positioned at 
the intersection of death (as object) and death (as subject). The chapters that follow address both of 
these two aspects of the double genitive in shifting configurations. The deconstructive operation at 
work in my analysis is positioned on the threshold between these two registers, at times slipping in 
one direction or the other with greater weight and emphasis. Within the tension between these two 
sides of the double genitive lies a space of reflection about sovereignty.  
Hans Belting’s problematization of the difference between internal (mental) and external 
(technical or physical) images further specifies what I mean by the phrase “images of death.” As 
Belting rightly points out, the question What is an Image? requires a two-fold answer. Images are both 
mental and medial. On the one hand, images refer to mental constructs (dreams and imaginings) and 
sensible images of the visible world (what Aristotle calls phantasma).30 On the other, images refer to 
medium-specific forms of technicity. In the former case, the body is the “medium” for images we 
carry within us. How are these images displaced onto medial images? The distinction these two 
registers is unstable. Belting is rightly suspicious of it: “Images do not exist only on the wall (or on 
the TV screen), nor do they exist only in our heads. They cannot be extricated from a continuous 
process of interactions, and that process has left its traces in the history of artifacts.”31 Stiegler 
similarly concludes that “There have never existed physical images (images objet) without the 
participation of mental images, since an image by definition is one that is seen (is in fact only one 
 
29 Jacques Derrida, “By Force of Mourning,” in The Work of Mourning (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2017), 
147. See also Saghafi, Apparitions, 71.  
30 See Aristotle, De Anima, 428a 1-4. 





when it is seen). Reciprocally, mental images also rely on objective images in the sense that they are 
the retour or the rémanence of the latter.”32  
I am concerned with both sides of this analytic distinction and the relation between them at 
the threshold of death and power. My efforts to develop a political hauntology of photography 
complicates this analytic distinction by co-inscribing these two registers. Taking Life is concerned both 
with technical images of death and the imagination’s confrontations with mortality, with both 
“actual” and “virtual” images and their co-imbrication in what Derrida calls “actuvirtuality,” a term 
meant to deconstruct the modal distinction of the old philosophical distinctions of actual/virtual (E 
1-27).  
Itinerary 
Chapter 1, “Sovereignty, Spectrality, Image,” presents the main argument through an exposition of 
the three interconnected axes that organize this work: sovereignty-spectrality-image. I look at each of 
these interconnected terms in light of each other. First, I trace the different dimensions of the 
overdetermined concept of spectrality through Derrida’s work and argue for its explanatory power 
in linking images and sovereignty. Second, I delineate the “phantasm” of sovereignty. How has the 
Western tradition understood sovereignty? How is sovereignty conditioned by spectrality and what 
has the repression of this ineluctable spectrality given rise to? Third, I give an account of the analogy 
between images and death as it has been theorized from philosophy to contemporary theories of the 
image. Finally, I link up these three axes in my articulation of the double and deconstructive “logic” 
whereby sovereignty needs technical images to install itself, even as those same images expose its 
phantasmatic dimensions. I delineate this as a general “infrastructure,” which I call the “optic of 
spectrality.”33  
The optic has an explanatory function in the rest of the dissertation. The subsequent 
chapters deploy it as a framework from which to examine the production, circulation, and 
consumption of images of death in a series of visual provocations drawn from different archives, 
 
32 Bernard Stiegler, quoted in Belting, Anthropology, 5. Cf. Gilles Deleuze’s “virtual image” in “The Actual and the Virtual,” 
in Dialogues, ed. Clare Parnet, trans. Eliot Ross Albert (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1987), 148-159. See 
also, Leonard Lawlor, “A Nearly Total Affinity: The Deleuszian Virtual Image versus the Derridean Trace,” Angelaki 5, 
no. 2 (August 2000): 59–71, doi:10.1080/09697250020012197 for a critical comparison of Derrida’s notion of the trace 
and Deleuze’s virtual image. 
33 I borrow the term “infrastructure” from Rodolphe Gasché. We will see in the next chapter how this helps to specify 
the relation between deconstruction and Kant’s critical philosophy by assessing the ways spectrality functions as a 




historical, and geo-political contexts, as well as shifting scopic regimes, including death penalty 
photography, bystander recordings of extrajudicial police killings in the US, and the multifarious, 
networked images operative in drone strikes. Each chapter performatively engages another 
perspective—or cinematic “take”—of this general infrastructural optic, demonstrating the double 
logic of spectrality at play in shifting configurations of sovereignty and visibility.  
Chapter 2, “Time of Death: Photography and the Death Penalty,” mobilizes the optic of 
spectrality to examine the relation between sovereignty, visibility, and time in the analogue era and 
beyond, through a double reading of the anonymous 1939 film of Eugene Weidmann’s public 
execution by guillotine.34 Following Derrida’s invocation of a photograph of Weidmann in the first 
year of the Death Penalty seminar, I interrogate the theatrical and spectacular dramaturgy of capital 
punishment, which implies the exceptional right of the sovereign decide over the life and death of its 
citizens. Pulling at one of the minor threads that runs through the seminar, I examine sovereignty’s 
attempts to “master” death by “killing time” vis-à-vis the machines of execution and image-making 
(DP1 226).  
Derrida’s (largely implicit) engagement with Foucault’s historical thesis of the 
despectacularization of punishment grounds my interrogations of the relation between the 
nineteenth-century notion of photographic instantaneity and a certain concept of the instant of 
death mobilized in the Western onto-theology of the death penalty. The scene of Weidmann’s 
execution provides a lens to explore Derrida’s ideas about the visibility of power. Mobilizing 
questions about sovereign technicity and time, I interrogate Derrida’s assertion that the hallmark of 
sovereign power involves the right to command death in public spectacles that are still “visible”—
though more virtual—with today’s accelerated tele-technologies. I argue that images, which emerge 
as a contrapuntal theme in the seminar, provide a critical site for interrogating the desire to master 
death and spectrality by executing a death penalty. My analysis of the temporality of guillotine and 
classical photographic instantaneity allows me to deconstruct the putative instantaneity of death, 
while setting up the larger argument about the centrality of the visible appropriation of death as a 
site of political formation. I argue that images are one of the quintessentially modern sites of this 
operation and substantiate this claim through a reading of the instant in the chronophotography 
movement, Bazin, and Barthes. This analysis of the instant illuminates how sovereignty has 
 
34 An earlier version of  this chapter was published as “Phantasmatics: Sovereignty and the Image of Death in Derrida’s 




conceived of time in the history of Western thought. I conclude by sketching Derrida’s rethinking of 
the spectral structure of the photographic instant and its consequences for our thinking of 
sovereignty.  
Chapter 3, “Black Death,” rearticulates the double logic of the spectral optic to interrogate 
digital video images of extrajudicial police killings circulating across social media platforms. This 
chapter extends Derrida’s analysis by introducing entirely new instances of visual technicity into the 
discussion, while still remaining within a fundamentally Derridean optic. I examine police dash-cam 
video footage of the 20 October 2014 shooting of Laquan MacDonald by Chicago Police Officer 
Jason Van Dyke in Chicago to interrogate the intersection of race and sovereignty. I draw on critical 
race theory and black visual cultures to examine the relation between sovereignty, race, technicity, 
and the visibility of punishment, in the specific extension of white supremacist sovereignty. I argue 
that this historically and geopolitically specific configuration of sovereignty is a reactive terror 
formation that arises in response to a kind of ontological panic. Extending Derrida’s analysis of the 
death penalty through an engagement with Mbembe’s theorizations of “necropolitics” and “living 
death” (mort vivant), I argue that white supremacist sovereignty tries to master death by tethering it to 
“blackness” as racial alterity that can be brought under material and symbolic control through a 
series of terrorizing strategies, including the proliferating digital archive of dash-cam and body-cam 
video utilized by an increasingly militarized and death-prone US police state. Facilitating an analysis 
of the deathly trajectories of sovereign power that mark subalternity in the US, this second “take” of 
the optic of spectrality examines the double role of state-sanctioned spectacles of black suffering (1) 
as a mechanism of antiblack violence that regulates the dissymmetrical distribution of death and 
produces the black subjectivity as a form of “living death” (mort vivant) and (2) as a site of radical 
recuperation and critical resistance in radical black politics that exposes the white supremacy’s 
phantasmatic dimensions. 
Chapter 4, “The Operative Image, Drone Warfare, and the Survival of the Death Penalty,” 
examines the intersection of the death penalty, war, sovereignty, technicity and visibility. Operating 
outside the purview of the laws of war, David Wills has named the deaths perpetrated by Hellfire 
missiles as the “primary instance of the American attachment to the death penalty.”35 Interrogating 
this claim, this third “take” on the double optic of spectrality considers post-documentary works by 
the late German media theorist and image practitioner, Harun Farocki that interrogate tactical 
 




systems of surveillance under militarization projects and the ubiquity of “intelligent” image 
processing and weapons technologies deployed in the predatory “shadow theater” of drone strikes 
(BSII 259).36 I read these image operations as a symptom of what Derrida calls the “survival” of the 
death penalty. To understand Derrida’s enigmatic claim that the death penalty will survive its 
abolition, I turn to the second year of  the seminar, where he shifts focus from one Foucauldian 
intervention to another: that is from the question of  the virtual visibility of  power in DP1 to the 
question of  what constitutes an act or action and thus to the distinction of  making die and letting 
die, which is central to Foucault’s paradigm of  biopolitics in DP2. In the second year of  the seminar 
Derrida engages a broader concept of  the death penalty and its relation to the “impure” phenomena 
of  war (sovereign killing) and world hunger or AIDS (letting die). I argue that the drone—as a new 
distribution of virtualized visibility and an intensified form of the convergence of technologies of 
visual and military-industrial power, spectacle and surveillance—further blurs these distinctions 
between activity and passivity, actuality and virtuality, while situating this blurring within an account 
of the visuality of power. 
Building on Wills’ analysis of the drone’s spatiotemporal and necropolitical dimensions, I 
provide an account of the visual operations at work in this intensified, geopolitically specific 
extension of sovereign technicity, which tries to appropriate spectrality to master death and time in 
global space for the purposes of ontological security. Drawing on Farocki’s concept of the 
“operative image,” coined in the context of his discussion of automated warheads, I examine the 
function of lethal images in the context of an increasingly virtual, global, and electronic warfare that 
is displacing the old model of “border lines, front lines or theaters of war.”37 These military imaging 
technologies do not simply represent death iconically, but are part of the operations of state killing. 
Whereas chapter 2 focuses on analogue photography and chapter 3 on digital platforms, this final 
chapter discusses the “post-photographic” ethos of virtual and even invisible digital imaging 
technologies encoded in increasingly illegible forms of machine vision that are virtualizing visibility 
in ways that simultaneously effects global power and exposes sovereignty to its invisible underside.38  
 
36 See Harun Farocki, “Phantom Images,” Public 29 (2004): 12–22.  
37 Jacques Derrida, “Psychoanalysis Searches the States of Its Soul: The Impossible Beyond of a Sovereign Cruelty,” in 
Without Alibi, trans. Peggy Kamuf (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), 246. 
38 On the notion of  the “post-photographic,” see Joan Fontcuberta, “A Post-Photographic Manifesto,” in Vision Anew: 





Chapters 2-4 deploy the infrastructural optic of spectrality in performative engagements with 
images of death in order to demonstrate the double logic at play in shifting configurations of 
sovereignty. The oscillating movement of the spectral optic repeats in each chapter, building an 
accumulative force that displaces traditional linear, progressive argumentation. With each iteration, 
or cinematic “take,” I approach a different set of relations between sovereignty, spectrality, and 
images of death. In other words, each chapter articulates a new differential iteration of the same 
general logic operative within sovereignty, yet this logic manifests in different ways in different 
historical and geopolitical contexts. Together, these contextual engagements aim to provide new 
insight on a series of border struggles over the visible/invisible, virtual/actual, life/death. From 
these counter-histories of visuality emerges an understanding of sovereignty that is exposed to 
finitude and spectrality in ways that render it fragile and precarious.39 
 
Note On Method 
A few words about method and we’re off. First, this project is constitutively interdisciplinary. It is 
situated at the intersection of a number of borders: between the transcendental and the empirical, 
the conceptual analysis of philosophy and the fugitive objects of visual cultures, aesthetics and 
politics, etc. Part of the objective of such an approach is to problematize these borders. Taking Life is 
situated between disciplinary fields that have tended to neglect one other. As Margaret Iverson 
recently noted, philosophy and photographic theory are still largely ambivalent towards each other’s 
respective work.40 Discourses on sovereignty in political philosophy rarely question the visual 
regimes of power at work in the construction of individual subjects and the nation-state. As Mark 
Reinhardt puts it: “one can read widely in the political science literature on sovereignty without 
encountering much in the way of visual analysis.”41 Visual studies fares better. A few key theorists 
 
California Press, 2015), 254–63 and Camila Moreiras, “Joan Fontcuberta: Post-Photography and the Spectral Image of 
Saturation,” Journal of Spanish Cultural Studies 18, no. 1 (January 2, 2017): 57–77. 
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39 I borrow the term “counter-history of visuality” from Nicholas Mizeroff’s study of the ways that visuality functions to 
suture and naturalize power, while rendering these operations transparent. See The Right to Look: A Counterhistory of 
Visuality (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011). 
40 See Margaret Iverson and Diarmuid Costello, “Introduction: Photography between Art History and Philosophy,” 
Critical Inquiry 38, no. 4 (Summer 2012): 679–93. 
41 Mark Reinhardt, “Vision’s Unseen: On Sovereignty, Race, and the Optical Unconscious,” Theory & Event 18, no. 4 





take up the visual registers of power. Of particular import are theoretical and methodological 
interventions in Black visual cultures by Saidiya Hartman, as well as studies by Marie-Josée 
Mondzain and Ariella Azoulay that specifically examine the political vis-à-vis images of death.42 Yet, 
theories of the image, while privy to the operations of visual power, tend to smuggle ontological 
presuppositions into their work (even as they claim to distance themselves from ontology). For 
example, Lee Raiford’s Imprisoned in a Luminous Glare and Jennifer Malkowski’s Dying in Full Detail—
two exceptional works that deal extensively with images of death—rely on a so-called common 
sense knowledge of “death,” which is neither certain nor unitary and which this dissertation seeks to 
problematize.43 To counter these tendencies, the account of the linkages of political and visual 
power addressed in this dissertation engage a series of tactical maneuvers that bring together insights 
from various disciplines that deal with visuality: poststructuralism, photographic theory, film and 
media studies, critical race theory, and black visual cultures. The images of death interrogated here 
serve as a point of convergence rooted methodologically in the empirico-transcendental operations 
of deconstruction, as well as the field of visual culture studies, understood as a flexible point of 
intersection between aesthetics and politics, critical theory and curatorial practice, with each of these 
restlessly interrogating the others.44  
 
Spectral Inheritance 
The resulting concept of spectrality developed here is robust and interdisciplinary. It does not aim 
simply to explicate what Derrida has said about spectrality, but rather to develop its “logic” and 
pursue its ramifications in order to elucidate and critically assess the linkages between political power 
and the visual field through an examination of images of death. Spectrality affords an infrastructural 
logic that helps me assess the political life of images of death; this account helps me explain the 
 
42 See Ariella Azoulay, Death’s Showcase: The Power of Image in Contemporary Democracy, trans. Ruvik Danieli (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT, 2003); Susan Buck-Morss, “Visual Empire,” Diacritics 37, no. 2–3 (2008): 171–98, doi:10.1353/dia.0.0026; Marie-
José Mondzain, “Can Images Kill?,” trans. Sally Shafto, Critical Inquiry 52, no. 1 (2009): 20, doi:10.1086/606121; 
Sampada Aranke, “Black Power/Black Death: The Visual Culture of Death and Dying in Black Radical Politics” (PhD 
diss., University of California: Davis, 2008).  
43 See Leigh Raiford, Imprisoned in a Luminous Glare: Photography and the African American Freedom Struggle 
(Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2013) and Jennifer Malkowski, Dying in Full Detail: 
Mortality and Digital Documentary (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2017). 
44 I am indebted to W.J.T. Mitchell’s discussion of the social construction of vision in “Showing Seeing: A Critique of 
Visual Culture,” Journal of Visual Culture 1, no. 2 (2002): 165-181, doi:10.1177/147041290200100202; and Mieke Bal’s 
discussion of disciplinarity and visual cultures methodology in “Visual Essentialism and the Object of Visual Culture,” 




double logic of sovereignty and the function of images in framing, and thus determining, the 
meaning of death and the operations of power in capital punishment, drone warfare, and the 
trajectories of radical Black politics.  
Taking Life performatively demonstrates that images of death allow us to better understand 
the questions of philosophy and vice versa: spectrality helps me think through the deconstruction of 
sovereignty, which is already underway in images of death. Although Derrida repeatedly indicates the 
central import of spectrality for his thinking of teletechnologies, he does not explicitly develop its 
consequences for the deconstruction of sovereignty. Spectrality helps me assess the ways in which 
images of  death are inscribed in the order of  power; it discloses the multiple ways that the technical 
machines of  inscription, including photography but also film and increasingly virtualized visibility of  
networked regimes of  digital images, are deployed to “frame” and thus “master” death. The account 
of  media spectrality I develop contributes what Derrida calls the “critical culture of  the spectrality 
of  the media” (DE 45). In this regard, I seek to amplify critical literacy around the political function 
of  images. This requires critical visual theories and methodologies for reading and interpreting 
images and understanding their imbrication in networks of power. In bringing visual analysis to bear 
on the deconstruction of sovereignty, I elucidate the import of deconstruction for a thinking about 
images and for social theory of  visuality. Taking Life argues for the relevance of  deconstruction for 
debates in visual cultures about violence, war and cinema, witnessing and spectatorship, and the 
aesthetics of  necropolitics, while refocusing questions about the status and power of  images in the 
digital age. 
In exploring intersecting themes of  spectrality-sovereignty- images, I inherit Derrida’s legacy in 
ways that allow us to consider the political futures of the image. Rather than simply rehearsing 
Derrida’s arguments on photography or sovereignty, I am concerned with a thinking of the future 
they might make possible. Images of death are a site of critical inheritance through which the twin 
projects of memory and futurity are negotiated. Contrary to common sense, haunting—or being “in 
the wake,” to use Christina Sharpe’s formulation—is a way of dealing with the dead that “contrary 
to what good sense leads us to believe, signals towards the future” as much as the past (SM 99).45 
Futurity is at stake here, but a future that always enfolds the past into its wake in this relation of 
critical inheritance. “To inherit,” as Martin Hägglund notes, “is not simply to accept what is handed 
 





down from the master; it is to reaffirm the legacy in order to make it live on or survive in a different 
way.”46 Spectrality—with its figures of return, the revenant, and the phantom—is another word for 
this concept of critical inheritance, which always involves repetition and therefore also technicity. 
This inheritance—of spectrality and the images of violence analyzed in this study—is not a passive 
receiving. At the heart of any experience of inheritance is a decision to reaffirm and interpret (DE 
77).47  
Yet, as Toni Morrison shows in her novel Beloved, the ghost can also return “the worst” (le 
pire), and this return can foreclose on the future.48 Rising from the waters of memory, Morrison’s 
ghost story awakens a history of violence of slavery and its afterlives.49 I have grappled with this risk 
throughout this study, but most acutely in chapter 3, which resuscitates fraught archives of anti-
black violence enmeshed in historical processes of subjugation. In contending with these images one 
always runs the risk of re-inscribing their violence. This is why Hartman refuses to repeat the all too 
familiar “scenes” of terrorized black bodies. She reminds us that there is no way to escape from the 
fact that one is always implicated by images of violence.50 For my own part, I have chosen to look at 
and write with violent images, knowing that one still contends with them even when one refuses 
them, as Fred Moten argues, 51 and recognizing moreover, that these images have played a significant 
role in constructing my own positionality—as a white woman in settler-colonial nation, living and 
working with great privilege in an academy built on unceded Kanien’kehá:ka territory, thus as the 
beneficiary of a genocidal legacy of settler-colonialism.52 I take on this inheritance with a critical 
 
46 Martin Hägglund, Radical Atheism: Derrida and the Time of Life (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008),   
47 For a discussion of deconstruction and inheritance see Samir Haddad, Derrida and the Inheritance of Democracy 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2013), 124. Demonstrating the key role inheritance plays in Derrida’s 
thinking, Haddad develops a general theory of inheritance and shows how it is essential to democratic action. See also, 
Matthias Fritsch’s discussion of the relation between the structure of the promise, iterability and inheritance in The 
Promise of Memory History and Politics in Marx, Benjamin, and Derrida (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 
2005). 
48 For a discussion of “the worst” see Jacques Derrida, “Faith and Knowledge: The Two Sources of ‘Religion’ at the 
Limits of Reason Alone,” in Acts of Religion, ed. Gil Anidjar (New York, NY: Routledge, 2002), 100.  
49 Toni Morrison, Beloved (London: Vintage, 2016), 60.  
50 See Hartman, Scenes, 10. 
51 See Fred Moten, In the Break: The Aesthetics of the Black Radical Tradition (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2003), 4.  
52 My interrogations of the concept of sovereignty are rooted historically in European political modernity and thus in the 
colonial projects of “discovery” in the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries. They fail to address important 





awareness of the risk and ethical necessity of bearing witness. How do images of death hail and 
interpellate us? How do they haunt us? How does this haunting take place differently and 
differentially in different geopolitical and historical contexts and from different subject positions? 
Do they make us witnesses or spectators? What is our responsibility towards them and how can we 
respond to them? How moreover, is the capacity to bear witness raced and gendered? How in other 
words, do images of death function to generate political community of a given “we,” and at whose 
expense? In grappling with these questions, Taking Life seeks to establish the centrality of images of 
death in the modern concept of sovereignty, as well as its deconstruction.
 
between Derrida’s concept of “living on” (survivance)—yet another deconstructive concept in the orbit of spectrality—
and the concept of survivance proposed by Anishinaabe theorist Gerald Vizenor. A portmanteau of “survival” and 
“resistance,” Vizenor’s concept suggests a condition of resilience that reclaims Indigenous ways of knowing, while 
providing a critical lens for contemporary Indigenous art as a practice of resistance. Vizenor notes the intersection with 
Derrida’s concept in passing. See Spencer Mann, “Sovereignty: Do First Nations Need It?” Idle No More, December 23, 
2013, http://www.idlenomore.ca/sovereignty_do_firstnations_need_it and Gerald Robert Vizenor, “Aesthetics of 
Survivance: Literary Theory and Practice,” in Survivance: Narratives of Native Presence (Lincoln, NB: University of 




CHAPTER 1: SOVEREIGNTY, SPECTRALITY, IMAGE 
 
 







This chapter develops along three principal axes: sovereignty, spectrality, and image. I will look at each 
separately and in conjunction. I begin by tracing the various dimensions of Derrida’s “quasi-
concept” of spectrality through its formulation as a double, deconstructive “logic of the spectral and 
haunting, of surviving, neither present nor absent, alive nor dead.”54 I then provide a diagnostic 
schematization of the concept of sovereignty that Derrida aims to deconstruct. With Derrida, I 
argue that spectrality is the paradoxical condition of possibility (and impossibility) of sovereignty, 
but that the specific historically determined concept of sovereignty that Derrida calls “ipsocratic” 
attempts to repress its originary relation to death, finitude and alterity—or spectrality. In so doing, it 
gives rise to a consortium of “phantasms,” including the desire to “master” and control death. 
Having established the fraught relation between sovereignty and spectrality, I turn to images. 
Arguing for a visual register of both spectrality and the phantasm, I sketch a genealogical account of 
the analogy between the image and death. This “thanatography” clarifies how the image and its 
powers have been linked to death in various theories of the image from Ancient Greece through 
analogue photography and then to spectrality and prosthetic repetition in Derrida’s thought.  
Within the triad sovereignty-spectrality-image, spectrality functions as the “third” or “middle” 
term. Rather than mediating in the sense of Hegelian speculative dialectics (where the prior two 
would be subsumed as identity at a higher level), spectrality is heterogenous to both terms, yet acts 
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as a hinge (brisure) that allows me to connect the analysis of images to the deconstruction of 
sovereignty. I argue for the explanatory power of spectrality in Derrida’s thinking of sovereignty and 
images. Triangulating between these guiding axes allows me to clarify the “phantasmatic” structure 
of sovereignty inherited from political modernity. My goal is to pry this concept of sovereignty open 
with the “logic of spectrality” in order to expose its inherent tensions, weaknesses, and instabilities. 
This chapter culminates by developing the “logic of spectrality” into a general 
“infrastructure” that I call the “optic of spectrality.” The optic has an explanatory function in the 
rest of the dissertation. It serves as a heuristic device through which to analyze the production and 
consumption of images of death circulating in contemporary art and media. The optic holds 
together two contrasting thoughts and operations: on the one hand, it shows how images of death 
are deployed to “master” death and thus to stabilize the phantasm of “ipsocratic” sovereignty; on 
the other hand, images of death simultaneously expose a structural deathliness that destabilizes 
sovereignty, rendering it fragile and precarious. The optic guides my double-sided analysis in the 
remaining chapters, through a series of regional engagements, each of which aims to deconstruct 
sovereignty with images of death. 
 
Spectrality 
Spectrality has haunted Derrida’s thought since the 1960s, providing a “tenuous,” yet “indispensable 
guiding thread” from the early engagements with Husserl and Heidegger’s phenomenologies, 
through the late texts on teletechnologies (SM 236). What does spectrality mean in Derrida’s 
thought? What work does it do? And what effects does it produce? How is spectrality associated 
with the deconstructive figure of the ghost, haunting, and “hauntology”? In Specters of Marx, Derrida 
links the figures of the specter, the revenant, haunting, and spectrality, to a long thread of 
deconstructive “quasi-concepts” including différance, iterability, trace, supplementarity, etc. that 
Derrida has invoked in different contexts to problematize the “metaphysics of presence” through a 
radical rethinking of identity and presence as an effect of difference and iterability. It is therefore 
instructive to begin with différance and iterability before returning to the concept of spectrality that 








Différance & Iterability 
In his 1967 essay “Différance,” Derrida invents the neologism différance by substituting the ‘e’ of 
difference with the phonetically silent ‘a.’55 Différance famously condenses two modes or registers of 
difference—spatial differentiation (differer, to differ) and temporal deferral (differer, to defer)—in a 
movement, which is both active and passive, and which opens the (re)production of  phenomenal 
appearance and signification. On the one hand, différance names an “interval, a distance” or empty 
spacing between elements in a signifying system.56 In the context of his discussion of Ferdinand 
de Saussure’s structural semiology, Derrida shows that meaning is not closed or synchronically 
present to itself, but rather emerges from the “systematic play of differences” that condition the 
possibility of signification. The minimal meaning of any identity, like any given sign, is always 
haunted by that which it is not. Identity only emerges, in other words, by way of a differential detour 
through all those other meanings from which it differs and thus cryptically incorporates. On the 
other hand, this spatial differentiation means there is no coming back to identity full circle. Rather, 
identity remains indeterminate—always temporally deferred and disseminated. Identity is always 
subject to a temporal delay that retrospectively organizes meaning, while setting loose an infinite 
chain of possible referrals. The upshot: every sign and by extension everything that appears as 
present-being is haunted by an ineliminable absence and non-presence that Derrida associates with a 
principle of death within life. The presumed presences we take for granted could never appear, 
according to Derrida, “without difference as temporization, without the non-presence of the other 
inscribed within the sense of the present, without the relationship with death as the concrete 
structure of the living present.”57 
This brings me to “iterability,” or difference in repetition. In “Signature, Event, Context,” 
Derrida uses iterability to describe the “logic which ties repetition to alterity.”58 As opposed to the 
classical concept of repetition (in which what returns is identical to the original, which precedes in 
an order of causal and ontological priority), iterability names an originary or spectral repetition that 
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co-implicates identity and difference. Instead of thinking repetition as a modification of a prior 
presence, iterability helps us think identity as an effect of differential repetitions that are spaced out in 
time. The meaning for example of any linguistic sign is never given as a full self-presence. Rather, it 
needs to be repeated in order to be understood and shared by others in an intersubjective context. If 
différance means that nothing is self-identical to itself from the beginning, then identity is always on 
the go. Identity needs to come back to itself; it lives off of returning to itself. Iterability refers to this 
relation between repetition (associated with technical machines and automaticity, thus with a 
principle of death that haunts all identity) and singularity, according to which a principle of 
repeatability is internal to singularity, while the two nonetheless remain heterogeneous to one 
another. “Any unity of identity needs to be established by a never-ending process of relating to itself, 
or self-repetition,” as Matthias Fritsch notes. Iterability is “originary” in the sense that it is logically 
and temporally prior to any recognizable unity, including the sovereign self and state.59 Moreover, 
this ongoing self-repetition always implies the partial absence of the repeated. This non-present 
alterity precedes and gives to identity. In this sense all identity is spectral—ghostly or revenant. 
 
The Logic of Spectrality 
In later works, including Specters of Marx (SM) and Echographies of Television (E), différance and iterability 
take on the new guise of spectrality. Spectrality is yet another name for this movement according to 
which identity is spaced out and temporally deferred: 
The concept of the spectral … has much in common with the concepts of trace, or 
writing and différance, and a number of other undeconstructable motifs. The spectral is 
neither alive nor dead, neither present nor absent, so in a certain way every trace is 
spectral. We always have to do with spectrality, not simply when we experience 
ghosts coming back or when we have to deal with virtual images. (DE 43-44) 
Like différance, spectrality refers to an originary non-coincidence or non-simultaneity between the self 
and itself. Spectrality refers to an “originary” spatiotemporal structure of differential iterability that is 
the condition of possibility and impossibility of any phenomenal appearance. Spectrality conditions 
the emergence of all phenomena, including the phenomenon of sovereignty, but it simultaneously 
demonstrates the instability of all forms of identity—from the minimal idealization of the sign 
through the individual subject and the political entity of the sovereign state. At one and the same 
 




moment, spectrality renders identity possible (there is no identity without spectrality) and impossible (in 
the sense that identity is never absolved of its relation to heteronomy, alterity, time, and death) (DE 
5). In other words, spectrality promises all phenomena a necessary but fleeting stability, while at the 
same time rendering those same phenomena ineradicably—and aporetically—unstable. Spectrality is, 
first and foremost, an account of how the present, identity, etc., comes to be given in the first place. 
According to Derrida, the present is ghostly, and this ghostliness is ineliminable because the present 
emerges only from and with the non-present and the absent, etc. To appear as ghostly is therefore the 
very condition of appearing at all. Like différance and iterability, Derrida’s concept of spectrality can 
be understood as an attempt to name an aporetic relation between sameness and otherness, identity 
and difference.  
Yet, spectrality adds a new chain of associations and displacements to the “older” 
deconstructive concepts. Condensing the differential economies of delay and non-simultaneity with 
the deconstructive figure of the ghost, spectrality invokes a consortium of phantoms and 
apparitions, as well as the spatiotemporal modes of haunting or revenance. While the ghost is an “old” 
term that has been used since Plato to refer to the inferior position in conceptual hierarchies, 
Derrida mobilizes the specter catachrestically, as a kind of “paleonym” to displace the binary logic of 
Western conceptuality.60 In Derrida’s paleonymy, the ghost already demonstrates a kind of repetition 
with difference. Spectrality is a slippery and overdetermined concept, hence Derrida’s recourse in 
Specters, to the ambiguous idiomatic expression “plus d’un,” which has at least three meanings. This 
expression can be translated as no more one (no identity without spectrality), more than one (never just 
one, but always a plurality or a community, self + others; the ghost is never univocal), and rather 
ominously, more of one (a lot more of one, the most one, in the superlative sense).61 Deconstructive 
fidelity to the specter is a fidelity to the plus d’un (SM xx). 
 
60 For Derrida’s discussion of paleonyms see Derrida, Positions, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
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that of counting by ones to that of counting without number one, or of taking account of the other than one. “In 
French, then,” Kamuf continues, “it is possible to say all that at once, or rather to write it, because this pluralization of 





Although the concept or “schema” of the ghost haunts a number of Derrida’s early texts for 
example, Dissemination, The Postcard, and Of Spirit, where it intersects with the “problematics of the 
work of mourning, idealization, simulacrum, mimesis, iterability” (SM 232), it is with the 1993 
publication of Specters that spectrality is named the proper “medium” of deconstruction; in this 
analysis of Marx, spectrality is linked to the themes of technology and value, justice and mourning. 
In Echographies of Television, a conversation with Bernard Stiegler filmed at the Institut national de l’ 
audiovisuel in 1993, roughly contiguous with Specters, Derrida confirms that spectrality is “de facto a 
deconstructive logic.” “It is in the element of haunting,” he says, that “deconstruction finds its most 
hospitable place in the very heart of the living present (présent vivant)”(E 131). 
However, the “logic of spectrality” is not strictly speaking a “proper” logic. Rather, it names 
an irruptive logic that makes legible the indetermination concealed by classical Greek conceptuality. 
Spectrality disrupts logic in all its figures, from reason to logos (as a verbal and conceptual economy 
of gathering, circularity and exclusion). Derrida deploys it as a strategic “lever” to forestall the 
closure of the metaphysics of presence by pointing to the aporetic contradictions that inhabit it.62 
The “logic” of spectrality is always a deconstructive and double. Like Freud’s theory of the drive, or 
Blanchot’s neuter, spectrality is an aporetic logic that simultaneously inhabits “both sides of the limit 
between two opposing concepts” (BS2 185). The figure of the ghost is a privileged deconstructive 
figure because it is at once both (and yet neither): present/absent, actual/virtual, visible/invisible, 
living/dead, present/absent etc. Spectral logic is not an “either/or” logic, but rather a “both/and” 
logic. The specter is both present and absent, both visible and invisible, both living and dead.  
The thematization of the ghost aims to deconstruct the traditional determination of a limit 
between life and death, while exposing the ways in which the philosophical priority given to the 
living conceals the spectrality within life:  
To try to accede to the possibility of this very alternative (life and/or death), we are 
directing our attention to the effects or the petition of a living-on or survival [une sur-
vie] or of a return of the dead (neither life nor death) on the sole basis of which one is 
able to speak of ‘living subjectivity’ (in opposition to its death). (SM 232) 
Attending to what Derrida here calls “living-on” or “survival” (survie), or what he will in other 
moments call “lifedeath” (lavielamort), the specter helps us rethink life not as opposed to death, but 
 





as a kind of “economy of death” within life.63 To survive is never to be fully present in itself, but 
rather to open every moment to the trace of the past and the future that give rise to the present. 
Derrida inveighs upon us a vigilance before the frontier that is supposed to divide life and death. 
The rehabilitation of the ghost disrupts, displaces, and unravels the logic of binary oppositions that 
structures Western philosophy and scientific rationality.  
Within the general frame of this “elementary spectrality” (spectralité élémentaire) Derrida further 
determines spectral dimensions that link spectrality (1) to a politics of mourning and (2) to vision 
and visuality.64 
1. Hauntology and Spectral Justice: in Specters, Derrida links spectrality to a politics of memory and 
mourning and therefore to questions of justice and responsibility: “being-with specters would also 
be, not only but also, a politics of memory, of inheritance, and of generations” (SM xviii). This 
brings us to deconstruction’s ethical and political stakes. Spectrality gives way to a politics that 
articulates the non-living onto the living. Because spectrality gives rise to a present that is always 
riven by the non-present, Derrida coins the neologism “hauntology.” Playing on the silent slippage 
in between near-homophones of a “critical, pre-deconstructive” ontology (ontologie) and a 
deconstructive “hauntology” (hantologie), Derrida argues that spectrality precedes, prefigures, and 
displaces Western philosophy’s traditional understanding of being as presence advanced in broad 
strokes from Plato through Husserl and even Heidegger (SM 170-1). The discourse on specters 
proceeds in the name of a claim for justice that does not restrict its responsibility to the presently 
living, or the “living present” of Husserlian phenomenology. Such delimitations sidestep the ethical 
claim of the non-living (i.e. the dead and the unborn) on the present. The hauntological injunction 
was a major catalyst for the “spectral turn” in the humanities and literature in the 1990s, where the 
figure of the ghost was mobilized both as a metaphor and critical concept to address a series of 
social, ethical and political questions about memory and historical trauma.65 
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2. Visuality. Hauntology rearticulates différance with a renewed emphasis on vision and visibility. 
The terms “specter” and “spectrality” are linked etymologically to the Greek phainesthai, (“to 
appear”) and thus to visibility, spectacle, and spectatorship. As Kas Sagafi notes, the English term 
“ghost” condenses a number of related archaic and Attic Greek terms, including “eidōlon, phantasma, 
phasma, and psuchē” that “designate a category of doubles hovering between life and death, the real 
and the unreal.”66 These terms have been translated into the philosophical lexicon of Western 
thought, as I will show in the thanatography that follows, as imago and then “image,” which retains 
linkages to death, in shifting historical configurations. According to W.J.T. Mitchell, Specters 
catalyzed a shift in the humanities from the “linguistic turn” towards the imagistic or “pictoral 
turn.”67 Spectrality proves particularly useful for theorists of visual power because it critically 
complicates traditional phenomenologies of vision first, by showing that visibility and invisibility are 
intertwined and second, by showing how vision is tied up with prosthetic technologies (DE 18-23). 
Spectrality points towards an invisible, which is “included within the experience of the visible” (DE 
18).68 The specter wavers between the visible and the invisible, the material and immaterial. Rather 
than signaling simply a sensible object, spectrality refers to visible presences that emerge through a 
recourse to the nonvisible, nonpresent other (E 115).  
Moreover, whereas traditional phenomenologies of vision avoid or even repress the question 
of prosthetic technology and the “virtualization and digitalization of the field,” spectrality gives an 
account of how vision is imbricated with technological processes. The thematic of the phantom, the 
revenant and spectrality are “essentially connected to the question of the technical prosthesis, of 
technics in general” (FWT 159). Visuality is organized by technological-political machines of 
inscription: photography, film, television, the internet and digital technologies, are our contemporary 
forms of the specter. According to Derrida, “our critical, political relation to visual culture today 
 
66 Saghafi, Apparitions, 67. 
67 See Mitchell, “Picturing Terror,” 277–90. However, the linguistic and the visual should not be understood as 
oppositional concepts. Derrida’s differentiated concept of “writing” (écriture), is by no means restricted to a phonetic-
alphabetic model. Instead, it refers to a more general differential model of meaning emerging in relation to alterity. In 
this regard, spectrality alludes also to the play of light and dark, seeing and not seeing, visibility and invisibility. In 
Echographies Derrida refers to a “pictographic” model of writing concerned with “optical space” (E 22; 103-4). 
68 Consider for example, Ulrich Baer’s mobilization of spectrality to analyze the parallels between the structure of 
photographic images and the experience of historical trauma, which is never present to consciousness. See Ulrich Baer, 
Spectral Evidence: The Photography of Trauma (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005). On the parallelism between psychic 
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should take into account these complications” (DE 22). Spectrality provides a critical resource for 
understanding the linkages between the operations of power and the invisible field, which is 
transforming at an unprecedented speed with the hyper-digitization of virtual images. 
 
Sovereignty 
Having rehearsed this spectral topography, I will now turn to my second axis: sovereignty. What is the 
relation between spectrality, death, sovereignty and its deconstruction, which Derrida takes up most 
explicitly in later works, such as Rogues (R) and the Death Penalty seminars? By articulating the link 
between spectrality and sovereignty, this section will set the stage for an interrogation of the role of 
images in the triadic axes: sovereignty-spectrality-image. 
But first, I will sort through the different senses of sovereignty in Derrida’s thought. I 
discern two distinct meanings. At the most general level, Derrida argues that every living thing 
(including individuals, but also institutions and collectivities) strives for its own maintenance and 
existence—or “sovereignty”—over time. There would be no life without sovereignty, which names a 
kind of fleeting, but necessary stability over time. In this first general sense, sovereignty refers to the 
differential movement that produces the identity of life by returning to itself from dispersion. 
Derrida’s crucial move is to argue that identity is only accomplished through an ineliminable passage 
to the other, to death and spectrality. Sovereignty thus means something like self-identity, which is 
only accomplished in and through spectrality. Whereas the desire for sovereignty is constitutive and 
therefore never simply eliminable, Derrida insists that self-identity can only ever be attempted, never 
presupposed. Where self-identity is presupposed, sovereignty will give rise to “phantasms.” 69 
 
69 The term “phantasm” comes from the Ancient Greek phántasma (phantasm, an appearance, image, apparition, specter) 
from phantázō (I make visible). It thus belongs to the same semantic “family” as phenomenon—both are semantically 
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traveling into scholasticism, particularly through Aquinas’ commentaries. Tracing the historical contours of the 
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Phantasm is a technical term in Derrida’s work. Broadly conceived, it refers to forms of projection, 
figuration, fantasies and imaginary constructions. In “Comme si, comme ça,” Michael Naas 
describes the phantasm as a kind of specular slippage, or projection, between two disparate 
modalities of the as if of “speculative fiction” and the as such of “inflexible law.” The phantasm of 
sovereignty is a “performative fiction” that tries to pass itself off as “constative observation.”70 In 
Paper Machine, Derrida explains that the word condenses “the image, spectrality, and the 
simulacrum—and the weight of desire, the libidinal investment of affect.”71 The phantasm—and this 
definition is unduly elliptical—refers to our belief in a particular kind of phenomena that putatively 
has no relation to différance, iterability, or spectrality. In short, the phantasm of sovereignty refers to 
the belief in a phenomena of sovereignty as pure life, cut off from death and spectrality. 
This second meaning of sovereignty refers to a specific modern, humanist theory of 
sovereignty inherited from European political modernity (specifically, from Hobbes, Bodin, and 
Schmitt). The understanding of sovereignty, which Derrida says, has its origin in censorship and 
repression (BS2 155), refers to a kind of fable, or as if, of the political onto-theology of sovereignty.72 
Derrida calls this determined concept of sovereignty the “phantasm” of “pure sovereignty,” or 
“ipsocratic” sovereignty (R 100-101). It is this historically determinate sense of sovereignty, 
associated with psychic mastery over death, that Derrida aims to deconstruct. 
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What are the basic features of this phantasm of “ipsocratic” sovereignty? How does Western 
philosophy—or the metaphysics of presence—think sovereignty? Derrida’s first gesture is 
diagnostic: he gives an account of the generalized logic that organizes this classical concept of 
sovereignty. Its general structure can be schematized with five general traits: (1) indivisibility, (2) 
autonomy, (3) closure, (4) instantaneity, (5) spontaneity. All these characteristics are interlocked and 
mutually reinforcing, so that in expounding one, I may presuppose another.  
First, indivisibility: sovereignty involves a claim to self-coincidence, self-identity, or what 
Derrida calls “drive to ipseity” (BS2 103). Sovereignty must remain indivisible. As the early modern 
political philosopher Jean Bodin argues, sovereignty is absolute, hence it cannot be shared or 
divided.73 In Rogues, Derrida traces this claim to indivisibility back to the principle of ipseity. “Ipse” is 
the Latin translation of the Greek “autos,” which means “self” and “same.” Ipseity names a self-
relation that forms the central axiom of sovereignty “before any sovereignty of the state, of the 
nation-state, of the monarch, or, in democracy, of the people” (R 11). Ipseity is the very “essence of 
sovereignty” (R 100). Tracing the etymological filiation between the French même, or same, the Latin 
metipse and ipseity (which share the Latin root ipse), Derrida argues that the sovereign “is he who has 
the right and the strength to be and to be recognized as himself, the same, properly the same as himself” 
without distance or hiatus (BS1 3). The classical concept of sovereignty is thus grounded in a notion 
of the “self-same [même]” as an indivisible, stable identity of the self, as sameness devoid of 
difference and alterity (R 11). Sovereign is alone, solitary, separate—like an island.  
Second, autonomy: sovereign ipseity is understood as the unconditioned source of its own 
power and authority. Ipseity suggests both an understanding of indivisible self-identity as well as a 
concept of self-moving power or potency:  
Ipseity names a principle of legitimate sovereignty, the accredited or recognized 
supremacy of a power or a force, a kratos or cracy. That is what is implied, posed, 
presupposed, but also imposed in the very position, in the self- or autopositioning, of 
ipseity itself everywhere there is some oneself, the first, ultimate, and supreme source 
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for every “reason of the strongest” as the right [droit] granted to force or the force 
granted to law [droit]. (R 11) 
Ipseity condenses (as though through some optical device) the different registers of “the self” as 
intentional consciousness with the “power, potency, sovereignty, or possibility implied in every ‘I 
can.’” It involves a “power that gives itself its own law, its force of law, its self-representation” (R 
11). Ipseity glosses a principle of action, power, or force (kratos) that finds its source within itself: it 
gives itself its own law and answers to no other. Sovereignty’s “auto-positioned power-to-be-
oneself” involves a performative authorization of power.74 As Max Weber puts it, the sovereign 
“claims the monopoly of legitimate force for itself,” and this autonomy places the self-ruled outside 
the shared law (nomos) of the community.75 Sovereignty is anchored to a concept of power to be 
master of oneself, as well as the house, the city, or the state, and finally, of death. 
Third, closure: sovereignty is understood according to a principle of “circularity or 
sphericality.” Sovereign autonomy is thought from within the circular self-enclosure of the self. 
Derrida describes the self as structured by a turning around itself. The ipseity of “the One, the autos 
of autonomy, symmetry, homogeneity, the same” is described as a closed circle of exchange 
modeled on Aristotle’s “unmoved mover”—which is at once the first principle and final cause of 
eternal movement around itself, all the while remaining “unmoved” at its center (R 12).76 The 
sovereign self is a circle that begins from itself, goes out into the world, and returns to itself, 
gathering itself to itself, in a “specular, self-designating” fashion. This self-ruled circularity designates 
an economic principle of re-appropriation, according to which the self (auto) affects itself by 
faithfully returning to itself as though through the closed system. Derrida calls this “auto-affection.” 
Hence his recourse in Rogues, to the terms “revolt,” “volt,” the turn, and return; to the closed figures 
of the wheel and the circle; and the Odyssean trajectories traced in his reading of Robinson Crusoe’s 
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circling around his solitary “Island of Death,” in the second year of the Beast and the Sovereign 
seminar. Just as the Westphalian model of nation-state sovereignty has been associated with 
territorial closure, the sovereign self is understood as a solitary island that is closed upon itself and 
clearly divided against death and the sea, which serves as the pivot to Sea of Images, part of the 
curatorial component of this dissertation.77   
Yet, Derrida shows that the circle is never closed: each time the self returns to itself as living 
it is only by way of a passage through finitude, death, alterity, or the other (heteros). Derrida calls this 
necessary condition of life exposed to and affected by the other, “hetero-affection.”78 Sovereignty 
(of the self or the state) only becomes what it is by returning to itself, but each repetition also 
introduces the alterity that is constitutive of identity. Another way to say this: the self—as conceived 
by this model of sovereignty—is never fully closed or present to itself, rather it always involves an 
originary exposure to the other, to death, and to time.  
Fourth, instantaneity: this circulatory economy tends towards simultaneity. The auto-affective 
enclosure of the self-turning towards itself ideally takes no time. Sovereign ipseity tries to possess 
power autonomously and indivisibly and this means contracting power into a moment—an instant 
of action or decision—and paradigmatically, the moment of the death penalty, “without any thickness 
of time” (R 10-11). Sovereignty dreams of annulling time by drawing itself towards the “strange 
necessity of the zero” (R 13). Derrida describes the moment proper to sovereignty as “the stigmatic 
point of an indivisible instant” (R 100). Sovereign indivisibility is linked (as I argue in my discussion 
of the guillotine and the Western philosophy of time in chapter 2) to a notion of the instant 
understood as a point that is aporetically both within and outside of time. According to the 
philosophy of time associated with the sovereign moment, sovereignty is not in time. Sovereignty 
imagines itself as synchronic and eternal, a-historical and a-temporal. It imagines that it is not 
exposed to finitude. As Fritsch points out,  
The sovereignty of Eurocentric humanism consists in seeking to master death by 
pin-pointing it as the end of life, by dreaming of “killing time,” and with it 
affectability by others, as Derrida puts it near the end of the first year of the Death 
Penalty Seminar (DP1, 226/308; see also Rogues 109/154). Because subjection to time 
and change signals receptivity, suffering, and relation to others, to contract time into 
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an instant is to attempt to master time, to kill it, and to render the self sovereign 
invulnerable to alterity.79  
This drive for psychic mastery over death and alterity manifests in various attempts to take life. At 
the extreme, this deployment of power takes the form of those the sovereign state chooses to kill, 
literally, for example, by executing a death penalty (chapter 2), in state-sanctioned killing (chapter 3) 
and war (chapter 4). 
Finally, spontaneity. Sovereignty involves a claim to spontaneous generation that excludes 
technicity. Sovereignty says it has no need for technē, technics, or prosthetic repetition. The attributes 
of the machine—repetition, automaticity, supplementarity (in short, death)—appear to be antinomic 
to the spontaneity of sovereignty. Sovereignty’s claim to spontaneous generation excludes or 
represses the question of technology, and specifically, its relation to prosthetic images, as a specific 
form of technicity. This repression follows from a long lineage of the Socratic tradition. In the 
Phaedrus, Socrates famously argues that philosophy has no need of writing. Processes of external 
memory would corrupt living memory and lead to forgetfulness.80 Following this, philosophy 
relegates technicity to a secondary status. For this reason, images have been understood as posing a 
threat to sovereign spontaneity. Ancient allegories teach us that images are deadly: Narcissus is 
turned to stone by his own reflection.81 
Derrida by contrast, is a thinker of original technicity. On his account, sovereignty has a 
technological, even prosthetic structure: sovereignty is “the product of a mechanical artificiality” 
(BS1 27). One cannot deal with sovereignty “without dealing with the immense question of what is 
called technology, the technology of the living being” (BS1 187). Sovereignty needs processes of 
inscription to stabilize itself over time and these modes of externalization are also spatial processes 
of materialization. Technics, including media, images, writing, etc. are originary in the sense that 
sovereignty needs to reassert itself through a movement of technical différance. Sovereignty only 
“comes to itself by virtue of technical mediation, that Derrida calls “differential of technē” in 
 
79 Matthias Fritsch, Taking Turns with the Earth: Phenomenology, Deconstruction, and Intergenerational Justice (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2018), 190. 
80 Simon Critchley gives a helpful summary of Derrida as a thinker of “originary technicity” in Ethics, Politics, Subjectivity: 
Essays on Derrida, Levinas and Contemporary French Thought (London, UK: Verso, 1999), 172-174. The other critical 
reference in this regard is Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus, trans. Richard Beardsworth and 
George Collins (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998). 





Specters, or what I will call sovereign technicity (SM 192).82 This differential iterability animates a 
shifting menagerie of machines (mystic writing pads, typewriters, computers; gramophones, 
telephones, photographs, films, the internet, etc.) that haunt Derrida’s work.83 ⁠  These are not 
simply a set of techniques external to life and temporality. We do not “add” them to a sovereignty, 
which is already spontaneously present to itself. Rather, the whole problematic of technology is 
internal to sovereignty: there is always a certain sense of technē or technicity at work in sovereignty. 
Sovereignty lives off differential iterability, which involves repetition and difference; it needs 
methods of mechanical inscription to install and stabilize itself over time. However, these modes 
technical extension are expressed in different ways at different historical moments, including the 
need for tele-technological forms of taking life and witnessing death, as well as technological 
extensions of visualizing the spectral field of police and military power.  
We can recapitulate the general structural features of the phantasm of ipsocratic sovereignty 
in five traits: (1) indivisibility, (2) autonomy, (3) closure, (4) a-temporality, (5) spontaneity. According to 
Derrida, these characteristics endure across historical mutations of sovereignty from Bodin through 
Schmitt. The phantasm of sovereignty involves a claim to indivisibily, but it is in fact divisible and 
conditioned by exposure to the other. It says it is a-temporal—it even tries to “kill time” by 
contracting it into an instant—but it is fundamentally exposed to finitude and spectrality. Finally, 
sovereignty says it is spontaneous generation, with no need of technicity or of images, but in fact, 
sovereignty has recourse to images all the time! As we will see throughout, sovereignty needs 
processes of technical inscription in order to install itself and guarantee its stability over time, but 
these very processes also make sovereignty vulnerable to its own undoing. 
 
Quasi-Transcendentality 
Despite its tenacity, Derrida argues that this model of sovereignty is on the wane. It is undergoing an 
“auto-deconstruction”: sovereignty is failing, as Geoffrey Bennington puts it.84 This failing is not 
simply a historical or empirical observation; rather, it is inscribed within this very concept of 
sovereignty, such that all the empirical signs of its waning are indications of the general structural 
instability of sovereignty. I have reached the central thread of my argument: this concept of 
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sovereignty is governed by a paradoxical double logic. It is “phantasmatic” insofar as it imagines 
itself as pure life, cut off from death. Yet—and here’s the rub—sovereignty cannot do without 
unconditional exposure to mortal finitude. Sovereignty is made possible by the alterity of death and 
time, which it nonetheless attempts to repress and control when it “takes life,” for example, by 
executing a death penalty or by representing death in spectral images. Spectrality is sovereignty’s 
condition of possibility and, by the same token, that which renders it fragile and precarious.  
Whereas Derrida’s first deconstructive move is critical-diagnostic, his second deconstructive 
move is a “quasi-transcendental” gesture that seeks to expose the necessary conditions that make 
sovereignty possible. In Kantian terms, we can say that spectrality is the condition of possibility for 
sovereignty. Kant’s transcendental method involves arguing back from the “given” of experience to 
the necessary conditions required for the way experience is given. Following Kant (but also Husserl 
and Heidegger), Derrida is interested in sovereignty’s necessary conditions. In this sense, he is a 
responsible guardian of the heritage of the transcendental project. Yet, spectrality is a strange kind of 
transcendental: Derrida calls it a “quasi-transcendental.”85 The deconstructive prefix “quasi” 
introduces two qualifications that transform and radicalize the critical project.86 Derrida’s quasi-
transcendentals (spectrality, différance, iterability, etc.) are (1) conditions both of possibility and 
impossibility and (2) they serve to rearticulate the relation between the empirical and the 
transcendental. 
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Genealogy, Deconstruction, and Politics, eds. Penelope Deutscher, Olivia Custer, and Samir Haddad (New York, NY: 
Columbia University Press, 2016), 184-231. 
86 Khurana, “Derrida, Foucault, and the Transformation of the Transcendental Question,” 196. Derrida puts it this way 
in “Signature, Event, Context”: “the condition of possibility of those effects is simultaneously, once again, the 





First, Derrida’s general possible/impossible formula is as follows: what makes a given 
phenomenon possible also makes its rigorous purity impossible. Différance is the condition of 
possibility of meaning, yet it makes this very meaning possible only by way of a differential 
constitution that simultaneously makes all attempts to definitively stabilize meaning impossible. 
Spectrality—as the articulation of spatial difference and temporal deferral—makes sovereignty 
possible, but simultaneously makes it impossible—if by sovereignty we mean something that is 
stable, final, closed, synchronically present, or “ipsocratic.” Spectrality teaches us that sovereignty is 
always aporetic. As Thomas Khurana explains, Derrida’s aim is to reconceive our notion of 
enabling, as well as our sense of success and failure: “The point,” he asserts, “is not to claim the 
ubiquity of failure nor the sheer impossibility of definite success, but rather to point out the complex 
way in which success is only won against, in, and even through ‘failure.’”87 This is another way to 
construe Bennington’s claim: sovereignty is always haunted by failure and this very failing is 
constitutive of its success. 
Second, spectrality, as quasi-transcendental, re-describes the relation between the empirical 
and the transcendental as one of mutual contamination. Deconstruction is concerned with the 
possibility of philosophy’s relation to “non-philosophy,” or the empirical domains of the social 
sciences (anthropology, linguistics, psychoanalysis—as much as visual culture) that analyze empirical 
material. Disrupting the traditional hierarchy that separates the conditioned (the empirical) from that 
which conditions (the transcendental), Derrida’s “quasi” shows that transcendental conditions are 
always irreducibly related to the empirical phenomena they make possible. Repetition, for example, 
cannot be thought apart from what is repeated.88  
In part, this is because the quasi-transcendental refers to the condition for all phenomena, 
yet “is” nothing “in itself.” Spectrality is neither present nor absent, active nor passive—it designates 
an originary gap or absence—the spacing of time—that makes it impossible for anything to be in 
itself.89 For this reason, it cannot be rigorously isolated. Derrida demonstrates that that facticity of 
phenomena philosophy claims to ground always contaminate concept-formation in advance. 
Philosophy, as Fritsch puts it, “remains tied to historical, factical context, and it remains afflicted 
with a certain contingency.”90 At the same time, the human sciences and their empirical objects 
 
87 Khurana, “Derrida, Foucault, and the Transformation of the Transcendental Question,” 198. 
88 See Derrida, Of Grammatology, 162.  
89 See Hägglund, Radical Atheism, 3.  




(including the images of death) never wholly determine philosophical method. The “quasi” 
negotiates both sides of this empirico-transcendental difference.  
In presuming that identity is something that can be presupposed, sovereignty has covered 
over this quasi-transcendental logic. Ipsocratic sovereignty disavows, all the while drawing upon, the 
spectrality that is its ineliminable condition. The phantasm emerges when sovereignty denies or 
represses the spectral disidentification that institutes it (BS2 103).91 As Naas argues: “When the 
specter of life-death is repressed, what takes its place is the phantasm of pure life. Life without 
technique or without the machine, life that has not yet been compromised by death or 
representation—that, in the end, is the phantasm.”92 The political onto-theology of sovereignty is 
tied up with the production of, and fascination with, phantasms, as a kind of “reactive formation” 
that attempts to purify itself of the very spectrality that precedes and gives rise it.93 It will therefore 
always be necessary to deconstruct this phantasm.  
And yet, if the phantasm is a fiction, it is nevertheless a necessary one! In Kant’s terms, the 
phantasm involves a kind of “necessary illusion” of purity that we need to function in the world, 
insofar as it is co-constitutive of sovereignty—though it need not take this exact onto-theological 
form. We will never be done with this desire for identity, and thus with phantasms, nor can we simply 
recognize the phantasm as false and be rid of it. The phantasm is not simply an illusion that can 
dispelled simply by pointing to the “truth”—“like an image to reality,” as Naas says—because the 
very notion of truth is ultimately one of its effects. The phantasm is not “some imitation, image, or 
representation” or even misrepresentation that could be dispelled by opposing it to the real.94 
Instead, it needs to be understood as a kind of projection “on the part of a subject or nation-state of 
the way one would wish them to be—and, thus, in some sense the way they become, with all their 
real, attendant effects.”95 The phantasm has a performative power: it is not true, yet it is always more 
 
91 Naas, “Comme si, comme ça,” 190.  
92 Naas, Miracle and Machine, 225. 
93 Naas, “Comme si, comme ça,” 197. 
94 When Naas says that the phantasm cannot be thought under the usual conceptual oppositions of illusion/truth, or 
image/reality, he posits what I believe is more than a coincidental analogy to the phantasm to the image. Naas tells us 
that the phantasm cannot be thought from within the old Platonic network of mimesis that treats the image as a 
secondary reproduction, depleted of power and affect. This is certainly right. However, as I will argue here, this 
association of image and phantasm needs to be reconsidered in terms of Derrida’s spectral revisions to the meaning of 
the term “image.” Like spectrality, the phantasm belongs to a visual lexicon to which Derrida returns throughout his 
work. In the second year of the Beast & the Sovereign seminars for example, Derrida suggests the need to trace the 
linkages “between phantasm, visual image and imagination” (BS2 154). 




than false. The aporia is that we must both explain the emergence of the phantasm along with its 
historical ineluctability, all the while still allowing its deconstruction to take place.  
 
Image 
This brings me to my third axis—image. How are images of death related to the quasi-transcendental 
questioning of sovereignty outlined above? What links power to death and death to the image? How 
are prosthetic images—as a form of differential iterability—deployed to supplement sovereignty’s 
attempts to “master” death? To understand this, we need to turn to the old analogy of image and 
death.  
The meaning and function of the image has for a long time—though in different ways—
found its answer in death. This section sketches a genealogical account of the analogy between the 
image and death, as it has been understood both in Western philosophy and in contemporary 
theories of the image. This will elucidate how the image and its powers have been linked (1) to death 
in various theories of the image from Archaic Greece through the classical ethos of analogue 
photography and then (2) to spectrality and differential iterability in Derrida’s thought.  
 
Thanatography 
“Photography,” writes Sontag, “has kept company with death ever since cameras were invented, in 
1839.”96 In the nineteenth century, at the advent of photography, the West was preoccupied with 
death and embraced its representation. Confined by heavy camera technologies and slow emulsions 
that required subjects to remain immobile for the duration of long exposure times, the British 
photographer, William Henry Fox Talbot turned his lens to the graveyards of England (Figure 3). In 
America, Alexander Gardner and Timothy O’Sullivan produced a series of stereoscopic wet-plate 
collodions of the Confederate dead “ranged in ghastly rows for burial” on the blasted battlefields of 
Antietam and Gettysburg (Figure 4).97 In France, Félix Nadar exposed a hundred plates of the  
 
96 Sontag, “Looking at War,” np.  
97 Emily Godbey offers a provocative reading the phenomenology of Civil War stereoscopy in “‘Terrible Fascination’: 
Civil War Stereographs of the Dead,” History of Photography 36, no. 3 (2012): 265–74, 
doi:10.1080/03087298.2012.672225. The American photographer Sally Mann revisits these “Imperial landscapes,” (to 
borrow W.T.J. Mitchell’s term), in her 2002 series What Remains, which takes its title the last stanza of President 
Abraham Lincoln’s 1863 Gettysburg Address. Using the nineteenth-century collodion wet-plate process, Mann’s 






Figure 3. Sir Henry Talbot Fox, The Tomb of Sir Walter Scott, in Dryburgh Abbey. 
1841. Salted paper print, 40.7 x 35.6 cm. The Metropolitan Museum of Art. 
Photo courtesy of Wikimedia commons. 
 
Figure 4. Timothy O’Sullivan, Gettysburg, Pennsylvania [Confederate Dead, View Looking toward the Orchard on the Rose Farm, July 5, 1863]. 
1863. Stereograph - wet collodion process. LC-B811- 260 LOT 4168. Photo courtesy of the United States National Archives. 
  
 
images of death only hint at a history of racist violence that inheres in these Southern landscapes. See Ayelet Carmi, 
“Sally Mann’s American Vision of the Land.” Journal of Art Historiography, no. 17 (2017): 2–26. For W.J.T. Mitchell’s 
analysis of the function of landscape in the social construction of history see W.J.T. Mitchell, Landscape and Power. 




subterranean “cité des morts” below the surface of Haussmann’s Paris using new magnesium 
lighting. Nadar’s images show a labyrinthine maze of ossuaries where the skulls of guillotined 
aristocrats and revolutionaries are juxtaposed in an aleatory relation with the bones of their 
executioners (Figure 5).98 The Paris above—the Paris of the living—could, as Jean-Pierre Arthur 
Bernard notes, at any moment be swallowed, digested by the Paris below—the Paris of void and 
death.99 There was moreover, the whole custom of taking post-mortem portraits of the dead, which 
played an important role in Victorian mourning practices (Figure 6), as well as the Spirit Photography 
movement that sought to capture ghosts and other paranormal manifestations that made spectral 
appearances in early photographic emulsions. According to modern esoteric spiritualists, 
photography facilitated communication with the dead who delivered enigmatic oracles through the 
haunted medium.100 Summarizing this neatly, a journalist writing for The Athenaeum described Talbot 
Fox’s 1844 publication The Pencil of Nature as “a wonderful illustration of modern necromancy,” thus 
linking the nineteenth-century medium to death and to communication with the dead.101  
 
98 Nadar gives an account of his descent into Parisian chthonic depths in “Le dessus et le dessous de Paris.” His essay 
appeared in Paris-Guide par les principaux écrivans et artistes de la France, deuxième partie, la vie (Paris: Librairie Internationale, 
1867), 1569–91, which was published for the Second International Exposition of 1867, when the Second Empire is at 
the height of its power. Walter Benjamin would later describe the exhibition as the most radiant unfolding of the 
“phantasmasmagoria of capitalist culture” in “Exposé of 1935,” The Arcades Project, 7. Nadar recycles much of this 
material in a section titled “Paris souterrain aux catacombes et égouts” in his biography Quand j’étais photographe (Paris: 
Ernest Flammarion, 1899), 99-112. The abridged English translation published in October, omits this vignette. See 
“When I Was a Photographer,” trans. Thomas Repensek. October 5, no. Photography (Summer 1978): 6-28. 
99 Jean-Pierre Arthur Bernard, Les deux Paris: les représentations de Paris dans la seconde moitié du XIXe siècle (Paris: Editions 
Champ Vallon, 2001), 164-167. See also Shao-Chien Tseng, “Nadar’s Photography of Subterranean Paris: Mapping the 
Urban Body,” History of Photography 38, no. 3 (2014): 233–54 and Émile Gérards, Paris-souterrain (Paris: Garnier frères, 
1909), 448. 
100 Photography’s relation to mourning and memory is underscored in a number of historical studies focusing on 
photographic representations of death and more specifically, on post-mortem photography and its sociological 
function. See for example, James Van Der Zee’s funeral portraits collected in The Harlem Book of the Dead; Stanley and 
Elizabeth Burns’ studies of mortuary practices in America gathered in Sleeping Beauty: Memorial Photography; Ruby Jay, 
Secure the Shadow: Death and Photography in America; and Audrey Linkman, Photography and Death (London: Reaktion 
Books, 2012). See Rebecca Comay, “Proust’s Remains,” October 144 (Spring 2013): 3–24, for a discussion of Proust’s 
deathbed portrait. For a fascinating account of the rise and fall of sprit photography see Fred Gettings, Ghosts in 
Photographs: The Extraordinary Story of Spirit Photography (Montreal, QC: Optimum, 1978;) and Louis Kaplan, The Strange 
Case of William Mumler, Spirit Photographer (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2008). 





Figure 5. Felix Nadar, Catacombes de Paris: Crypte N°8. 1861. Positive photograph on 
albumen paper, 22,4 x 18,8 cm. Department of Stamps and Photographs. Photo 
courtesy of the Bibliothèque nationale de France. 
 
Figure 6. Atelier Nadar, Victor Hugo. 1900. Positive photograph on albumen 
paper. Department of Stamps and Photographs. Photo courtesy of the 





The ubiquity of representations of death in the medium’s first decade demonstrates a 
fascination with capturing death in images. While death could never be known “in-itself,” the 
processes, practices, and social functions of death were mediated by images. Early efforts to register 
death allowed it to be discursively framed, examined, confirmed, and categorized, giving a sense of 
control over death: Nadar’s images of the Paris underworld mediated death’s reintegration back into 
the solar order of the living; Gardner’s Civil War stereoscopy confronted the traumatic rupture 
caused by a new experience of death in the age of mechanized warfare.  
The nineteenth-century fascination was broadly reversed in the twentieth when, as the 
French historian of death Phillipe Ariès famously writes, a “great silence” settled over the subject of 
death in the West.102 In the context of death’s denial in the West, images of death (in the first, 
objective or iconic sense of the double genitive traced in the introduction) fell under a widespread 
indictment: no more images of death. Post-mortem photographs, once a crucial mediator in social rituals 
of death and mourning, were deemed pathological. There are many indices of this inversion in 
attitudes towards the representation of death. Here are two. First index: in “The Pornography of 
Death,” sociologist Geoffrey Gorer argues that the denial of death has given rise to a morbid 
fascination with a surfeit of “pornographic” representations of death in the media.103 Second index: 
echoing Gorer, in his 1949 text “Death Every Afternoon,” Bazin voices a metaphysical prohibition 
of cinematic representations of death: “Like death, love must be experienced and cannot be 
represented (it is not called the little death for nothing) without violating its nature… the 
representation of a real death is also an obscenity, no longer a moral one, as in love, but 
metaphysical.”104 Gorer and Bazin co-index two intertwined prohibitions against death: one moral, 
the other ontological.  
 
102 Philippe Ariès, “The Reversal of Death: Changes in Attitudes Toward Death in Western Societies,” American Quarterly 
26, no. 5 Special Issue: Death in America (December 1974): 537. See also Ernest Becker, The Denial of Death. London: 
Souvenir Press, 2011. For Derrida’s discussion of Ariès’ sociological thesis vis-à-vis Heidegger see Aporias, 43-59. For 
Foucault’s implicit engagement see his discussion of the anatamo-clinical concept of the body in his Introduction to 
The Birth of the Clinic. Translated by A.M. Sheridan (London, UK; New York, NY: Routledge, 1989), ix-xxii; see also 
Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France 1975–1976, trans. David Macey (New York, NY: Picador, 2003), 
248-9. 
103 Geoffrey Gorer, “The Pornography of Death,” Death, Grief, and Mourning (New York, NY: Doubleday, 1955), 192–9. 
104 André Bazin, “Death Every Afternoon,” Rites of Realism: Essays on Corporeal Cinema, ed. Ivone Marguiles, trans. Mark A 





Interestingly, a number of new theoretical frameworks emerge in the midst of this “reversal” 
in attitudes towards death and its representation, which link the photographic image structurally to 
death. The image’s death-reference thus exceeds the typology of nineteenth-century iconicity. 
Barthes (to whom we will return in more detail in the next chapter) is the most famous proponent 
of the analogy of the image and death. Writing in the wake of his mother’s death—and on the 
precipice of his own—Barthes’ Camera Lucida considers “the anthropological place of Death,” in 
view of the “crisis” of death diagnosed by his colleague Edgar Morin in L’homme et La Mort.105 As 
death disappeared from culture, it re-emerged in the image: “photography may correspond to the 
intrusion, in our modern society, of an asymbolic Death, outside of religion, outside of ritual, a kind 
of abrupt dive into literal Death.”106 Death, Barthes famously concludes, is the “eidos” of the 
photograph.107 In L’acte photographique, Dubois argues that photography is the writing of death, or 
“thanatography.” The photographic act “thanatographs” things. The immobile temporality of the 
photograph executes time in order to save it.108 Sontag echos Dubois: “every photograph is a kind of 
momento mori. To take a photograph is to participate in another person’s (or thing’s) mortality, 
vulnerability, mutability.”109 Death, in Alan Cholodenko’s words, “animates the photograph.”110 
Summing up the analogy of the photograph and death rather neatly, film theorist Christian Metz 
argues that the photograph’s stillness and immobility link it figuratively to death, which he opposes 
to the flow of cinematic time.111 Sontag’s formulation is even sharper: “Life is a movie; death is a 
photograph.”112  
The notion of thanatography marks the resurgence of an older concept of the image that 
precedes photography and proleptically prepares for its advent. I will take a detour through this 
before returning to photography. In Vie et mort de l’image, Régis Debray writes: “the birth of the 
image is partly linked to death. But if the archaic image springs from the tombs, it is in refusal of 
 
105 Edgar Morin, L’homme et la mort (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2002). 
106 Barthes, Camera Lucida, 92. 
107 Barthes, Camera Lucida, 60. Edgar Morin, L’homme et La Mort, Paris: Buchet-Chastel, 1951. Barthes and Morin would 
go on to establish the Centre for the Study of Mass Communication at the Ecole pratique des hautes études in Paris, now 
known as the Edgar Morin Center at École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS). 
108 Dubois, L’Acte Photographique, 160.  
109 Sontag, On Photography, 15.  
110 Alan Cholodenko, “Still Photography?” Afterimage 32, no. 5 (April 2005): 5. 
111 Metz develops the notion of thanatography in “Photography and Fetish,” 81–90. 





nothingness and to prolong life.”113 Hans Belting’s analysis of the image and death in The 
Anthropology of Images provides a critical resource. Tracing the analogy back to archaic societies, 
Belting discerns two different concepts of the image in Western thought, which are linked to death 
with different sociopolitical effects. Each of these concepts bears out differently in relation to 
funerary practices. I will describe these under the headings of the Greek eidōlon (a term invoked by 
Barthes without much by way of explanation), and the Latin imago.  
1. Eidōlon: Belting notes two “faces” of the eidōlon in Ancient Greek culture: Archaic and Classical. 
The archaic eidōlon represents an absent body by way of a process of presentification. This comes 
close to what Derrida means by “image,” albeit with some critical differences. In this first paradigm, 
eidōlon designates the soul (psychē) of the dead that flies away from the corpse in the form of a non-
corporeal shadow, phantom, or double. The taxonomy of eidōla in archaic Greek culture includes the 
crude effigy or idol erected in stone (kolossos), the dark shade associated with the power of the dead 
(psuchē), the dream-image (oneiros), the shadow (skia), and the apparition (phasma).114 The function of 
the archaic eidōlon was both (1) to translate the power of the dead into a visible form and (2) to 
symbolically reintegrate the dead back into the order of the living in earth-bound Archaic Greece. 
Eidōla are not iconic images, but rather a process of making-present or “presentification” that gave 
material form to an absence. The archaic eidōla played a pivotal role in mourning and funerary rites 
in the Iliad, Homer’s epic description of battlefield deaths during the last weeks of the Trojan War. 
Mourning took place by way of the image of death, which finalized absence by giving the departed 
 
113 Régis Debray, Vie es mort de l’image: Une histoire du regard en Occident. Paris, France: Gallimard, 1992: “La naissance de 
l’image a partie liée avec la mort. Mais si l’image archaique jaillit des tombeaux, c’est en refus du néant et pour 
prolonger la vie. La plastique est une terreur domestiquée” (16).  
114 This aniconicity of the image of death in the Greek funerary cult led Jean-Paul Vernant to posit a split between the 
archaic theory of the ‘double’ and the Platonic theory of the ‘image’ (eidōlon) under the Classical theory of mimēsis 
sketched by Xenophon in Memorabilia III.11 and Symposium IV.21, and formalized by Plato in Sophist 265b–266d. 
Because Archaic Greece privileged the new medium of embodiment as an image of death over iconic representation, 
Jean-Pierre Vernant tells us that image is not the right term for these aniconic symbolizations. Instead, he uses the 
category of the ‘double’ to refer to the taxonomy of eidōla in archaic Greek culture. Vernant defines the term “image,” 
“properly speaking” as the outcome of a historical process that crystallized at a pivotal point in the fifth century as “an 
imitative artifice.”114 The archaic Greek category of the double, is thus, according to Vernant “completely different” 
from the category of the image.114 For Vernant then, category of the double is not an image of dead, because it does not 
resemble the physical appearance of the deceased, but rather functioned as the substitute for the absent corpse. Belting 
rejects Vernant’s division of double/image on the grounds that it presumes a narrow Platonic concept of the image by 
assuming a criterion of resemblance that already belongs to Platonic theory of mimesis (108). See Jean-Pierre Vernant, 





new material form. Similarly, non-iconic images (like the kolossos) could be installed in the place deserted 
by the dead. The image was considered a symbolic substitute that pointed to empty place of the 
dead: “The image of the dead, in the place of the missing body.”115 The kolossos was supposed to 
attract and then fix, immobilize, and localize the elusive puschē that “flits around forever elusive” at 
once everywhere and nowhere—spectral, as Derrida would say. In so doing, the eidōlon mediated 
between the world of the living and that of the dead. They served, in Baudrillard’s terms, as a site of 
“symbolic exchange” between life and death.  
This archaic concept of the image (eidōlon) underwent a significant shift in Classical Greek 
culture when Plato introduced a new hostility to images. This is the second “face” of the eidōlon. In 
Book 10 of the Republic, Socrates condemns images (whether in art, music, or poetry) as secondary 
imitations: with this the archaic eidōlon is reduced to a copy, a degraded reproduction. Positing a 
clear-cut dualism between the real, intelligible image (eidos) and the sensory image as copy (eidōlon), 
Plato argues that the sensory world is a copy of the intelligible Forms, art is a copy of a copy, twice 
removed from truth.  
Alongside the rigid opposition of eidos/eidōlon, in the Sophist (a text Derrida engages in Athens 
Still Remains), Plato further distinguishes between the good repetition of the true image (eikōn) and 
bad repetition of the false image (phantasma), within the larger category of the eidōlon, in order to 
distinguish philosophy from sophistry.116 Following the Platonic method of division (diairesis), the 
Eleatic stranger discerns two kinds of images, or rather, two kinds of relation between the original 
and its copy, along with two different practices of dealing with appearances (phantasai): correct and 
incorrect. According to Plato’s mimetic paradigm of representational verisimilitude, the “likeness” 
(eikōn) (from which the English ‘icon’ is derived) conforms to the truth, providing adequate 
representation of the model, which precedes it causally and ontologically. The likeness (eikōn) 
reproduces the true proportions of the original. It is a correct image and therefore the only thing that 
can properly be called an image.117 On the other hand, “bad repetition” produces false images—
phantasms, semblances, or apparitions. Examples of phantasmata include dream images, reflections in 
water, mirror images, and ghosts. As opposed to the philosopher who makes likenesses (eikastikē), 
 
115 Belting, Anthropology, 107, 84 and 308. 
116 Plato, Sophist, 236a-b. 





the sophist is involved in apparition-making (phantastikē) that distorts the proportions of the 
original.118 Accusing it of emptiness and illusion, Plato defines the phantasma as a false likeness.119 He 
attempts to purify image of ruse by dividing the eidōlon into two categories: one true (eikon), the other 
false (phantasma) and banishing the phantasma with its diffuse meanings (as kolossos, psuche, dream-
image, and most of all as apparition) from the concept of the representational image as Classical, 
mimetic eikōn.  
With this, the concept of the image could no longer fill the gap left by the departed, but 
rather became a metaphor for death: the image “was itself like death.”120 When the world of 
appearance dissolved into semblance, images were stripped of their archaic function. As Derrida has 
shown in Dissemination, Plato’s critique of images is impelled by a desire to defend against prosthetic 
forms of memory, which he considers dead externalizations (hypomnēmata) that threaten to corrupt 
living internal memory (mnēmē) by duplicating death. Even the good kind of repetition threatens 
living memory with death: in “letting themselves get stoned [medusé]” images sink into forgetfulness 
and in so doing increase the “domains of death, of non-truth, of non-knowledge.”121 The Platonic 
critique of images leads to the famous indictment banning the tragedians’ deathly images from the 
ideal Republic. Plato, who sought to overcome the fear of death by seeking within it the truth of an 
immortal soul, argues that Homer’s poetic representation of death in the Iliad induces fear into the 
Athenian polis, thus threatening a properly human relation to death.122 
 
118 Plato, Sophist, 235a10-236d8.  
119 Plato, Sophist, 234c. Whereas eikōn comes from the Greek verb eokia (to be like), which has been uniformly translated 
in English as “likeness” (rather than transliterated as ‘icon’), phantasma comes from phantazesthai (to make appear) 
which is related to the more general phantasia (appearance).119 Giving rise to a slippery knot of translations, including 
“semblance,” “appearance,” “simulacra-phantasma,” “apparition,” the term phantasma resists stabilization. It 
disseminates itself through a sematic shifting that associates it with an excessive logic haunted by dispersal, absence, 
and the risk of unmeaning. (Even so, Derrida says that his specter is not the Platonic phantasma.) For F. M. Cornford’s 
translation of phantasma as “semblance” see Plato, “Sophist,” Plato: The Collected Dialogues, trans. F. M. Cornford, ed. 
Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1989). Cf. Noburu Notomi’s translation as 
“apparition” in The Unity of Plato’s Sophist: Between the Sophist and the Philosopher (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), 147; and Allan Silverman’s translation as “appearance” in “Plato on Phantasia,” Classical Antiquity 10 no.1 
(1991): 123-47. 
120 Belting, Anthropology, 111. 
121 Derrida, Dissemination, 105. 
122 Plato, Republic, §386b. In Plato, for whom the sole “aim of those who practice philosophy in the proper manner is to 
practice for dying and death,” the virtuous citizen should neither fear death nor grieve their dead, and must have 
courage to stand firm in the face of death (Phaedo, 64a). Plato therefore prohibits public displays of grief along with the 





2. Imago: Roman culture gave rise to yet another paradigm of the image. The imago retains the 
Platonic sense of the image as icon (eikon). However, with this second (third or fourth, depending on 
how one counts) concept, the Platonic fear of simulacra gives way to an iconocratic cult of 
imitation.123 The Latin imago came to mean “copy, imitation, likeness, picture,” but also “phantom, 
ghost, apparition,” thus glossing over the Platonic division of the eidōlon into eikon/phantasma. Imago 
referred to any copy or likeness (Aquinas argues for an etymology that links the Latin verb imitari to 
imago), but also more specifically, to the ancient Roman funerary practice of making portrait-masks 
of the faces of the dead in cast wax, which were carried and sometimes worn in funerary processions 
and displayed in the atrium of noble Roman households. 124 The imago provided the living with an 
image of departed fixed at the instant of death. Roman mourning rituals maintained the archaic 
 
proper attitude towards death. This education includes the metaphysical doctrine on the immortality of the soul and 
new regulations for the city. There is no reason to fear death says Plato, because the soul (which is “deathless, 
intelligible, uniform, indissoluble, always the same as itself”) survives the body (which is “mortal, multiform, 
unintelligible, soluble and never consistently the same”) (Phaedo 80ab). Moreover, following Solon’s legislation against 
“set dirges” (thrêneîn pepoiêména), Plato prohibits of the lamentation and representation of the dead—a critical part of 
Attic Greek mourning rituals—because they formed a threat to the political organization of the city by inviting fear of 
death. Homer and Hesiod’s poetic representations of battlefield deaths and the shadowy Underworld traversed by 
drifting “shades” of the dead similarly introduced fear of death and thus threatened the ability to act courageously in 
the face of war, illness, and dangerous voyages on the high seas. On the Athenian statesman and lawmaker Solon’s 
funerary legislation, see Plutarch, Plutarch’s Lives, trans. John Dryden (New York: Modern Library, 2001), 21.4. 
123 Cf. Marie-José Mondzain’s discussion of the onto-theological heritage of iconic images in “Can Images Kill?” She 
argues that Greco-Roman culture was the first to explicate the philosophical and political import of iconic images as a 
symbolic reflection of power directly instrumental in its conquests. According to Mondzain, the Platonic fear of 
simulacra gave way to an iconocratic “cult of imitation” that inaugurated an unprecedented “reign of the image” (20). 
124 In Natural History, Pliny says that the main purpose of the imago was for funeral ceremonies (35.6). This practice 
formalized a political economy of the image. Ancient Roman law reserved the right to the imago to sovereign nobility 
according to the concept of the Jus imaginum / jus imaginis (right image), a modern term coined on the basis of a passage 
in Cicero’s In Verrem that describes the legal right to display a portrait and thus transmit one’s image for posterity as a 
privilege belonging only to those who held office (5.14). The visual iconocracy of the Jus imaginum was controlled 
through a series of restrictions laid down by the state that mandated the conditions of public exhibition the image of 
death. According to a circular logic of enclosure, only the magisterial class had the right to images and only those with 
images were granted the right to hold public office. By delimiting the privilege and authority of the imago, the Roman 
Empire ensured the lineage of forefathers would survive by the ancestral image that mandated the order of inheritance. 
See Pliny, Natural History: A Selection, trans. John F Healy (London; New York: Penguin Books, 2004) 31.I.6; Polybius, 
The Histories, trans. Robin Waterfield (Oxford UK; New York NY: Oxford University Press, 2010) VI.53; R.N. 
Wornum, “Some Account of Greek and Roman Portraits,” The Classical Museum, Volume 4, ed. Leonhard Schmitz. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge, 1847), 47-65; and Harriet I. Flower, Ancestor Masks and Aristocratic Power in Roman Culture 
(Clarendon: Oxford UK,1996), 53–9. Debray comments in passing on the imago and Jus imaginum in Vie et mort de l’image 
(Paris: Gallimard), 19-22. See also Belting’s fascinating account of Roman funerary practice in “Pompes Funèbres in 





belief in the power of images as a mode of symbolic communication with the dead. In the cult of 
ancestors, the absence of the dead was supplemented by their representation in images, which 
established a linear mode of inheritance through paternal images (imago). The image was the means 
by which the living secured continuity with their lost ancestors, by preserving their presence in the 
form of an image. This served, in Louis Marin’s words, as a kind of “ontological transfer” of power 
and authority to the image.125  
This morphology leaves us with three different theories of the image that have organized the 
political relation to death in a distinct fashion. Under the Greek paradigm of eidōlon (with its internal 
divisions of Archaic/Classical, and then further under the Platonic distinction of the Classical 
concept eikon/phantasma), first, as a process of non-iconic materialization that mediated between the 
living and the dead; second, as a mimetic and weakened representation; third, under the Latin imago, as 
a form of iconic power—or “optopower” to borrow Mondzain’s term—that organized the relation 
between the living and the dead through the mediation of images in the cult of religion-based 
ancestor worship.  
Let’s return, after this long detour, to photography. Belting describes photography as a 
“modern brand of archaism” that aims to defend the living against death.126 Images, he argues—
even those that do not represent the dead—are kept visible among the living in an effort to defend 
against loss. Every image announces the presence (visibility) of an absence (invisibility) and is therefore 
an image of death. As Louis Marin puts it: “death is the other subject of every image.” To represent 
is always to bear an absent object into presence as absent. In so doing, the image attempts to 
“master its loss, its death by and in representation.”127 Photography gives us a particularly modern 
 
125 Louis Marin, “The Tomb of the Subject in Painting,” in On Representation (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
2001), 269.  
126 Belting, Anthropology, 120-124 and 3. In the ancient Greek tale recounting the origins of painting recorded by Pliny the 
Elder, a Corinthian maid traces the profile shadow cast on the wall by the living body of her departing lover so as to 
secure his “silhouette” or “shadow” as an index of the absent referent and thus figuratively, of death: “As soon as the 
Greeks looked upon a shadow missing its body, they fell under the spell of a metaphor that brought death into play.” 
See Pliny the Elder, Natural History, Chapter 15. For Derrida’s consideration of skiagraphy or shadow writing and the 
Corinthian tale of the imprint of the departed see Memoirs of the Blind: The Self-Portrait and Other Ruins, Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2010. 
127 Marin, “The Tomb of the Subject in Painting,” 311. Cf. In “Two Versions of the Imaginary,” Maurice Blanchot 
similarly conceives a distance between life and death, the thing-itself and its image as a “fine line does not hold us at a 
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version of the attempt to banish death through its deferred appropriation. And yet, photography can 
never “master” death! The photograph secures the survival of the departed, but paradoxically 
produces more death in the very act of trying to defend against it.128 The moment the image is frozen 
by the camera it becomes “a living dead person.”129 Photography, writes Sontag, in her introduction 
to Peter Hujar’s collection of portraits of the dead, “converts the whole world into a cemetery.”130  
Derrida responds to this thanatographical inheritance. His quasi-transcendental concept of 
spectrality explains this paradox. Images can never “master” death because of their intrinsically 
spectral structure. Displacing the image from the heritage of this opto-onto-theology, Derrida 
reorients both terms—“death” and “image”—vis-à-vis spectrality. On the one hand, all of the 
theories outlined above still presuppose a notion of death as instantaneity clearly divided from life: 
Blanchot associates it with the figure of the limit; Metz describes the snapshot as “immediate” and 
“definitive” like death; even Belting, who claims to bracket the meaning of death from his 
anthropology, nonetheless presupposes, even while denying, an understanding of death as limit.131 As 
we will see in the next chapter, Derrida throws the determinability of death into question. He argues 
that we do not know, at bottom, what “death” means. At the same time, he thinks death not in 
opposition as two poles separated by an indivisible line, but rather, as a structural absence within life. 
Life is always, on this reading, inhabited by death, the machine, and automaticity, etc. in ways that 
render it vulnerable and exposed to finitude. On the other hand, image for Derrida, seems to suggest 
 
has become interval” (255). The aim of the image is both to maintain this distance and control it. See “Two Versions 
of the Imaginary,” in The Space of Literature, trans. Ann Smock (Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska Press, 2015), 254–
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(Autumn 1985): 81–90. 
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a broadened concept of “writing” (écriture). Photography, for example, as light-writing, involves (like 
the archaic eidōlon, to which Derrida seems to owe a great deal) a process of “presentification,” but 
also (unlike the like the archaic eidōlon) a process of “absentification,” or self-effacing erasure. This 
double movement attends to an attempt to preserve against loss, which is nonetheless ineliminable. 
This double and spectral pressure explains the failure of the image to defend against death.  
According to Derrida, contemporary teletechnologies—including cinema, television, 
photography—amplify spectrality, providing a new instantiation of its “logic.” Phantoms, specters, 
and revenants are promulgated by the media. Photography, which speaks to Derrida of ghosts, 
phantoms and “apparitions,” serves as a “medium” for the departed. “The spectral,” he writes, “is 
the essence of photography.”132 Cinema is “an art of phantoms (phantomachia), a battle of 
phantoms.”133 In a conversation with German photographic theorists Hubertus von Amelunxen and 
Michael Wetzel, later published in English as Copy, Archive, Signature, Derrida notes:  
Spectrality, far from being reduced by the rationality of modern technology, found 
itself, on the contrary, amplified, as if this medium (photo cinematography, tele 
perception, teleproduction, telecommunication) was the very site, the proper element 
(also properly privileged), of a fantastical phantomaticity, of the phainesthai in its 
originary link with techne. The revenant is not confined to the culture of the manor 
house or to spiritualism and fantastic literature from the last century. Every culture 
has its phantoms and the spectrality that is conditioned by its technology.134 
Spectrality infiltrates today’s global post-photographic constellation of satellites, CCTV cameras, and 
GPS. The accelerating velocity of global media gives rise to an unprecedented tele-virtualization 
constituted though technological networks that are neither living nor dead, present nor absent but 
which, as Simon Critchley notes “haunt our most intimate private spaces” with their “imagery of 
power.”135 These new configurations of imaging technologies oblige us, as Derrida argues in Spectres, 
to think “the virtualization of space and time, the possibility of virtual events whose movement and 
speed prohibit us more than ever […] from opposing presence to its representation, “real time” to 
“deferred time,” effectivity to its simulacrum, the living to the non-living, in short the living to the 
living-dead of its ghosts” (SM 169). 
 
132 Derrida and Plissart, Right of Inspection, np. 
133 Derrida, Jousse and de Baeque, “Le cinéma et ses fantômes,” 78. 
134 Derrida, Copy, Archive, Signature, 39. 





Derrida suggests two consequences of media spectrality for contemporary politics. He 
argues that it offers both a new promise and threat. First, the technological amplification of spectrality 
intensifies the claim of the dead upon us. Partaking of the spectral logic characterized by the 
contamination of oppositions between the living/dead, present/absent, real/virtual, teletechnologies 
contribute to a politics of mourning that understands the dead as intrinsically haunting the living. 
New constellations of teletechnologies make visible a disjointed experience of time. In returning the 
dead as ghostly, they articulate a critique of the philosophy of time associated with sovereignty, 
which I chart in the following chapters. The spectral moment of the technical image “no longer 
belongs to time” if one understands by the word time “the linking of modalized presents (past 
present, actual present: “now,” future present)” (SM xix). Rather, it is “furtive and untimely” like the 
apparition. Images amplify the spectral disjuncture of the present. Processes of mechanical 
inscription expose a past whose wake I pull up as inheritance and the structural possibility of death 
in the future. They proliferate with the dead who return from the past and the future, to regard us and 
to deliver an ethical demand to speak with ghosts—not only those who litter photography’s 
battlefields, but those that go unnamed and unrepresented. In short, spectrality is structurally 
amplified by technical images—and specifically by images of death—which afford a critical resource 
for the deconstruction of the sovereignty. 
Second, and because of this unprecedented amplification of spectrality, the media and visual 
culture becomes all the more critical as a site of struggle and contestation. Today’s fast-paced 
technological developments involve new ways of “producing, handling, organizing, making profit 
out of some spectrality” (DE 44). While Derrida is careful to distance himself from anti-
technological discourses, he is aware that teletechnologies are transforming public space. Struggles 
to control spectrality (in terms of what is made visible and invisible) plays out across the spectral 
space of the media in ways that are crucial to the operation of power in the context of globalization. 
Media spectrality opens up critical new dimensions of struggle over what Derrida calls the right to 
inspection (droit de regard), or what Nicholas Mirzoeff, calls the “right to look,” which is 
fundamentally linked to power over appearance and representation.136 Derrida therefore highlights 
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the need to examine the role of the archive and its organization by elected delegates in the 
production and distribution of knowledge. He enjoins us to develop a critical culture of media 
spectrality that attends (as Butler does in Frames of War) to the way images function—both through 
representation and lack thereof—to assign and circulate power (DE 45).137 This threat relates to the 
third sense of “plus d’un” (more of one) discussed in our spectral topography. Derrida associates this 
superlative sense of the plus d’un with the “the worst” violence. Here, the worst involves the 
manipulation of media spectrality to produce more indivisible sovereignty. Images, reshaped by digital 
communication and scopic regimes of surveillance constitute new networks of violence, ranging 
from the most direct (for example, the remote killing operations of drone strikes coordinated 
through GNS satellite), through the most indirect (for example, the iconoclastic attempt to eliminate 
visibility by withdrawing images from circulation).  
The challenge is to think both the promise and threat of spectrality as two sides of the 
technological structure of the aporia of sovereignty. The “differential deployment of technē” leaves 
us with a double injunction: to speak with ghosts that haunt via the media and to develop a critical 
culture of the spectrality of the media that attends to the ways in which images are mobilized in the 
service of the phantasm of sovereignty, while simultaneously undoing it (SM 169).  
 
Postmodern Spectrality 
Before developing this double injunction into an “infrastructure,” I will compare Derrida’s account 
of the threat of spectrality to the dystopian vision of spectrality articulated by critics of the 
“postmodern”: Jean Baudrillard and Fredric Jameson.138 Both thinkers diagnose representational 
crises brought about by the so-called “death of photography” (even if their theorizations predate 
this turn of phrase) and the concomitant erosion of the categories of “index” and “reference” I trace 
in the next chapter. The anxiety brought about by the advent of new digital imaging technologies is 
that they unhinge images from their referents, undermining their relation to the “real,” thus 
 
137 See Derrida and Stiegler, Echographies and Trace et Archive, Image et Art (Paris, France: INA Éditions, 2014). 
138 See Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, trans. Sheila Faria Glaser. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 
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dissolving them into ghostly representations that are mere “phantasms.”139 The Baudrillardian 
critique of spectrality diagnoses this dissimulation of reality into the “hyperreality” of the 
dematerialized simulacrum. Baudrillard, who was influenced by Guy Debord’s Situationist theory of 
the spectacle, gives voice to a dystopian vision of “America as a country of lonely screens flickering” 
depleted of sociality.140 With this, utopic dreams of global connectivity are displaced by electronic 
networks of digital imaging, cyber-optics, and techno-culture that obfuscate the real. Jameson 
similarly describes the threat of “postmodern virtuality” as a quotidian or “daily spectrality” that 
circulates so insidiously that it eludes our attention. As Jeffrey Sconce notes, such accounts of 
“television’s constant transmission of instantaneous representations make the medium both the 
prime catalyst and most pervasive symptom of an age marked by the increased dissolution of all 
referentiality.”141  
Yet, it should be clear from the thanatography that the deconstructive figure of the specter 
must be distinguished from the Platonic theory of the image, as well as from the Baudrillardian 
account of the postmodern simulacrum, which accepts too much from Platonic concepts.142 
Derrida’s quasi-concepts of the image, the phantasm, and spectrality cannot be thought from within 
Platonism. The furtive visibility of the invisible that Derrida associates with spectrality distinguishes 
the specter “not only from the icon or the idol but also from the image of the image, from the 
Platonic phantasma, as well as from the simple simulacrum” (SM 6). Derrida’s account of media 
spectrality rejects the binary thought that: (1) the image, as reference, is attached to real things and 
thus bound to truth (Platonic eikōn), or alternately, (2) that world is nothing but an image, as in the 
account of image as simulacrum (Platonic phantasm). Rejecting the oppositional values of truth and 
non-truth that emerge from this dualistic Platonic heritage, Derrida rethinks the image as both 
simulacral and referential, virtual and actual, living and dead, at the same time. Spectrality takes up both 
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sides of the opposition in a way that destabilizes postmodern spectrality and its Platonic 
antecedents.143  
 
The Optic Of Spectrality 
Linking up the three principle axes of this study—sovereignty-spectrality-image—this final section 
develops the double and deconstructive logic of spectrality at work in sovereignty and in images into 
a general “infrastructure” I call the “optic of spectrality.” This double optic will serve as a heuristic 
device that helps to assess the multiple ways images have been deployed to “master” death by 
exploiting, repressing, and controlling spectrality, while simultaneously thwarting attempts at visual 
mastery, in ways that render sovereignty fragile and precarious. 
Before venturing further, I will specify the kind of work this general “infrastructure” is going 
to do for me. I borrow the term from Rodolphe Gasché, who lifts it from Derrida.144 “An 
infrastructure,” Gasché explains, “is not what is called a ground in traditional philosophical 
language. It is, on the contrary, a non-fundamental structure, or an abyssal structure.”145 Gasché 
mobilizes the concept of infrastructure against its usual meaning. In legal-economic discourse, 
infrastructure tends toward standardization and reproduction of the same (rather than generation or 
variation). In philosophy, it usually suggests a deeper, more fundamental structure or origin. For 
Gasché, on the other hand, infrastructure articulates a general structural logic that both grounds and 
ungrounds at same time. To borrow the language of quasi-transcendentality again, “infrastructures 
are conditions as much of the impossibility as of the possibility of origins and grounds.”146 As an 
infrastructure, the optic should be understood as co-articulating the spectral logic at work in 
sovereignty and images.  
 
143 See Jacques Derrida and Bernard Stiegler, “Artifactualities,” in Echographies of Television: Filmed Interviews, trans. Jennifer 
Bajorek (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2007): 1-27. Cf. Foster, “Death in America,” 36–59. Foster makes a similar 
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structural” critiques of the image as simulacrum in the 1990’s. Foster similarly rejects this either/or blackmail by 
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Calling this general possible/impossible law of infrastructure an “optic” allows me to 
refocus spectrality’s relation to the visual and to vision and then technicity. The optic is a kind of 
technical infrastructure that frames sovereignty as an optical affair. “Optic” is of course imported 
from the lexicon of visibility (from the Greek optikos “of or having to do with sight,” from optos 
“seen, visible” and ops “eye”), which has been historically related to the production of knowledge. 
Recall that the concept of theory (theoria) depends on the rhetoric of “visualization, visuality, vision, 
seeing, optics. To theorize means... to see, to contemplate, to gaze, as in theoria” (DE 16). The optic 
troubles the long history of the optical space of vision that associates seeing with knowledge, 
reaching from Plato’s theory of eidos (as a visible image) through the uniform monocular space of 
geometrical perspective theorized as the ground of the Cartesian subject in La dioptrique.147 The 
stereoscope provides a useful analogy. (In fact, the images of Gettysburg that began the 
thanatography are themselves stereoscopic images; photography and death were linked from the 
beginning and these images of death were always doubled.) Cartesian optics—like Renaissance 
perspective—attempts to understand objects as, in principle, masterable by placing them on a grid 
observed from a stable, immobile point that reduces vision to an affair of geometry. This 
immobilization of the eye flattens the visible field around a focal center that excludes foveal 
curvature. The stereoscope, by contrast, relies on its three-dimensional effect on the presence of 
curved space of vision; it accepts into the image, the elliptical margins of the foveal periphery as well 
as the focal center. As such, it represents a different kind of seeing that retains within it a spectral 
heterogeneity at the margin of seeing.148 
Moreover, as Jonathan Crary notes in “Techniques of the Observer,” the stereoscope’s 
three-dimensional imaging system relies for its effect on the principle of “binocular disparity”—i.e. 
the fact that each eye sees a slightly different image. This is illustrated by David Brewster’s 1849 
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diagram of his lenticular telescope (Figure 7). The stereoscope aimed to quantify the differential 
between the optical axis of each eye by rooting the synthesis of retinal disparity in the observer’s 
body (as opposed to earlier theories that the observer only ever saw with one eye at a time) the 
stereoscope was able to explain how two different images, when viewed together, could be 
experienced as a single univocal “image.”149 Pushing the stereoscopic analogy further, this account of 
the mechanisms of stereoscopy can be related to the phantasm of sovereignty instituted by an 
ineliminable spectrality, which it nevertheless covers over when it projects an image of itself as 
indivisible, instantaneous, and devoid of technicity. Yet, as Crary shows, the stereoscope provoked a 
historical crisis in the nineteenth century. The problem was that the new vision machine made all to 
clear the fact that perceptual experience is the apprehension of spatial differences, or “disjunct or 
divergent images” over time.150 In so doing, it undermined the stability of the subject. Brewster 
wrote of his fear that the synthesis of retinal difference would never be stable or secure.151 
Stereoscopy’s immersivity captivated and fascinated, but it was not sufficiently able to conceal its 
phantasmaticity. It offered neither the assurance of “the identity of a copy nor the coherence 
guaranteed by the frame.”152 This led to the apparatus’ eventual displacement by the photograph, 
which preserved aesthetic distance and the codes of monocular space. In effect, the stereoscope was 
too deconstructive.  
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Figure 7. Unidentified artist, David Brewster’s lenticular stereoscope. Etching, from Sir David Brewster, The 
Stereoscope; Its History, Theory, and Construction. London, UK: John Murray (1856). 
 
The analogy of the stereoscope—with its principle of binocular disparity—will help illustrate 
the double-sided analysis and explanatory effect of the optic of spectrality I mobilize throughout this 
work. As an intrinsically double, recombinant space, the optic allows us to see two things “at once.” 
It holds together the possibility and impossibility, the transcendental and empirical, as well as the 
complication of visibility and invisibility associated with the logic of spectrality outlined above. My 




needs images to install itself over time, even as these same images simultaneously undermine 
sovereignty by exposing it to the very death that they are supposed to contain. The optic has two 
cinematic “angles,” or interpretative functions.  
The first deconstructive angle of the optic of spectrality is broadly critical and diagnostic: it 
reconstructs various ways images of death are deployed to institute sovereignty by variously 
repressing, foreclosing, or exploiting spectrality and thus the ways images of death have been 
deployed to institute the phantasm of sovereignty, even as sovereignty represses the question of 
technicity. As I have suggested, the phantasm of sovereignty is associated with forms of psychic 
mastery over death, which play out in terms of who and how the state decides to kill, for example, in 
the death penalty and warfare. But this also plays out significantly in relation to images and visible 
representation, that is, by how the state manipulates and legislates the power that accrues around 
images of death.  
Sovereignty marshals its conceptual resources against death. Relying on a clear-cut divide 
between life and death that takes the form of a threshold, sovereignty absolves itself of spectrality: 
the phantasm of sovereignty cleaves life from death and confirms the line between the two. The 
French expression that power “holds the bar” (tient la barre) is no metaphor. Rather, it refers to the 
supposition of a line between the living and the dead.153 Images proliferate at this line that is 
supposed to divide life from its proper end. They are deployed in this divided space, as a kind of 
tollgate and border control that regulates the exchange between the two and thereby seeks to 
“master” death through its visible appropriation. Images of death function both to circulate power 
and to stabilize the meaning of death in opposition to life: it is at this frontier that power emerges 
and is defended. Images of death afford a key site where the grappling with death takes place. As a 
form of differential iterability they are one of the empirical processes or techniques that work to 
stabilize sovereignty, as well as the border between life and death—or Life/Death, to use Barthes’ 
visual formulation.154 This confrontation with death takes different forms in different historical 
contexts. Sovereignty tarries with death when it telescopes death into an instantaneous image 
(chapter 2) and when it disseminates lethal images through global satellite networks that coordinate 
the capture and destruction of bodies in counterinsurgency operations (chapter 4). However, this 
 
153 See Jean Baudrillard’s remarkably incisive analysis of “death power” in Symbolic Exchange and Death (London, UK: 
Sage, 1993), 129-131. (This term appears in English in the original 1976 French Edition.) 




drive to master death is also deployed through modes of what Orlando Patterson calls “social death” 
and “natal alienation” inflected through the exclusion from opportunity or the relegation of social 
life to what Mbembe calls forms of “living death” (mort vivant), for example in mass incarceration, 
and in networked digital images of antiblack violence that circulate the possibility of death as an 
omnipresent threat that circumscribe black social life under social death. In each of these cases, 
sovereignty orchestrates material processes of inscription in an attempt to confront the exposure to 
finitude and death, which is sovereignty’s quasi-transcendental condition of impossibility. In 
deploying technicity, sovereignty tries to immunize itself against death and time. 
The second deconstructive angle follows the critical angle with a quasi-transcendental 
argument. It shows how images of death circulating in visual culture simultaneously expose 
sovereignty’s weaknesses and phantasmatic dimensions. Sovereignty deploys the machine-like 
repetition of teletechnologies to install itself, but it equally needs to control images because they 
simultaneously harbor an unruly potential to disrupt the limit between life and death: differential 
iterability also amplifies spectrality in ways that deconstruct sovereignty by exposing its aporetic 
structure. Dissimulating themselves across the border in the manner of the ghost, images disrupt the 
bar that is supposed to divide the purity of life from death. In their quasi-transcendental operation, 
images also “unground” sovereignty. Images, with their general technical and structural possibility of 
differential iterability and their long association with death, amplify spectrality and complicate our 
understanding of sovereignty. They afford a point from which to deconstruct sovereignty’s 
phantasmatic dimensions. There is a sense in which images of death are never fully within our grasp. 
As Belting rightly notes, “we are not the masters of our images, but rather in a sense at their mercy; 
they colonize our bodies … so that even if it seems that we are in charge of generating them, and 
even though society attempts unceasingly to control them, it is in fact the images that are in 
control.”155 This disruptive potential frames the second angle of the optic. 
In reframing deconstructive reading in its visual operations, this stereo-aporetico-scopic 
“infrastructure” affords a heuristic device from which to approach the double function of images of 
death in relation to sovereignty, whereby images of death function both to stabilize a phantasmatic 
concept of sovereignty that understands itself as indivisible and absolute, while simultaneously 
rendering that same structure perilous by exposing it to the very finitude and alterity that images are 
supposed to occlude and master. Images of death are imbricated both in the institution and 
 




deconstruction of sovereignty. The optic of spectrality helps me assess (first eye) how historically 
and geopolitically specific mutations in sovereignty deploy images to immunize itself against the 
incursion of death and finitude and (second eye) how—at the same time—these same images expose 
the phantasmatic attempts to control death, time, and visibility mobilized by sovereignty. The optic 
of spectrality traces a constellation of questions about symbolic violence and iconic power, 
phantasmaticity and spectrality, death and representation.  
The following chapters put this two-eyed optic to the test in a series of visual provocations. 
The optic of spectrality will organize my analysis of the production and consumption of images of 
death circulating across spatiotemporal and political borders in contemporary art and media. What 
follows is an attempt to test the diagnostic efficacy of the optic in a series of historically specific 
contexts and visual regimes of power. In the next chapter, I will deploy the double logic to 
interrogate in the visible field of the death penalty. Turning to Derrida’s engagement with Foucault 
in the first year of the Death Penalty seminar, I examine the theatrical and spectacular dramaturgy of 
capital punishment, which always implies the right of the sovereign to have the power to decide over 
the life and death of its citizens, as well as a certain thinking of the time of death as instantaneity. 
The remaining chapters examine how this two-eyed logic of spectrality plays out in videos of anti-
black police violence (chapter 3) and the “operational images” deployed in an increasingly virtualized 
global warfare (chapter 4). In this later engagement, stereoscopy is mobilized not only as an analogy, 
rather, it’s principle of reconciling binocular disparity is instrumentalized in the operations of global 
warfare: the drone is a transcontinental stereoscope whose aim is annihilation. 
Methodologically, this organizing logic should not be seen as reflecting a distinction of 
universal/particular (as though I am giving you the paradigm and then the example). In other words, 
the optic should not be understood as a theoretical apparatus that can simply be repeated or 
“applied” to visual objects as case studies. Instead, it needs to be understood as a kind of “formal 
rule” that regulates differently each time it is put into play.156 Each of the following chapters 
mobilizes the optic to show the “same” double logic at work in the different socio-political, 
geographic, and historical contexts. The spectral tensions amplified in each regional engagement 
discloses different aspects and ramifications of the double logic at work in sovereignty. Each 
differential iteration performatively engages another aspect of this general infrastructure, disclosing 
various inflections and shifting emphases: from prosthetic to mental images, from iconic to 
 




symbolic, etc. Each brings the oscillating double movement of the optic into play in different ways, 
with new elements moving to the fore, while others recede into the background.  
What happens to spectrality for example, with the advent of the vernacular instantaneous 
photography movement, when new prosthetic techniques emerge for arresting the flow of time in a 
visible instant of scopic mastery? What happens to spectrality in the midst of the early fascination 
with images of execution, which serve as a preeminent site where the frontier between the living and 
the dead is drawn and defended? Or when spectacular structures of state killing are deployed in the 
service of white supremacy to construct the racial other as intrinsically less human and more 
precarious? What happens moreover, when cameras are installed in remote control missile heads and 
when “dematerialized” images transmit lethal data codes across satellite networks that are 
increasingly illegible to the human eye? What happens to spectrality across the mutations of 
sovereignty? And what does this tell us about the reversible necessity of photography for the 





CHAPTER 2: Time of Death: Sovereignty, Photography & The Death Penalty 
 
 






9 December, 1937: the body of Jean de Koven is found in a shallow grave beneath the porch of a 
Saint-Cloud villa outside Paris (Figure 8). Moments before her untimely death, the aspiring American 
dancer took two snapshots of her killer, the handsome German exile, Eugène Weidmann. Her 
camera, recovered alongside her corpse five months after the fatal rendezvous, still held the exposed 
negatives, which were developed belatedly—only after a delay—to serve as evidence in the 
sensational trial that captivated all of France.158 Reporting for The New Yorker, Janet Flanner writes: 
In the quick quarter-hour with him before Miss De Koven went to her new operatic 
role, sheer sociality reigned; they smoked, she took pictures of him with her nice new 
camera, he kindly refreshed her with a glass of milk. When, five months later, his 
unfortunate guest was disinterred, she still summed up (except for the murderous 
cord tight around her throat and the awful action of time) the sartorial elements of 
the sociable summer tourist. She was still wearing her cute brown sports hat, her 
gloves, her blue dress with its red Scotch plaid top, her new patent-leather shoes—
still had her white handbag (empty of $430 in American Express checks and about 
300 francs cash), still had at her side her nice new camera containing snapshots of 
her murderer.159 
We do not have de Koven’s snapshots, which frame and sever Weidmann’s head in a “micro-
version of death” that uncannily anticipates his beheading by guillotine on 17 June, 1939. (De 
Koven’s images are buried yet again, but this time in some institutional repository, perhaps Les 
  
 
157 Dubois, L’acte photographique, 98. 
158 The temporal torsion introduced by this photographic process illustrates Freud’s analogy for the unconscious 
structure of trauma, which is not lived in the time of the event, but only retroactively—after a delay. 





Figure 8. Unidentified photographer, Police Digging in the Garden of the Death Villa at St. 
Cloud. 14 December, 1937. Press photograph. Photo courtesy of AP Photo. 
 
archives de la préfecture de police de Paris.) We do however, have a short film depicting 
Weidmann’s execution outside the Prison Saint-Pierre at Versailles, in what would prove to be 
metropolitan France’s last public execution.160 This short film will guide my first deployment, or 
“take,” of the infrastructural optic of spectrality to examine the relation between sovereignty and 
images of death in the first year of Derrida’s seminar on the death penalty. Between these deathly 
images—between de Koven’s snapshots of Weidmann and the anonymous film of his 1939 
execution—emerge different notions of time and the instant that will be the focus of this chapter. 
 
A source of fascination among France’s literati, Weidmann made posthumous appearances in Jean-
Paul Sartre’s The Age of Reason and Albert Camus’s Reflections on the Guillotine. Jean Genet—the 
“fascinated analyst” of the legal murder to whom Derrida turns his attention in the first session—
commences Our Lady of the Flowers with the proper name “Weidmann,” effectively penning his debut 
novel under the watch of the seductive “killer with a velvet gaze,” as he was affectionately known in 
 





the press.161 Commenting on the analogical powers of the photograph in her seminal book On 
Photography, Sontag recounts: “On one wall of cell No. 426 in Fresnes Prison in the early 1940s Jean 
Genet pasted the photographs of twenty criminals he had clipped from newspapers.”162 Among 
these glorified images of virile criminality was Weidmann, Genet’s “erotic talisman,” clipped from 
France-Soir.163 “Multiplied by the presses,” this image of Weidmann’s face, bloodied and bandaged 
after a shoot-out with the French police, “swept down upon Paris and all of France, to the depth of 
the most out-of-the-way villages,” reaching a youthful Derrida in Algiers.164 In the first lecture of the 
seminar, Derrida confesses that he can “still see the image of his photograph” (DP1 29), which 
appeared in the independent French-Algerian newspaper L’Écho d’Alger (Figure 9). The image returns 
like an “apparition in the media,” at once “theatrical and spectral,” in the uncanny temporal modality 
of the Freudian Nachträglichkeit to haunt Derrida’s interrogations of the death penalty with a kind of 
retroactive force that constellates questions about the role of visuality and contemporary tele-
technologies in the formation of sovereign power and conversely, in the “discontinuous, but 
irreversible” movement for the abolition of the death penalty (DP1 30). Following Derrida’s 
invocation, I resuscitate Weidmann’s ghost to show how the phantasm of ipsocratic sovereignty is 
structurally linked to technical images that are presumed to be instantaneous.  
As discussed in the last chapter, this model of sovereignty has five interlinking traits: 
indivisibility, autonomy, closure, instantaneity, and spontaneity. In this chapter, I focus on instantaneity and 
its relation to sovereign technicity. I examine how this trait asserts itself in the ethos of analogue 
photography through the attempt to arrest time in an instantaneous image. In the last chapter, I 
argued that there is always a phantasmatic dimension of sovereignty that one can deconstruct. My 
aim in this chapter will be to elucidate the phantasmatic dimensions of this understanding of time 
presupposed by sovereignty when it “takes life,” by executing a death penalty. Following Wills’ 
observation that the “central question of the death penalty is the question of time,” I argue that 
 
161 Macha Séry, “Colette Au Procès d’Eugene Weidmann,” Le Monde, 2014, my translation, 
http://www.lemonde.fr/culture/article/2014/07/31/colette-au-proces-d-eugen-weidmann-le-tueur-au-regard-de-
velours_4464899_3246.html. Jean Genet, Our Lady of the Flowers, trans. Bernard Frechtman (New York, NY: Grove 
Press, 1963).  
162 Sontag, On Photography, 162. 
163 Edmund White, Genet: A Biography (London: Vintage, 1993), 143. 





photography, which emerges as a contrapuntal theme in the seminars, provides a critical site for 




Figure 9. Unidentified photographer, Eugène Weidmann, a few 
moments after his arrest. 1939. Press photograph. L’Echo d’Alger. 








In the first section, I examine Derrida’s assertion that state sovereignty presumes an ability 
to calculate the time of the other’s death—down to the very instant. In putting the life and death of 
its subjects as its disposal, state sovereignty assumes a phantasmatic understanding of an objective 
instant of death that Derrida will deconstruct throughout the seminars. Pulling at one of  the long 
veins that runs to the very heart of  Derrida’s attempts to think through a rigorous philosophical 
abolitionism, I read the seminars with an eye to visuality and to images. I argue that we can better 
understand Derrida’s deconstruction of death by reading it in tandem with his questioning of the 
temporality of the instant, which he has treated in another light, in his texts on photography. The 
second section elaborates the debate staged by Derrida in the first lecture when he argues, contra 
Foucault, that the hallmark of  sovereign power involves the right to command death in public 
spectacles that are still visible—though more virtual—with today’s accelerated tele-technologies. I 
then sketch a genealogy of the instant mobilized by the Western onto-theology of  the death penalty 
as well as by a certain concept of  photography, by way of  an analysis of  the temporality of the 
guillotine and the nineteenth-century photographic snapshot (the French term for snapshot is 
instantané). My general argument here is that these two technical apparatuses give phenomenal 
support to the desire to a “master” an objective instant of death: both are modern techniques of 
sovereign power and both, in their own way, seek to master death by contracting time into a visible 
point (or punctum, to borrow from Barthes’ lexicon).166 This genealogy sets the scene for a double 
reading of the instant in the anonymous film of Weidmann’s execution in the final section. The 
short film stages a double and deconstructive reading of the instant first, as a technique of mastering 
death and spectrality by contracting time into a visible instant and second, as a mode of spectral 
revenance or haunting that destabilizes the very limit sovereignty presumes to calculate and operate. 
Drawing on Derrida’s critique of the temporality of the photographic instant, argue that this short 
film divulges another understanding of the instant and its power that can help us examine the 





166 I am indebted to Elissa Marder’s keen observation of  the “shocking convergence” of  the guillotine and photography 
in “The Elephant and the Scaffold: Response to Kelly Oliver,” in Spindel Supplement: Derrida and the Theologico-Political: 
From Sovereignty to the Death Penalty, ed. Stephan Blatti (Memphis, TN: University of Memphis, 2012), 106, 





Derrida opens the first year of the Death Penalty seminar with the claim that the sovereignty of state 
power “is marked by the right of life and death over the citizen, by the power of deciding, laying 
down the law, judging, and executing” a death penalty (DP1 5). The sovereign presumes the right to 
command death and to grant exceptions to the law, for example, by deciding whether or not to 
grant clemency and stay an execution, at the very last moment. “State sovereignty,” says Derrida, in 
conversation with Elisabeth Roudinesco, “defines itself by the power of life and death over subjects. 
And therefore by the right of exception, by the right to raise itself, if one may say, above the law” 
(FWT 144).167 To think through the philosophical underpinnings that justify the death penalty, as 
well as the potential resources for a principled philosophical abolitionism, Derrida maintains the 
need to interrogate the “phantasmatico-theological” foundations of sovereignty that “presents itself, 
represents itself as the right to decree and to execute a death penalty” (DP1 22).  
According to Derrida, these foundations remain uncontested—de facto if not de jure—in the 
history of philosophy (DP1 5). No philosophy, he argues, has ever contested the legitimacy of the 
death penalty in a principled, philosophical way: in the Laws, Plato judges the death penalty (thanatōi 
zēmiousthō) as a curative for the disease of stubborn impiety; in the Philosophy of Right, Hegel advances 
a retributive theory of justice that preserves death as legitimate form of punishment; in The 
Metaphysics of Morals, Kant (Derrida’s main interlocutor) refers to the death penalty as a categorical 
imperative of penal law, while arguing that a principle of equivalence (or lex talionis) between crime 
and punishment is proper to the dignity of human reason. Even those philosophers that maintained 
a public discourse against capital punishment never did so in a “properly philosophical way” (FWT 
146).168 At stake between the “innumerable silences” of Heidegger, Sartre, and Foucault and the 
outright support articulated by Plato, Hegel, and Kant, is not only what philosophers have said (or 
 
167 This echoes Jean Bodin’s definition of sovereignty. For example, in Method for the Easy Comprehension of History, trans. 
Beatrice Reynolds (Sharon Hill: Russell Press, 1985), Bodin argues that “the power of life and death where the law 
itself has made to provision for flexibility or clemency” is one of five basic rights of the sovereign (174-175). See also 
Bodin: On Sovereignty, trans. Julian H Franklin (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), Book 1, Chapter 10.  
168 See Plato, “Laws,” in Plato: Complete Works, trans. Trevor J. Saunders (Indianapolis, IL: Hackett Publishing, 1997); 
Georg Wilhelm Fredrich Hegel, Hegel: Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), §101-102; Immanuel Kant, “On the Right to Grant Punishment and Clemency,” The 





failed to say) about the death penalty. Rather these resistances expose the organization of Western 
philosophy around a speculative (and specular) investment in the doctrine of punishment.169  
Derrida wants to elaborate an abolitionist discourse that counters the “stupefying fact” that 
there is no philosophy as such that objects in principle to the death penalty.170 To do this in a 
“principled” and “unconditional way” he needs to contest the understanding of sovereignty that 
arrogates to itself the power over the life and death—over the time and finitude of the other (FWT 
144). This whole concept turns on the phantasm that the sovereign can master an objective instant 
of death: 
The concept of the death penalty supposed that the state, the judges, society, the 
bourreaux and executioners, that is, third parties, have mastery over the time of life 
of the condemned one and thus know how to calculate and produce, in so-called 
objective time, the deadline to within a second. This knowledge, this mastery over 
the time of life and death, this mastering and calculating knowledge the time of life 
of the subject is presupposed … alleged, presumed in the very concept of the death 
penalty. (DP1 220) 
In this paragraph, which appears only near the end of the seminar, Derrida announces what will 
have been one of the guiding themes of the seminar: a critique of the Western philosophy of time. 
The question of time and more specifically, the concept of the instant (of death) (which Derrida has 
incessantly problematized, from his earliest writings on Husserl’s phenomenology of the living-
present through his interrogations of photography) is lodged at the very heart of the critique of the 
phantasm of sovereign power over death in the seminars: what we have called “ipsocratic” 
sovereignty thinks that it can master an objective instant of  death.  
 
169 Derrida treats this omission in Heidegger in DP2 148-149. 
170 Derrida is not content with the familiar pragmatic arguments against the death penalty such as those outlined by the 
American Civil Liberties Union: that it is retributive, that it violates the Eighth Amendment of the US Constitution, 
which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment; that it fails as a social deterrent to crime; or that it is disproportionately 
directed against minorities. None of these pragmatic grounds for abolition provide an unconditional, secular rejection 
of capital punishment he aims to articulate in the seminars. The best these pragmatic arguments can hope to achieve is 
a contingent abolition. For example, the Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in Furman v. Georgia, argued that the practice 
of capital punishment violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments against cruel and unusual punishment. The 
four-year de facto moratorium on the death penalty was reversed with the US Supreme Court’s 1976 decision in Gregg 
v. Georgia, effectively reinstating the death penalty. Derrida wants something more radical and more principled. See 






This phantasmatic desire for the juridical calculation of the “time of life,” in turn, 
presupposes an unexamined conception of death that is our philosophical inheritance (DP1 220). 
This “pre-comprehension” is presumed “more or less explicitly” by all the great thinkers of death 
(DP1 237) from Plato—who, in the Phaedo, describes philosophy as a calmative that prepares the 
citizen for death and who, in the Republic indicts the tragedians’ deathly images for inducing fear and 
thus threatening a properly human relation to death—through the most “radical” and 
“deconstructive phenomenologies,” including Heidegger’s existential analysis of being-toward-death and 
Levinas’ ethics of radical alterity.171 In each case, sovereignty is still construed by way of a relation to 
death that has long served as the fulcrum of speculative thought. To philosophize, according to the 
old injunction that bears us back to ancient Greece, is to learn to die, and learning assumes a certain 
thinking of the possible as a capacity, power or ability on the part of a subject to master an objective 
instant that “separates a state of death from a state of life.” Each of these analyses presupposes the 
“existence of an objectifiable instant that separates the living from the dying, be it of an ungraspable 
instant that is reduced to the blade of a knife or to the stigmē of a point” (DP1 239). “Knife-edge” 
and “point” are presented here as two figures for the same allegedly objective division of life from 
death in a single instant that can be “determined” and “calculated” by a third party. Death is 
understood as an objective border, a limit, line or a threshold, but it is also figured a stigmatic point, 
a “puncta” or punctum (to borrow from Barthes’ photographic language). 
A radical and principled philosophical abolitionism must rethink the time of death and the 
time of the instant together (as Bazin argues the moment of death is the unique instant par excellence) 
along with a displacement more generally, of the topography of the border that is presumed to 
separate life from death in a clear-cut opposition. Derrida aims to dismantle this fantasy of control 
over an objective instant of death along with the specular and “speculative scaffolding” of the 
guillotine—a technical apparatus said to share with photography a certain temporal “metonymy of 
the instantaneous” (FWT 61). He contests the phantasmatic belief that one can master and control 
the instant by calculating the time of the other’s death in executing a death penalty. This presumed 
mastery of death is impossible because there is no instant as such. Derrida exhorts us to deconstruct 
this phantasmatic delimitation of death. The seminar thus traces a patient “deconstruction of death,” 
which is also a deconstruction of the Western philosophy of time, which understands time as a 
series of discrete moments that are conceived as indivisible “points.” Derrida wants us to put this 
 




“point” “under surveillance” (haute surveillance) (DP1 7). He enjoins us to be “vigilant”—to keep our 
“eyes open” to what this watch-word “death” means and to what it makes us say, “in more than one 
language,” including the idiomatic language of photography (DP1 240). We can better understand 
Derrida’s injunction to “deconstruct death” by reading it in tandem with his questioning of the 
temporality of the instant, which he has treated in another light, so to speak, in his texts on 
photography. Images give us another point from which to interrogate the sharp edge of the instant 
of death that is supposed to divide the living polis from the community of the dead. 
Although Derrida, (a self-proclaimed cineaste), does not develop a systematic discussion of 
images in the seminars, he lists the visible presentation of the death penalty among the veritable 
“thicket of problems” within the “immense overgrown archive of the death penalty” (DP1 47-8). In 
the first double session of the seminar Derrida places two interrelated visual sub-themes against the 
broader horizon of the “big question of sovereignty in general, of sovereignty of the state in 
particular” (DP1 xv).172 The first subtheme indicates a concern with the role of visuality in the 
“primal scene” of sovereignty. It involves the “spectacle” or the “scene” of capital punishment and 
the general history of its essentially visible and public character. Opening the seminars with a 
pathos-laden description of the “cinematic theatricality of execution” Derrida promises to return 
“often and in countless ways” to the specular and theatrical mise-en-scène that organizes the death 
penalty (DP1 42). The second subtheme involves the representation of the death penalty in theater, 
painting, photography, cinema, and literature.173 While Derrida focuses most explicitly on literature, 
technical images emerge in a spectral fashion, as an underdeveloped theme across the seminars, 
condensing and displacing questions about time and the instant, visibility and power, voyeurism and 
cruelty. Derrida references multiple films over the course of the seminars, including Louis Malle’s 
Elevator to the Gallows (1958), Tim Robbins’s Dead Man Walking (1995), and Clint Eastwood’s True 
Crime (1999), as well as a single photograph: that of Eugène Weidmann.174 My resuscitation of  
Weidmann’s ghost will give us another point from which to assess the co-imbrication of  these two 
themes in the “scopic drive” of  the death penalty. 
 
172 Derrida, qtd. in Geoffrey Bennington, “Editorial Note,” in DP1, xv. 
173 See Peggy Kamuf, Literature and the Remains of the Death Penalty (New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 2019) for a 
discussion of literature and the death penalty. 
174 Barnaby Norman explores questions of testimony and time through a reading of Werner Herzog’s documentary 
about Texas death-row, Into the Abyss: A Tale of Death, a Tale of Life (2011) in “Time of Death: Herzog/Derrida,” Oxford 





Before I trace this genealogy of the instant through the scopic machines of the death penalty and 
photography, I will treat the first of the two visual subthemes by taking a detour through Derrida’s 
claim that the hallmark of sovereign power involves the right to command death in visible (though 
increasingly virtual) spectacles. In the first double session, Derrida confronts Foucault’s historical 
thesis about the progressive “de-visibilization” of punishment. I will restage this debate (which is 
largely implicit in the seminar), to flesh out Derrida’s argument about the constitutive function of 
visibility in the death penalty. A comparison between the two thinkers will clarify the stakes of 
Derrida’s specular investments in the seminar, while setting up an argument for the continued 
centrality of images in the visible appropriation of death as a site of political formation and 
deformation in the contemporary nation state.  
Let’s begin with Foucault. In Discipline and Punish—a text that Derrida reads as an “overture” 
in the course of the first seminar (DP1 42)—Foucault describes the old spectacle of execution as a 
“manifestation of force” that displayed the sovereign’s absolute right over life and death (vitae ius ac 
necis) that Roman law called merum imperium. According to Foucault’s analysis of penal law, the 
sovereign’s power was confirmed through ritual display of violence. The public execution played the 
juridico-political function of restored a “momentarily injured sovereignty … by manifesting it at it 
most spectacular.”175 The scene of the execution was a form of public theater that aimed to 
reconstitute sovereignty. It was also an education in citizenship: the “right to be witnesses” tied 
spectator and spectacle in a “general economy of the public execution.”176 The people assembled to 
witness public executions were a critical part of the ritual performance of sovereign power.177  
This changed, says Foucault, on the “threshold of modernity” when the classical model of 
sovereignty, as power over death, was supplanted by a new “biopolitical” paradigm that sought to 
calculate, organize, manage, and preserve life (bios) more pervasively than it sought to distribute 
 
175 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage, 2012), 48. 
176 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 58-9. 
177 C.f. Diane George and Diane Shoos’s account of “witnessing” as an inherently political act vs. “voyeurism” as a 
theory of seeing associated with visual pleasure and power in their analysis the spectacle of the death penalty in 
“Deflecting the Political in the Visual Images of Execution and the Death Penalty Debate,” College English 67, no. 6 





death.178 According to Foucault’s famous thesis, the old negative power to “make-die and let-live” 
(faire mourir et laisser vivre) gave way to new positive power to “make-live and let-die” (faire vivre et laisser 
mourir). Foucault calls for the death of the traditional study of sovereignty as a political discourse: 
“what we need,” he argues, “is a political philosophy that isn’t erected around the problem of 
sovereignty, nor therefore around the problems of law and prohibition. We need to cut off the 
King’s head.”179 Although Foucault still accords a certain power to expose its subjects to death as 
the “underside” of biopolitics, his general historical thesis in the last chapter of History of Sexuality, 
“Power over Death and Right to Life,” is that the formation of power known as sovereignty—both 
in its monarchical and juridical instantiations—has been supplanted by the channels of “disciplinary 
power” and “biopower” that operate through discursive formations embedded in our social and 
institutional practices.180 Biopower is power over the administration and management of life, enacted 
in distributive, capillary modes: in the prison system, the health system and new forms of 
governmentality. With this, “the great spectacle of physical punishment disappeared” from the stage 
of the death penalty: “the tortured body was avoided; the theatrical representation of pain was 
excluded from punishment.”181 The bloody theater of the death penalty recedes behind the gates of 
the sprawling system of mass incarceration, signaling a decisive shift from the visible administration 
of death to invisible regime of punishment incorporated into bodies. The sovereign spectacle is 
erased; a new epochal episteme is born from this rupture. 
Derrida’s response to Foucault: visibility is not eclipsed, but “deferred.” Where Foucault sees 
hardened historical ruptures and binary oppositions, Derrida suggests a complex and complicated 
field of differences (FWT 12) . In a move characteristic of  disagreements between the two thinkers, 
Derrida argues that life and death have always been fatally entangled with power. Although Derrida 
 
178 In Bíos: Biopolitics and Philosophy (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), Roberto Esposito shows that 
Foucault waffles on the relation between sovereignty and biopolitics. At times, he argues that sovereignty and 
biopolitics are two incommensurable regimes, with the later chronologically superseding the former. Yet other times, 
Foucault suggests the two regimes are superimposed. On the one hand, he posits a clean and irreversible caesura—an 
absolute incompatibility of sovereignty and biopolitics. On the other, the two regimes are coextensive, rather than 
contiguous. Esposito argues that Foucault’s flirtation with these two oppositional hypotheses creates “an optical effect 
of splitting or doubling” (34). He attempts to overcome this antimonial knot by injecting his concept of “immunity” 
into the articulation of the two regimes of sovereignty and biopolitics. 
179 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, ed. Colin Gordon (New York, NY: Pantheon 
Books, 2009), 121. 
180 See Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume I (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), 144. 





does not confront Foucault’s epochal thesis about the shift from sovereignty to biopolitics we 
should nonetheless read this into the margins of his argument about the visibility and invisibility 
central to the death penalty.182 The stakes of this are far-reaching: Foucault’s (historical) genealogy of 
penal reform presumes an underlying divide of life and death that Derrida’s (quasi-transcendental) 
analysis of the instant of death seeks to problematize. Derrida argues: 
Foucault’s book is not a book on the death penalty, but it is a book that deals among 
other things with the historical transformation of the spectacle, with the organized 
visibility of punishment, with what I will call, even though this is not Foucault’s 
expression, the seeing-punish [voir-punir], a seeing-punish essential to punishment, to 
the right to punish as right to see-punish(ed), or even as duty-to-see-punish(ed) [devoir 
de voir-punir], one of Foucault’s historical theses being that at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, what “gets erased” is, I quote, “the great spectacle of physical 
punishment; the tortured body is avoided; the staging of suffering is excluded from 
the punishment. The age of punitive sobriety begins” (21). I am not so sure of this, 
but perhaps there is here a technical, tele-technical, or even televisual complication of 
seeing, or even a virtualization of visual perception. (DP1 43) 
Whereas Foucault posits the “progressive disappearance of spectacular visibility” and a generalizable 
shift from the (visible) right over death under sovereign power to the (invisible) administration of 
life under biopower, Derrida tries to demonstrate a shift from one “modality,” “distribution,” or 
parceling out of visibility and invisibility to another more virtual one that has the effect of extending 
the “field of the spectacular and the theatrical” (FWT 12). What Derrida, glossing Foucault, calls 
“seeing-punish” (voir-punir), as the essential right or duty to witness the scene of the execution, is still 
operative today. 
Like Foucault, Derrida traces shifting empirical apparatuses of killing in the history of the 
death penalty, from the “excessive jouissance” procured by the violent execution under the Ancien 
Régime to the elimination of pain with the guillotine, to the elimination of blood and the corporeal 
traces that mark the passage from life to death with the contemporary practice of lethal injection 
(FWT 159). But Derrida argues that seeing-punish remains throughout. Both visibility and 
invisibility, he argues, are always part of a “theatrical, spectacular, or even voyeuristic machinery” 
(DP1 2). Power is still erected over the scaffolds of death and death is still visible: “The spectacle will 
 
182 Foucault, History of Sexuality, 143. For a particularly insightful analysis of Derrida’s critique of biopolitics see Jeffrey T. 
Nealon, “Living and Dying with Foucault and Derrida: The Question of Biopower,” in Between Foucault and Derrida, ed. 





have continued; it still continues by becoming virtual” (DP1 205). Yet, visibility is more diffuse and 
virtual—more spectral. Thus, in the second year of the seminars Derrida recalls that “punishment, 
which is in the end always public, did not become invisible but only changed its form and its place of 
visibility by becoming virtual or by virtualizing itself (en se virtualisant)” (DP2 20, my emphasis). 
Derrida links this virtualization of visibility to spectrality and to empirical, or iconic images. 
He suggests that contemporary teletechnologies introduce a “technical, tele-technical, or even tele-
visual complication of seeing, or even a virtualization of visual perception” (DP1 43):  
On the question of whether “to see or not to see killing or cruelty,” Foucault speaks 
of a progressive disappearance of spectacular visibility. This is true, but at the same 
time, thanks to television and cinema, one sees more and more films that, under the 
perfectly good pretext of abolitionism, exhibit not only the condemnation to death 
but the process of execution, up to the last moment. Visibility is thus deferred. The 
transformation of the media makes it so that one should speak not simply of 
invisibility but of a transformation of the field of the visible. Never have things been 
as “visible” in global space as they are today; this is itself an essential element of the 
problem— and of the struggle. Spectral logic invades everything, especially at the 
intersections of the work of mourning and the techne of the image— which is to say 
everywhere. (FWT 159) 
This redistribution and virtualization of spectacular visibility involves intertwined temporal and 
spatial aspects.183 
On the one hand, what Derrida elsewhere calls “virtual time” suggests a temporal deferral.184 
Visibility is not abandoned, but postponed. The spectacle gets caught up in a delay made possible by 
prosthetic images, so that even where the application of the death penalty has become less visible, 
(for example, where civil society is banned from the direct scene of the execution), it is nonetheless 
re-established as the site of voyeuristic fascination with the representation of the death penalty 
across a multitude of screen cultures including television and cinema, as well mobile screens that 
 
183 Numerous projects problematize the biopolitical priority of the faire vivre over the sovereign power of the faire mourir. 
Esposito’s theory of “thanatopolitics” and Mbembe’s theory of “necropolitics” argue that biopolitics is entangled with 
the power of death and exclusion. I return to this in my discussion of sovereignty and race in the next chapter.  
184 In the final chapter, I turn to Derrida’s deconstruction of the concept of actuality in “Artifactualities,” where he 
argues for a portmanteau concept of “actuvirtuality,” which no longer opposes actuality and virtuality, but rather 
where the “virtual image” effects the production of actuality or event through a kind of detour through “virtual time” 





circulate an ongoing stream of violent images through our media feeds. Prosthetic images provide 
another site of fascination with the “immediate or deferred spectacle” of the death penalty (DP1 29).  
On the other hand, as the spectacle is disseminated through the channels of the media it 
loses its specificity of place. When the scene of the execution loses its proper borders the spectacle 
becomes idealized or “spectralized”—it is disseminated everywhere, like an itinerant ghost. The 
result of this virtual complication of space is an “exhibitionism that knows no bounds” (FWT 159). 
What Derrida is diagnosing here is a shift to a de-centered sovereign power whose global empire of 
images has become increasingly diffuse and omnipresent.185 The visibility of “seeing-punish” is 
displaced by the space and time of images. It is not that there is less visibility, but rather, a series of 
non-epochal transformations in the structure and field of visibility. Sovereignty is still linked to 
voyeuristic and spectacular violence, even where visibility is increasingly diffuse and “virtual” and 
where the apparatuses of capture are more mobile, as I will show in my in my interrogations of the 
archives of antiblack police violence (chapter 3) and the virtual field of drone warfare (chapter 4).  
 
The Instant: Scopic Machines Of Death 
But let’s return to the instant in the analogue era of photography. The focus on the instant permits 
us to thread together two mechanical themes or motifs that run through the death penalty seminars: 
1. Machines of death: On the one hand, the instant motivates Derrida’s analysis of the apparatuses 
for the administration of capital punishment—from France’s revolutionary guillotine to America’s 
medicalized lethal injection protocols. Each technique of execution gives empirical or phenomenal 
support to the phantasm of the instant that installs itself at the very heart of the nation-state’s 
sovereign administration of the death penalty, when it tries to calculate, control, and operate the 
time of the other’s death.  
2. Machines of vision: The instant is also central (as we have just seen) to Derrida’s efforts to 
understand the power of technical images in relation to “seeing-punish”. Images play a central role 
in framing our understanding both of instantaneity and death. In this regard, technical images (our 
paradigmatically modern form of visuality), have been central to the organization of the line or point 
that separates life and death. 
 
185 C.f. Gilles Deleuze “Postscript on the Societies of Control,” October 59 (Winter 1992): 3–7. Deleuze pushes this 
historical categorization when he argues that Foucault’s disciplinary societies have succumbed to new more diffuse and 




These two intertwined mechanical motifs are tied up with Derrida’s discussion of the instant 
and with his recurrent challenge to a dominant account of the Western philosophy of time that 
privileges the present moment. What is the instant like? How has it been represented? How have 
images of death framed the instant? What are the consequences of this model of thinking time? 
What links sovereignty to this account of time, which has enjoyed a historical privilege over other 
concepts?  
To answer these questions, this section traces the desire for the instant first, as framed by the 
“calculating machine” of the guillotine (which figures as the symbolic site of transfer from 
monarchical to popular forms of sovereignty) and second, as it is produced and developed in the 
ethos of analogue photography—with more or less deadly consequences. My basic argument is that 
both the guillotine and the classical ontology of the photographic snapshot (instantané) share—or 
develop—a common presupposition of the instant. This presupposition, moreover, serves to 
preserve the phantasm of sovereignty described in chapter 1. I argue for a kind of reversibility or 
convertibility between these two machines of political power, which analogically mirror one another 
in the specular theater of the death penalty. Through this mirroring, the possibility of mastering the 
instant through one machine’s operation is empirically confirmed by the other. These two machines 
thus preserve the phantasm en abyme. My first diagnostic move then, is to examine the understanding 
of the instant mobilized by these twinned machines. This will set the stage for the final section, 
which threads these two notions back together in a double and deconstructive reading of the instant 
of death in the short film of Weidmann’s execution. This “stereoscopic” analysis will demonstrate 




On the one hand, the guillotine, which served as the exclusive instrument for the deliverance of the 
death penalty in France from the Reign of Terror through to the abolition of capital punishment in 
1981, was said to end life in a single instant without subjecting the condemned to the specular nuit 
blanche of punishment that preceded executions during the Ancien Régime. As a more humane 
method of execution, neither “cruel” nor “unusual,” to borrow the language of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the guillotine was considered a reform in the progressive evolution of 
legal methods of putting to death. The guillotine was rational and egalitarian; a “humanitarian 




to the Penal Code of 1791, decollation was a method of execution reserved for the monarchy and 
aristocracy. However, when the machine’s inventor, Dr. Joseph-Ignace Guillotin presented his 
machine to the National Constituent Assembly on 1 December 1789, he promised that the blade’s 
mechanized instantaneity would democratize the death penalty by ensuring the repeatability of death 
without difference. Enlisting medical opinions to support the new democratic art of dying, the 
Assembly heard testimony from the Secretary of the Academy of Surgery, Dr. Antoine Louis, who 
assured the revolutionary government that the new apparatus would ensure that decapitation 
occurred in “an instant” according to the spirit and intention of the new law that stipulated that all 
should be equal in death.186  
The guillotine condensed the spectacle in a new economy of time that was supposed to rid 
the death penalty of pain by reducing death to a mere “instantaneous passage without duration” 
(DP1 222). According to Guillotin, the transit from presence to non-presence—or from “being to 
nothingness”—was said to fall “like a bolt of lightning” in an “infinitesimal, inconsistent, inexistent 
instant, an instant without time”—on a single point, or a punctual stigmē” (DP1 222). The French 
physician, René-George Gastellier, similarly reports: 
 
The velocity of lighting is not greater than that of the fall of the blade, whose 
accelerated precipitation by the weight of the mouton, is such that from the first point 
of contact to the last there is no distance: it is an indivisible point, the blade falls and 
the patient is no more.187  
Hence Foucault writes in Discipline and Punish, “decapitation reduces all pain to a single gesture, 
performed in a single moment—the zero degree of torture.”188 With the invention of the guillotine 
“death was reduced to a visible, but instantaneous event.”189 According to this logic, the guillotine 
contracts the death into a timeless instant. Instantaneity is thus connected to the exceptional logic of 
sovereignty, which underwrites the connection between mastery and death. Sovereignty imagines its 
proper instant as the “indivisible stroke” of the guillotine, which is “as silent as it is instantaneous, 
without any thickness of time” (R 109). The hallmark of sovereign power is zero-time. So long as the 
 
186 Dr. Antoine Louis was credited with designing a prototype of the guillotine. For a period of time after its invention, 
the guillotine was called the “louisette” or a “louison.” See Friedland, Seeing Justice Done, 243. 
187 René-George Gastellier, Que penser enfin du supplice de la guillotine? (Paris, France: chez les marchands de nouveautés, 
1796), 19-20, my translation. 
188 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 33. 




condemned dies in the “blink of the eye” (Augenblick), the death penalty remains proper to the 
dignity of man. The figure of the guillotine’s instantaneous blade, which severs life from death, 
serves to link the two themes of instantaneity (the “intemporal instant”) and anesthesia (“insensibility, 
non-pain, non-cruelty”) (DP1 225): the instant proper to the guillotine would put an end both to 
time and to suffering. This is why, Derrida quips, “The guillotine is not just a killer, it’s a painkiller 
[in even more colloquial American English, we might say that it is a killer painkiller] … And [it] kills 
pain because in a certain way, reducing time to an instant, to the nothingness of an instant, it kills 
time” (DP1 9).  
What then is the connection between sovereignty and this anaesthesial instant in this specific 
form of modern instantaneism? Ever since the revolutionary government chopped off the King’s 
head—in an iconoclastic instant that inaugurated a new model of popular or democratic 
sovereignty—there has been this intensified link between political sovereignty and a view of an 
anaesthesial instant that makes death masterable by suggesting its determinability. The sovereign is 
put in the position of mastering death by conceiving it as a “cut off” from life. As Fritsch writes,  
The sovereignty of Eurocentric humanism consists in seeking to master death by 
pin-pointing it as the end of life, by dreaming of “killing time,” and with it 
affectability by others, as Derrida puts it near the end of the first year of the Death 
Penalty Seminar (DP1, 226/308; see also Rogues 109/154). Because subjection to 
time and change signals receptivity, suffering, and relation to others, to contract time 
into an instant is to attempt to master time, to kill it, and to render the self sovereign 
invulnerable to alterity.190 
According to Derrida, this view of sovereign temporality is not entirely wrong. In principle, I 
wouldn’t be a subject if I didn’t contract time. Sovereignty, as we saw in the first chapter, involves a 
capacity or power—what I called ipseity—to return to itself, which shores up its power and identity 
by appropriating it back into itself. This is always part of sovereignty. However, in the case of the 
guillotine, this contraction manifests as a specific belief that one can determine the instant of death. 
Moreover, this account of “killing time” implicitly draws on a certain strand of thinking of 
time in the “metaphysics of presence” that gives priority to the instant or the “now.” Derrida calls 
this interpretation of time “constituted of simple discontinuous, discrete, and undecomposable 
instants,” Cartesian instantaneism (DP1 225). However, it belongs to a longer tradition of thinking 
 




of time that Heidegger links to Aristotle in Being and Time. According to Heidegger, Aristotle laid the 
foundations of a “vulgar” or “common” concept of time that subsequently informed various 
canonical formulations from Hegel through Bergson.191 On Heidegger’s account, Aristotle 
inaugurates linear instantaneity in the history of thinking about time in chapter 4 of the Physics, 
where he says that time is composed of a successive series of “nows” (nun) or atomic points separate 
from one another and ordered into a chain that make up the stream of time. Hegel then gives this 
classical temporal determination of the instant the spatial analogue of “punctuality” (Pünklichkeit), or 
the point. Heidegger tells us that this dominant understanding of time determined on the basis of 
the now, as a punctual point, always privileges the present (Gegenwart).192 It is this dominant account 
Western philosophy of time (which is by no means the only account of time) that Derrida has in 
mind when he says that sovereignty dreams of killing time, in the anaesthesial of the guillotine’s 
operation. 
Yet, Derrida is critical of Heidegger’s sweeping claims about the continuity of this account 
of time in the tradition of metaphysics. In “Ousia and Grammē,” he argues that Aristotle’s treatment 
of time, which is much more complicated and varied, takes the form of an exoteric aporia. Aristotle 
rehearses more than one understanding of the instant, when he describes the now both as a link 
(sunecheia) of time and a boundary-limit (peras). On the one hand, Aristotle says you have to give an 
account of the “part” and hence divisibility of time. If time is thought in terms of its divisibility—it 
is thought as a series of nows. On the other hand, you have to account for the movement or flow of 
time from a not-yet-now to a no-longer-now. Time implies “before” and “after,” or a coming to be 
and passing away of “nows” in a linear and successive fashion. However, if the now emerges out of 
a previous indivisible instant and gives rise to a subsequent indivisible instant, then each now also 
robs time of being, because it is always past and future. If time is thought in terms of indivisibility, it 
would never give way to another now, instead the now would be eternal. It would continue and 
there would be neither before nor after. In this case, there would be no change. For Aristotle, time is 
 
191 For Aristotle’s account of the aporia of time see Physics 4.10-14, 217b-218a, The Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. 
Jonathan Barnes. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984.  
192 Heidegger then develops his own understanding of “authentic” time against this backdrop. For Heidegger’s 
discussion of Aristotle see Heidegger, Being and Time, Division 6, 26. For his analysis of  Hegel’s thinking of  the 
punctuality of  the point see Being and Time, Division 2, 82 (a). See also Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity, 





aporetic: it both is and is not; the now is both a part and not a part of time. Time is both the 
temporal flow of nows, and a succession that divides the present and tears at the flow of time, 
entailing its destruction.193  
In The Guillotine and the Terror, the French historian Daniel Arasse suggests that the guillotine 
gives us a spatial metaphor for the Latin instans as that which “stands over” and “threatens.” The 
guillotine’s blade “expresses the instant” as a “knife’s edge” that divides the no longer now and the not 
yet now (Figure 10).194 Arasse writes: the instant of death without time “also consists of a separation, 
an infinitesimal and dynamic rupture between past and present. Each instant is a syncope out of 
which the linear continuity of time is constructed.”195 How can the instant both link and divide? 
How can continuity be based on the incessant tearing apart of time? The image of the guillotine 
stilled crystalizes the paradox of the Aristotelian aporetics of time in a strikingly modern form. There 
are at least three important consequences of this for our discussion. First, what emerges from 
Aristotle is not a coherent account of time, but rather, an aporetics of time, with more than one 
notion of the instant. Second, sovereignty implicitly draws on only one dimension of this aporia of 
time in order to support its claim that death is determinable in an instant that can be mastered in 
delivering a death penalty. Third, this experience of time needs technical methods of inscription in 
space. Both the guillotine and the camera serve this function.  
  
 
193 It is not clear that either of these accounts give Aristotle’s own position, nor whether he resolves the aporia of time. 
This perennial problem has been taken up by a number of thinkers, from Saint Augustine, Confessions, trans. Henry 
Chadwick (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009) to Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, Volume 1, Trans. Kathleen 
McLaughlin and David Pellauer (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1984). Derrida discusses the aporia of time 
and Heidegger’s treatment of it in “Ousia and Grammē: Note on a Note from Being and Time,” in Margins of Philosophy, 
translated Alan Bass (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 29–67.“Without a doubt,” he writes, “Aristotle 
thinks of time on the basis … of the now, the point, etc. And yet an entire reading could be organized that would 
repeat in Aristotle’s text both this limitation and its opposite” (61). Whereas Heidegger discerns two oppositional 
theories of time: one “inauthentic” account thought in terms of the present now and the other (his own) “authentic” 
account of temporality, Derrida advances his account of trace and iterability in order to think the co-implication of 
these accounts of time. See also Richard Beardsworth, Derrida and the Political (Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2013), 31-
34 and Fritsch, Taking Turns, which addresses Aristotle’s aporia by using Derrida’s figure of the “turn” give an account 
of democratic sovereignty that explains how time is both divisible and indivisible (162-163).  
194 Daniel Arasse, Guillotine and the Terror, trans. Christopher Miller (New York, NY: Penguin Press, 1989), 36. 











Figure 10. Unidentified photographer, L’ancienne guillottine ayant servi jusqu’en 1848. 
1921. Press photograph. Agence Meurisse. Photo courtesy of the Bibliothèque 







This brings me to the relation between the aporetics of time and processes of material inscription.196 
What is the connection between this phantasmatic concept of time and photography? Following 
Derrida, I will argue for a technical constitution of this experience of time. Photography functions to 
support this phantasmatic dimension of sovereignty that plays out in the death penalty’s attempts to 
master death vis-à-vis the determinability of the instant. Photography implicitly draws on this 
phantasm of sovereignty expressed in the guillotine’s instantaneity. The violent metaphorics of 
“taking” instantaneous pictures is beholden to this dominant concept of time premised on the 
instant. Conversely, the instant presupposed by the death penalty can only be experienced through 
processes of technical organization, which include the guillotine and photography. In short, 
sovereignty needs processes of material inscription to stabilize this phantasmatic dimension of time 
in the present. Yet, both photography and the philosophical concept of time have other sides. As we 
saw in the optic of spectrality outlined in chapter 1, photography’s modes of inscription are both 
complicit with sovereignty and a deconstructive and distancing device. These are the two 
“stereoscopic” sides our optic. Because of its intrinsic spectrality, photography also draws out 
another account of time constituted through differential iterability. This duplicity allows 
photography to trouble the indivisibility of ipsocratic sovereignty. As I will show in the next section, 
in my discussion of the short film of Weidmann’s execution, photography also allows for the 
exposure of sovereignty’s weakness. And in fact, as we have just seen, Aristotle’s account of time in 
the Physics is also both of these things! Aristotle gives us both an account of the divisibility and 
indivisibility of the instant, but without resolving the two into a single coherent account.  
For now, I will focus on photography’s complicity with this dominant “presentist” account 
of time’s determinability. I will track the relation between technics and time as it plays in a genealogy 
of the photographic snapshot (instantané), which attempts to seize the instant and make it visible. (I 
will return to this in the final chapter, where I interrogate the contemporary techno-scientific 
reorganization of the phantasm of instantaneity in “real time” operations of global warfare.) For 
now however, I will interrogate the representation of time as an instantaneous point in the history of 
analogue photography. The most I can do is trace a provisional genealogy of the snapshot in order 
to flush out the slumbering investment with instantaneity that stretches across very different 
theorizations of the image from Étienne-Jules Marey’s chronophotographic instant through Bazin’s 
 




realist analysis of the photograph as a “death mask,” and Barthes’ account of the punctum. 
Photography has been driven by a desire for the simplicity of the temporal instant as a minimal 
point of  phenomenal self-presence since its invention. Here too we find the theme of Augenblick or 
“the blink of the eye” is central to the conceptualization of the photographic instant. This itinerary 
will deepen our understanding of the association of image and death traced in the last chapter, as 
well as the complicity of a certain understanding of the image with the Western philosophy of time, 
while setting the stage for a deconstructive reading of the instant of death. 
The desire to contract and distill time into its minimal unity of a now-point was central to the 
modern project of nineteenth-century chronophotography. The instant was the primary passion of 
the early photographic research of Jules-Étienne Marey along with his contemporaries, Thomas 
Skaife, Eadweard Muybridge, Albert Londe, and Jules Janseen who aimed to materialize the “now” 
in an instantaneous image conceived as a point without duration.197 Thomas Skaife explains that 
“Time is duration with beginning and end, but instantaneity is beginning and end without 
duration.”198 For Skaife, the “twinkling of the eye” comprised of “a closing and opening movement 
during which the eye is darkened for the space of one-tenth of a second” served as the “best, oldest 
and most reliable” criterion for instantaneity. The theme of the Augenblick or the “intemporal 
instant” re-emerges to define the photographic instant as the smallest unit of time which the 
unassisted human eye fails to measure: lightening, for example, is considered instantaneous because 
the unassisted eye cannot perceive if its flash lasts one-tenth of a second, or else a ten-millionth part 
of a second.199  
This desire to capture the instant drove a series of  technical inventions that sought to reduce 
the time of  exposure to an absolute point without duration. New apparatuses of capture were 
 
197 The contemporaneous movement in Germany was known as Augenblickphotographie and in England, as the 
Instantaneous Photography Movement. For an account of Edward Muybridge’s pioneering contributions to the early 
vernacular Instantaneous photography movement see Phillip Prodger, Time Stands Still: Muybridge and the Instantaneous 
Photography Movement (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003). See Denis Bernard and André Gunthert 
L’instant Rêvé: Albert Londe. (Nîmes, France: Éditions Jacqueline Chambon, 1993) for an account of  Albert Londe’s role 
in the “discovery” of the snapshot in the early nineteenth century. Londe, is best remembered for his work producing 
the iconography of hysteria while serving as a medical photographer at the Salpêtrière Hospital in Paris under Jean-
Martin Charcot. See also André Gunhert’s thesis “La Conquête de l’instantané: Archéologie de l’imaginaire 
photographique en France (1841-1895),” École des hautes études en sciences sociales, 1999. 
198 Thomas Skaife, Instantaneous Photography, Mathematical and Popular Including Practical Instructions on the Manipulation of the 
Pistolgraph (Greenwich: Henry S Richardson, 1860). 





designed to render this “trifling obscurity of vision” visible as a point of presence. In 1859, The 
British Journal of  Photography reported a demonstration of  Skaife’s “Pistolgraph” which used a rubber-
band powered shutter to condense the speed of  the shutter’s operation.200 By 1878, new light 
sensitive gelatin dry-plate emulsions allowed for the reduction of exposure time to 1/25th of  a 
second. And in 1882, Marey presented his “photographic gun” (fusil photographique) in the journal La 
Nature, which allowed for the capture, dissection, and analysis of  bodies in motion through a 
sequence of still images with unprecedented sharpness and legibility (Figure 11). Marey’s apparatus 
allowed him to analytically dissect movement into a series of points that could represent temporal 




Figure 11. Louis Poyet, Étienne-Jules Marey’s Photographic Gun. 1882. Etching. La Nature 18.464. Photo courtesy of 
Wikimedia Commons. 
 
200 John Hannavy, ed. “Snapshot Photography,” in Encyclopedia of Nineteenth-Century Photography (New York, NY: 





Figure 12. Étienne-Jules Marey, Photographe d’une mouette pendant son 
vol. Photograph obtained with the help of a photographic rifle. 
1882. La Nature 18. 464. Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons. 
 
Cinematic Time, Mary-Anne Doane describes Marey’s primary interest as the methodological analysis 
of  time through its fragmentation into the smallest possible unit—the photographic instant—which 
could (at least in theory), be “re-synthesized” with the advent of  cinema.201 She writes: “The 
representation of  time … as a series of  points … potentially actualisable as a zero point mandates a 
conceptualization of  the instantaneous image as a point.”202 Analogically mirroring the knife’s-edge 
of  the guillotine, the mechanical nod of  the camera’s shutter cut into time’s flow, parceling it out 
into an equidistant succession of  atomic units representable as “instantaneous” images.  
Marin thus describes the representation of time as an indivisible point as both the “aesthetic 
ideal” and “proto-scientific technique” of nineteenth-century photographic research; the dream of 
“seizing the instant” in the snapshot by suspending the flow of time and fixing it in its minimal unity 
 
201 Although Marey’s images were an important precursor to the technical development of the motion picture camera 
Marey was compelled by the dissection movement, rather than its synthesis through the apparatuses of projection 
under development at the time by Lumière brothers. Marey’s contributions to the development of the 
chronophotographic instant nonetheless made possible the development of the motion picture camera. 





of an instant of presence was the “guiding axiom” of early chronophotographic experimentation.203 
Doane calls this desire to control time the “lure” of the instant. Marx might call it a fallacy of 
hypostatization. Marin calls it the Medusa effect.204 By this, he points to the instant as an effect that is 
framed as a minimal unity, only by repressing its relation to spectrality: 
But if the dream [of the instant] is an ideal of the creative imagination and of 
scientific reason, it is also illusion, quasi-hallucination, theatre of nocturnal shadows, 
dissipated in the clear morning of the watchful mind. The instant, an ideal; the 
instant, an illusion, an evanescence, pure hallucinatory effect, the recording of which 
cannot fix the proper lure, like the conjuror who can only pull the rabbit from his hat 
because he has put it there.205 
The “discovery” of the snapshot in the nineteenth century eruditely testifies to the phantasmatic 
desire for presence without différance or spectrality.  
In a certain sense the snapshot does not merely represent time, but rather, invents or 
supplements an understanding of time as comprised of a series of indivisible points thought on the 
basis of presence.206 This performativity of  the instant is a retroactive construct with political 
consequences: the photographic snapshot was the guarantor of  a new regime of  positivistic 
visuality. If the evanescent now eludes capture, if it disappears as the very moment we apprehend it, 
with the advent of photography, the instant could for the first time be seized in a visible form as 
something “actual” and “present” that could be analyzed and controlled. Marey’s interpretation of 
the instant facilitates its appropriation by scientific thinking, which associates actuality with reality, 
and finally, with objectivity. On this reading the camera, as an apparatus of capture, is admitted into 
a long history of machinery of domination. 
Bazin’s realist ontology gives us the next step in this genealogy of  the instant. In his 1945 
essay “The Ontology of the Photographic Image,” Bazin theorizes the photographic instant as an 
incision in time that embalms life. Like Marey, Bazin decomposes time into a series of  still frames 
understood as undecomposable points that form the most basic semantic unit of cinema. 
Developing a film aesthetics indebted to the Peircean concept of  index, Bazin invokes a number of  
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205 Marin, “Le présent de la presence,” 13, my translation. 





analogies to convey the immediacy of  the mechanical imprint: he compares the still frame to a 
footprint, a fingerprint, and finally—a death mask. The instant of the shutter’s release preserves a 
past-present snatched from the ineluctable flux of time and impressed like a “death mask.”207 Like 
the Roman funerary practice of the imago examined in the last chapter, the photographic image is 
produced by direct contact with the departed, it gives a direct trace or physical imprint of the real 
that serves to materialize the limit between life and death. The image is indelibly linked to the 
departed object by virtue of  this direct, physical transmission, (in this case of  the instantaneous 
operation of  light on silver bromide), giving an incontrovertible trace or record of  the real.208  
Under the sign of  the death mask, Bazin thus develops the indexical paradigm that came to 
dominate the first wave of photographic theory, serving at once to ballast the new medium’s status 
as objective evidence, while confirming the image’s relation to death.209 Thus Sontag, for example, 
 
207 The framing of the question of image in French post-Heideggerian philosophy around the figure of the death mask is 
formidable. Heidegger, having encountered Ernst Benkard’s influential publication Undying Faces: A Collection of Death 
Masks, trans. (Margaret M Green. London: Hogarth Press, 1929)—which reproduces the death masks held by the 
Schiller National Museum of Marbach—discusses the photograph of Blaise Pascal’s death mask in his Marburg 
lectures of the same year. He returns to the death mask in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics in the context of his 
interrogation of Kant’s transcendental schematism in the first Critique, where he argues for the centrality of the image 
(Bild) in the imagination’s synthesizing activity (the imagination, according to Kant, is responsible for unifying the 
manifold of intuition in an image through its temporalizing activity). See Martin Heidegger, “Image and Schema,” in 
Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. Richard Taft (Indianapolis, IL: Indiana University Press, 1973), 65–68. The 
question of the image is thus situated by Heidegger, using the example of the death mask, as the pivotal question 
around which the metaphysics of presence crystallizes. Derrida offers a short commentary on Heidegger’s reading in 
BS2 (171-173). Jean-Luc Nancy takes up the image of Roman mortuary mask in The Ground of the Image, where he 
argues that Heidegger’s critique of Western metaphysics revolves around his questioning of the status of the image’s 
relation to finitude (80-100). Louis Kaplan takes up Nancy’s argument to recast Bazin’s indexical theory of the 
photograph as death mask as a mode of exposure to alterity in “Photograph/Death Mask: Jean-Luc Nancy’s Recasting 
of the Photographic Image” Journal of Visual Culture 9 no. 1 (2010): 45-62; finally, Jeff Fort reads the death mask into 
Maurice Blanchot’s analysis of the “corpse-image” in the wake of Heidegger’s reading of the Kantian schematism in 
The Imperative to Write (New York, NY: Fordham University Press), 248-290. See also Emmanel Alloa, “Bare 
Exteriority: Philosophy of the Image and the Image of Philosophy in Martin Heidegger and Maurice Blanchot,” Text 
Theory Critique no. 10 (2005): 69-82.  
208 In “The Indexical and the Concept of Medium Specificity” Mary Anne Doane asserts that it is no accident that 
Bazin’s death mask of the pharaoh is associated with sovereignty, “for the indexical itself has attained a form of 
semiotic sovereignty in the face of its imminent demise” (129). See Mary Ann Doane, “The Indexical and the Concept 
of Medium Specificity,” Differences : A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies 18, no. 1 (2007), 128-52, doi: 
10.1215/10407391-2006-025.  
209 Laura Mulvey calls this the “time of index.” Pointing to the paradoxical conclusion of Bazin’s cinematic aesthetic, 
Mulvey aims to rethink cinema as life inhabited by death and stillness. In Bazin’s cinematic ontology, each instant that 
makes up the time of the moving image is comprised in an intrinsic relation to death that comes to haunt life itself as 





observes that the photograph is not an interpretation of the real, but the real itself; the image is 
“directly stenciled off the real, like a footprint or a death mask.” Like Bazin, she draws on the figure 
of the death mask to articulate an indexical account of photographic ontology: while a painting gives 
a mere interpretation of the world, the photograph is a literal “emanation” of light reflected by 
objects, “a material vestige” and thus an indexical trace.210 But whereas Bazin directs his theory of 
the index-qua-death-mask towards the ancient ambition of overcoming death, for Sontag, 
photography, by virtue of its indexicality, becomes potent means of gaining control over its 
objects.211 Following this logic, the photographer is a kind of hunter that asserts his dominance over 
the world by ensnaring it in images that submit it to a metaphoric death. The language surrounding 
photography attests to this analogy: one “takes” a photograph; one “shoots” one’s subject, etc. 
There is an implicit logic of violence and domination that is only strengthened by the historical fact 
that camera technologies were adapted from those of munitions. Barthes similarly confirms that the 
image and the referent remain tethered together “like the condemned man and the corpse in certain 
tortures.”212 
The indexical analogy of  the death mask allows Bazin to address a general existential alliance 
of  the image and death; it serves as a kind of shorthand for photography’s relation to time and 
finitude. Bazin’s analogy of the mask captures his idea of the materiality of the imprint, while 
signaling the instantaneous image’s paradoxical oscillation between conservation and loss, presence 
and absence. On the one hand, the instantaneous image is a certificate of a past-present. Like the 
footprint, the photograph announces the absence (and thus death) of what it represents. On the 
other hand, the analogy of the death mask is always an image of one whose time has run out. Like 
the imago, the photograph promises to halt time’s forward march, offering posterity to what it 
represents. The image seeks to save the instant from its inevitable disappearance. The camera 
promises the survival of the photographed, “freed the conditions of time and space that govern it.” 
 
each frame of the film strip: film as Mulvey concludes, is death at 24fps. This means that the old analytic distinction of  
still photographic image (allied with death) vs. the animate cinematic image (allied with life) is no longer tenable. See 
Laura Mulvey, Death 24x a Second: Stillness and the Moving Image (London: Reaktion Books, 2015). Jean-Luc Nancy also 
problematizes the equation between the photograph, stillness, and death in his investigations the violence of the image 
in Ground of the Image, trans. Jeff Fort (New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 2005). 
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Bazin’s image transcends death by saving what was bound to decay and time; the photograph 
“embalms time,” as he famously says, rescuing the referent from “its proper corruption.”213 The 
function of the image, according to Bazin’s pithy formulation, is “the preservation of life by 
representation of life.” On this reading, photography, as much as philosophy, succumbs to a desire 
to master death. Photography aims against death. It tries to preserve what is bound to decay by 
arresting the entropy inherent in all things. The photograph steals life, taking it to itself and producing 
its “petrified analogue.”214 Offered as an assurance that what is promised to death might survive, the 
photograph serves as a mnemonic defense against time.215  
But paradoxically, if the very passage of time is life, one can equally say that the 
photographic image preserves life by arresting or “shooting” it. Photography “masters” death, only 
by killing.216 And this elicits the thanatological metaphorics of Marey’s chronophotographic gun. 
Hardly a “sublimation of a gun,” Marey’s apparatus was a modified Colt rifle that borrowed its 
design from Jules Janssen’s 1873 “astronomical revolver” (revolver astronomique).217 The lexicon of 
capture and prey moreover, is encoded in the English term “snap-shot,” derived from an old 
hunting term describing a quickly executed pistol shot at a fast-moving target. The photographic 
sense of the term emerged only in 1860 when, Sir J.P.W. Herschel, spokesperson for the British 
Instantaneous photography movement, referred to “the possibility of  taking a photograph, as it 
were, by a snap-shot—of  securing a picture in a tenth of  a second in time.”218 The snapshot’s 
violent genealogy also extends to the methods employed for fixing images. For example, in 1888, 
George Eastman developed a photograph-chemical paper negative using guncotton, a highly 
flammable substance made from dissolving cotton wool in nitric acid. As Paul Landau notes 
“breech-loading guns and the Kodak camera not only drew on the same language; they both sealed 
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the same sort of chemicals in their cartridges.”219 The snapshot (instantané) thus remains tethered in 
this paradigm to a thinking of domination that links violence and vision.  
And yet, if photography kills, it is said to do so in an instant without time and without pain. The 
condition of its “essentially objective character” resides in an anesthetizing automaticity that Bazin 
describes, in tandem with the logic of the guillotine, as “impassive” (impassabilité).220 Harbingers of 
democratic modernity, both guillotine and camera alike, allow for the ostensible removal of suffering 
by virtue of their mechanism. Cinema too was a “killer painkiller.”221 Whereas the guillotine 
“democratized” the death penalty by offering decapitation to all, the camera’s lens (l’objectif) 
“democratized” the exclusionary practices of portraiture which had been reserved solely for 
aristocracy.  
All this is confirmed in a certain sense by Barthes’ Sartrean phenomenology of the image, 
which implicitly incorporates many of Bazin’s intuitions in its account of the lacerating force of the 
photographic punctum (the Latin term for point).222 But for Barthes, who performs a sort of reversal, 
the point of the now does not only cut into time, but into the viewer: the punctum names a detail in 
the photograph that “pricks” or “wounds” the viewer. It is in the punctum that Barthes finds the 
meaning of the image. What cuts into Barthes is the realization of his own impending death.223 
Death, as we saw in the last chapter, is the meaning or “eidos” of the photograph.  
However, for Barthes, the temporality of the photographic instant registers a double fatality. 
The photograph gives testimony that a thing has been present. This “that-has-been,” is for Barthes, 
the “noeme” of photography. “The photographic referent,” he writes, is not an “optionally real thing 
to which an image of a thing refers but the necessarily real thing which has been placed before the 
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Cahiers du cinéma would expunge the Catholic humanist in the wake of the political events of May ‘68 in Paris. 





lens, without which there would be no photograph.”224 Every photograph points euphemistically to 
“that which has occurred only once.”225 But just as the photograph presents a literal “emanation” of 
the referent—its “certificate of presence”—it simultaneously announces its absence and thus, death. 
For photography to be possible, the image must be able to separate from the presence of that which 
was photographed. From the moment the image is “taken,” there is sudden death. In becoming a 
photograph, one is transformed, petrified, immobilized, mortified—“embalmed,” as Bazin says. 
Severing the referent, the image turns the photographed subject into an object. The diabolical 
complicity of guillotine and camera is not lost on Barthes, who likens the splitting instant of the 
shutter to a “little death.” The nineteenth-century obsession with the “inexorable analogical 
similarity between the technology of the guillotine, in which the head is immobilized and framed 
before being severed from the body, and the mechanics of popular portraiture, in which the strange 
prosthesis of “Headrest and pedestal” are utilized to immobilize the subject before the click of the 
shutter shuts life down in a “micro-version of death.”226  
At the same time, photography enables us to speak of the ineluctability of death before our 
“actual” death. This strikes Barthes in his discussion of Alexander Gardner’s famous 1865 portrait 
of the young assassin Lewis Powell, who—like Robespierre—stands responsible for the death of a 
sovereign (Figure 13). (Powell was condemned for his involvement in the assassination of President 
Abraham Lincoln.) Gardner’s photograph of Powell awaiting the gallows registers a torsion in time 
that announces death in the future: “The photograph is handsome, as is the boy: that is the studium. 
But the punctum is: he is going to die.”227 The photograph marks a double structure: it mourns for 
what it represents as absent, but it is also a memento mori that anticipates death in the mode of the 
future anterior like a medieval ars moriendi. The instant thus signals a double fatality: “Whether or not 
the subject is already dead, every photograph is this catastrophe.”228 The punctum opens the now to 
another experience of the torsion of finitude that marks the structure of death-in-life as a structural 
force. We will return to this reading of the temporality of the photographic instant as a temporal 
rupture. For now, let it suffice to say that this provisional genealogy of  the temporality of  the 
photographic instant confirms a common philosophical heritage of  thinking the temporal instant as   
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Figure 13. Alexander Gardner, Washington Navy Yard, D.C. Lewis Payne, in Sweater, Seated and Manacled. April 






a point. This desire for instantaneity has served as the guiding thread, or idée fixe, from the early 
decades of chronophotographic experimentation through Barthes’ phenomenology of the image.  
We find evidence further of the alliance of these visionary machines of death inscribed in 
their respective nomenclatures. According to underworld slang, the first assistant to the executioner 
responsible for fastening the condemned’s neck into the bezel (lunette) of the guillotine was 
colloquially known as “the photographer,” ostensibly because his gaze strikes the condemned 
through the semi-circular window of decapitation that resembles the camera lens, while the angled 
blade recalls its shutter.229 Tracing the entanglement of the two emissaries of instant death through 
the literary imagination, Patrick Wald Lasowski writes: “Parmi les aides du bourreau, celui qui, par 
les oreilles ou les cheveux, tire la tête du condamné dans le collier—la lunette ainsi obtureé—celui-là, 
on le surnomme le photographe.”230 Conversely, on 2 April 1845, the young physicists Louis Fizeau 
and Léon Foucault introduced the newly christened “guillotine shutter” (obturateur à guillotine). The 
mechanism, which was described by the early photographer George Dawson in “Notes on 
Instantaneous Shutters” as a simple “slot falling immediately in front of the sensitive plate,”231 
sharpened the time of exposure to an unprecedented brevity, enabling Fizeau and Foucault to 
capture the first daguerreotype of the sun—none other than Plato’s great analogy for sovereign 
power in the Republic (Figure 14).232 
The twinned technologies of the image and death, which were by no means coeval 
developments (the guillotine, which was introduced to the French in 1789, proleptically prepared for 
the 1839 advent of photography), can thereby be seen to exchange their attributes. Marin captures 
this reversibility between the temporal notion of the instant mobilized by these two modern 
techniques of power when he tells us that the snapshot always has something to do with 
decapitation. This is reflected in the “phantasmatic structure” (structure fantasmatique) that makes the 
image appear, as much as through its iconic content.233 The snapshot (l’instantané), which emerges as  
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Figure 14. Hippolyte Fizeau and Léon Foucault, Image photographique du soleil prise le 22 avril 1845 par Fizeau et Foucault. 1845. 
Glass plate - wet collodion. Photo courtesy of Bibliothèque nationale de France. 
 
our paradigmatically modern method of framing and thus producing an understanding death in the 
nineteenth century, is beset by a drive to instantaneity that is yet another manifestation of the will to 
master the spectrality that is nevertheless sovereignty’s very condition. Whereas the guillotine was 
likened to a “terrifying ‘portrait machine,’”234the photograph severs the body of  its subject from the 
flow of  life: “the snapshot slits the throat (l’instantané lui tranche le cou).”235 Both attempt to master 
death by condensing time into an instant. “Life / Death” writes Barthes, using the caesura (Latin for 
‘cutting’) to visually separate the two terms, “the paradigm is reduced to a simple click, the one 
separating the initial pose from the final print.”236 
Having flushed out the shared subterranean desire for a phantasmatic notion of the 
determinability of the instant that coalesces around the sovereign mechanisms of the guillotine and 
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the photographic snapshot, we will see how the slippage between these cosignatories of instantaneity 
is visualized (mise en vision) in the short film of Eugène Weidmann’s execution, where the two 
instants converge—stereoscopically—on the penal stage of the execution. 
 
Take 1: The Scene Of The Execution 
Eugène Weidmann was beheaded on rue Georges Clémenceau, outside the Prison Saint-Pierre at 
Versailles, in what would prove to be metropolitan France’s last public execution. I want to turn 
now to the anonymous amateur film of Weidmann’s execution, shot unbeknownst to authorities 
from a window adjacent to the prison. Comprised of a single handheld shot, a mere thirteen seconds 
in duration, this film allow me to examine the relation “between the death penalty and spectacle, the 
mise en scène, the essential voyeurism that attaches to a putting to death that must be public because 
legal” (DP1 3-4). Here, guillotine and camera enter the scene together.  
This film affords a first performative articulation of the “optic” or “infrastructure” of 
spectrality—the first “take,” so to speak—according to which sovereignty needs images of death to 
install itself, even as images deconstruct sovereignty. Functioning under an aporetic exigency, the 
optic of spectrality frames a double and deconstructive reading of the film: first, as a sovereign 
technique of “mastering” death by condensing time into a visible instant, and second, as a mode of 
spectralized haunting that destabilizes the very limit it presumes to calculate and operate. I will 
examine the temporal logic explicitly operationalized by this film as well as that which it implicitly 
makes possible against its explicit intention. This stereoscopic reading illustrates the shared logic that 
weds the guillotine to the classical ontology of photography in a spectacular visual economy, while 
simultaneously uncovering the disruptive force of images of death.  
Let’s reconstruct the scene: it is the first light of dawn, 17 June 1939. A crowd has been 
milling about since the small hours of morning. Jazz can be heard spilling from the cafes onto the 
boulevard. (We might imagine Miles Davis’ lonely trumpet urging the plot to its ineluctable 
conclusion.)237 Police, apprehensive, erect barricades just after 2:00. By 3:00, journalists have 
installed themselves in the windows of a hotel adjacent the prison, while spectators clamber onto 
neighbouring rooftops. The proceedings, slated to commence at 3:30 under cover of night, are 
delayed. It seems the inexperienced executioner, Jules-Henri Desfourneaux had been engaged, 
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ironically enough, in a dispute with the head prosecutor of Versailles over the subject of time. As 
rumour has it, they were quarreling over whether the time of death, handed down in an exceptional 
moment of sovereign decision, should be calculated in accordance with standard or solar time. It is 
dawn, then, when the doors to the prison finally swing open at 4:31. There is enough light for the 
photographers to shoot the guillotine in action. Weidmann emerges from the prison gate, hands 
bound, eyes tightly shut, flanked on either side by the executioner’s assistants. He walks to his death 
“comme un somnambule, absent, voluntaire.”238 The assistants fling him face down on the tilting 
board (bascule); “his shoulders,” the New York Herald Tribune would report with slight erotic tenor, 
appear “startlingly white against the dark polished wood of the machine.”239 It is at this point in the 
dramatic action that the camera begins to roll, revealing the executioner’s assistant, or 
“photographer,” André Obrecht, awaiting his delivery at the far side of the guillotine (Figure 15).240 
The tilting board is thrust onto the lower block of the scopic machine. Obrecht threads his patient’s 
neck through the eye of the bezel, making adjustments so as to be sure to have the right angle. Then, 
relinquishing his hold, he takes two strides backwards, widening his view, assuring a clear sightline. 
He pauses, in anticipation—the image wavers. The executioner pulls the cable-release (le déclic). The 
knife drops like a bolt of lightning. The “photographer” dips forward, bringing his head in line with the 
film plane. He pushes in for a close-up. His comportment resembles the street photographer, who 
hastens to capture l’instant décisif. Weidmann’s body rolls neatly into the wicker basket pulled 
alongside the guillotine. “Clic-clac: dans le panier, comme le photographe dit: c’est dans la boîte.”241 
The camera cuts—It’s in the can. 
My question, then: what is it that this first assistant, this aide du bourreau, or so-called 
“photographer,” photographs?  
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Two things, or rather one thing seen from two “angles,” to use the language of 
cinematography. Each of these angles (we can call them the politics and the aesthetics of the scaffold) 
maps onto the optic of spectrality we sketched in the first chapter, whereby sovereignty needs 
images to master the specter of death while, at the same time, those same images amplify spectrality, 
exposing sovereignty to the very alterity they were supposed to hold at bay. Each of the 
photographer’s two angles crystalizes a paradox that condenses around the cutting edge of the 
instant. (These two angles also correspond to the first and second sides of the double genitive 





Figure 15. Roger-Viollet, Versailles, France: 1939. Execution of the German Criminal Eugène Weidmann. 1939. Photographic print. Photo 








of death and its role as a locus power over death. The second deals with the structural deathliness of 
the image of death.  
FIRST ANGLE: The photographer takes a picture of the execution for the State. He 
registers the shudder of death as though on the sensitized plate of national memory. The last person 
to witness the face of the condemned, the photographer “photographs” the one destined to die—his 
death mask—fixed at the threshold of death. As Arasse suggests in his account of revolutionary 
portraiture, “The guillotine portrait unmasks the traitor in his death mask.”242 
The photographer serves as the state’s witness to the brute facticity of the execution in a way 
demonstrative of the visuality that marks the application of any legal putting to death. As Derrida 
argues “with and against” Foucault (DP2 45): 
By definition, in essence, by vocation, there will never have been any invisibility for a legal 
putting to death, for an application of  the death penalty; there has never been, on principle, a 
secret or invisible execution for this verdict. The spectacle and the spectator are required. 
The state, the polis, the whole of  politics, the co-citizenry—itself  or mediated through 
representation—must attend and attest, it must testify publicly that death was dealt or inflicted, 
it must see die the condemned one.  
The state must and wants to see die the condemned one. 
And moreover it is at that moment, in the instant at which the people having become the 
state or the nation-state sees die the condemned one that it best sees itself. It best sees itself, 
that is, it acknowledges and becomes aware of its absolute sovereignty. (DP1 2 my emphasis) 
  
This paragraph elucidates our aide-bourreau-cum-photographer’s symbolic function in relation to 
political power. Drawing on the reflexive construction of the French “il se voit,” which can mean 
both “it lets itself be seen” or “it sees itself,” Derrida argues that the sovereignty of the sovereign is 
confirmed in the instant that the people “having become the state,” see the condemned die (DP1 2). 
The visuality of “seeing-punish,” is thus integral to the constitution of sovereignty. The state needs 
to see itself reflected as an image in the eyes of the co-citizenry in order to affirm and reaffirm its 
power (DP1 3). Elizabeth Rottenberg calls this a “new primal scene,” or the mirror stage of  
sovereignty: the nation-state reflects itself in a “sovereign selfie.”243 The photographer’s shot (prise de 
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vue) encapsulates this self-reflection of  sovereign power. In this photograph, “tout est donné dans 
un seul coup,” as Dubois writes in L’acte photographique.244 
On the basis of this scopic model, the “photographer’s” ideal image of death becomes the 
condition of possibility for sovereignty (perhaps we could even call this mode of sovereign 
technicity a “transcendental image”): this historically and geopolitically specific mutation of 
sovereignty tries to fix death as an instantaneous image in order to install itself. The deathly snapshot 
serves a number of interrelated functions at once:  
1. It institutes a new model of popular sovereignty in France, by uniting the headless body 
politic under a general will. What the Royalists decried as blasphemy, the revolutionaries hailed as 
“redemptive alchemy.” Decapitation was understood as an “esoteric necessity, indispensable to the 
emergence of a new head, a new era.”245 As Wills writes in “Drone Penalty,” a text to which I will 
return in the final chapter:  
The absolute monarchy could thenceforth be definitively overthrown only by 
decapitation; only in that way would Article II of  the 1789 Declaration of  the Rights of  
Man “the principle of  all sovereignty resides essentially in the Nation”—come to be 
fully respected; only by that means would sovereignty be transferred from an 
inviolable monarch to the state itself.246 
The instant of decapitation marks the dissemination of sovereignty into a new regime, by dividing 
the absolute singularity of power represented by the King as image of God (imago Dei) and making it 
sharable between the people. The people “become the state” in the moment they see the 
condemned die. Victor Hugo describes this “great mystery” as the central conceptual paradox of 
democratic sovereignty.247 The power of the state was concentrated in the image of the sovereign 
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King. The splitting instant of his beheading performed an iconoclastic division of the unity of power 
and disseminated it into the hands of the people. Popular sovereignty was thus a paradoxically 
divided sovereignty. 
Yet, the spectacle of the beheading both divided sovereignty and provided a symbolic 
resolution that re-subsumed the individual under the totality of an indivisible general will. Adapting 
Rousseau for the revolutionary government, Robespierre (who was at first opposed to the death 
penalty, but subsequently saw to the removal of several thousand French heads, beginning with the 
King) says that the public spectacle of the guillotine unites the body politic.248 The “seeing punish” 
(voir-punir), or the civic “duty-to-see-punish” (devoir de voir-punir), meted out in the scene of the 
execution unifies “the people” under a collective will in a symbolic re-legitimation of legal violence 
(DP1 43). Henceforth, each singular instant of  execution by guillotine in France, re-instantiates 
sovereign power. If  the specular structure of  the death penalty is pivotal to the demonstration of a 
modern theory of popular sovereignty, the guillotine gave this theory its specular illustration.  
2. Like the Roman imago, the aide-bourreau’s deathly snapshot materializes and stabilizes the limit 
between life and death. By taking Weidmann’s picture at the instant of death, he locates and abjects 
the condemned in a sacrificial exchange meant to ensure both the meaning of death and the 
continuation of the living polis in one and the same gesture. In this regard, while neither pikes nor 
promenades would survive the French Revolution, our “photographer” nonetheless marks a certain 
continuation of the specular function of the revolutionary headsman, whose job it was to raise the 
severed head for all to see.  
The performative force of decapitation in the institution and transference of sovereign 
power is famously illustrated by Isidore-Stanislas Helman’s engraving “Journée du 21 janvier 1793, la 
mort de Louis Capet sur la place de la Révolution” (1794), which was presented to the National 
Convention just weeks before the overthrow of Robespierre in the month of Thermidor (Figure 16). 
Helman portrays the executioner as he circles the scaffold, brandishing the King’s severed head like 
Perseus’ Medusa, in a petrifying act meant to revoke coronation, while transferring sovereign power 
into the hands of the people.249 The role of  the headsman was to fix the fatal moment visually and  
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Figure 16. Isidore-Stanislas Helman, Journée du 21 janvier 1793, la mort de Louis Capet sur la place de la Révolution. 1793. 
Etching. Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons. 
 
 
Figure 17. Unidentified photographer, Elie Théophile Deroo, Vromant, Auguste Pollet, and Abel Pollet. Les 4 têtes de Béthune. 1909. Press 





symbolically, by holding the truncated head for all to see. Analogically mirroring this function, the 
“photographer” takes the condemned’s portrait to confirm the death that has occurred.  
All this is complicated by the fact that there are actually two photographers on the scene: the 
aide-bourreau (let’s call him photographer-1) and the cinematographer who films the aide-bourreau 
as he “photographs” the instant that Wiedemann’s head is severed from his body (let’s call him 
photographer-2). Photographer-2 produces a technical image to confirm that photographer-1 has 
indeed witnessed the no time of the sovereign instant. This continues the development of the 
technological machines that makes it possible for everyone to do their job, so to speak; to actually see 
die the condemned (even if they were not there at the scene of the singular instant of the execution). 
Photographer-2 contributes to the virtualization of visibility. The reification of the moment of death 
into an instant requires technical methods of inscription for visual identification. This necessity has 
passed through a number of historical mutations. It is confirmed for example, by the gruesome 
collection of death masks held by the Black Museum of Scotland Yard of criminals executed outside 
Newgate Prison in London in the nineteenth century; by the photographs of the severed heads of 
convicts archived by the French “physiognomist of the guillotine,” Charles Marie Debierre, in the 
1895 publication La crâne des criminels; and finally, by the modern institution of the death-row mug 
shot, which symbolically decapitates the condemned according to the machine-like seriality of the 
guillotine itself: the condemned sits before the camera as though on the fatal plank, “awaiting the 
cruel instrument that will cut the thread of his days.”250  
Conversely, at the same time that processes of material inscription are necessary for the 
institution of sovereignty in the legal putting to death, they must equally be controlled. 
Photographer-1 serves as a symbolic functionary of the headsman, he testifies to the instant of 
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death, but is paradoxically prohibited from impressing the image he “takes.” His testimony must 
exclude technical intervention. Why? Because this interposition undermines testimony. As Derrida 
argues in “Demeure: Fiction and Testimony,” the very idea of testimony relies on the presence of 
the witness. One must be present “in order to testify to a present, to an indivisible moment, that is, 
at a certain point to a moment assembled at the time of an instantaneousness which must resist 
division.”251 The paradigm of “liveness” of the event must be retained (I will return to this in a 
moment), because the image’s mechanical repetition harbors a ghostly power that amplifies a 
spectrality that cannot be domesticated.  
Not only is photographer-1 prohibited from recording Weidmann’s “death mask” but, to 
add to the confusion (which is now approaching the dangerous form of a mise-en-abyme), 
photographer-2 is forbidden to photograph photographer-1 as he “thanatographs” the condemned. 
Penal spectacles had indeed come increasingly under fire with the advent of photography, with the 
jurist Joseph Louis Elzéar Ortolan campaigning for the abolition of public executions as early as 
1855. In 1909, the Minister of the Interior, Georges Clemenceau, introduced the first act of 
cinematographic censorship when he advanced a temporary act aimed at prohibiting Pathé 
cameramen from filming the quadruple execution of the infamous Pollet gang, whose severed heads 
were nevertheless the subject of post-mortem photography at the Béthune hospital (Figure 17).252 
Just the same, efforts to restrict publicity remained largely covert until 1939. For the most 
part, authorities regulated the production of images by ensuring executions took place at dawn, with 
just enough visibility to satisfy legal criteria.253 All this came to a head with the controversy 
surrounding Weidmann’s execution. Citing the scandalous images circulated by the press, on 24 June 
1939, Council President Édouard Daladier promulgated a decree that abolished public executions by 
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fiat. From that moment onwards, executions were conducted in prison courtyards and strictures 
were given to limit those entitled to attend. For the first time, clear directives were put in place to 
curtail the production of images of death. According to the proposed amendment to Article 26 of 
the French Penal Code, “No indication, no document relating the execution other than the [official] 
account can be published in the press, under penalty of a fine of one hundred to two thousand 
francs.”254 Even those who verbally recounted the scene of the execution could henceforth be 
prosecuted. With this, the death penalty in France was pushed offstage. We find a parallel situation 




Figure 18. Unidentified photographer, Public Hanging of Rainey Bethea on 14th August 1936, Owensboro, Kentucky. 1936. 
Photographic print. 3240535. Photo courtesy of Hulton Archive. 
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states throughout the 1880s and where photographic images of one of the last state-sanctioned 
public executions (in this case by hanging) of Rainey Bethea in Owensboro, Kentucky on 14 August, 
1936 before of a crowd of 20,000 spectators, played a role in prompting Kentucky’s governor to 
sign a bill eighteen months later that outlawed public executions, thereby ending the practice in the 
United States (Figure 18).256 To this day, statutes forbid the use of photographic mediation in all of 
the thirty-one remaining so-called “killing states.” Of these, fifteen still execute inmates in the 
middle of the night.257  
The first angle then, maps onto the first moment of our double optic of spectrality. If 
sovereignty demands a monopoly on the production and circulation of its images of death, this is 
because the image is both the symbol of power and the instrument of conquest, as I suggested in my 
genealogy of the snapshot. The visual iconocracy dictates the processes that govern how death is 
made visible and therefore how it is known and understood as an instantaneous event. This first 
angle involves a juridical-political problematic that coalesces questions about the institution and 
transference of sovereign power: images of death are both necessary and paradoxically controlled. 
At minimum, they are subject to regulation at the level of the nation-state.  
This does not, however, mean that executions are not visible! The decree “No images of 
death!” functions as a kind of juridical performative that covers over or represses sovereignty’s  
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Figure 19. Lucinda Devlin, The Omega Suites, Lethal Injection Chamber from Family Witness Room, Parchman State 





phantasmatic investment with images of death.258 The necessity of the witness is no less applicable 
today when the general public, while prohibited from the proscenium of the execution, is 
nonetheless considered to witness the event by proxy of official representatives, including media 
representatives who, in America, are approved by the Secretary of Corrections.259 Lucinda Devlin’s 
images of the iconic architectural environments of capital punishment trace the tensile binding of 
spectator and spectacle in the theatre of the death penalty. The Omega Suites (1991-1998) document 
the apparatuses and spaces of death, serving as poignant reminders that today’s carceral spaces are as 
specular as the old sovereign theatre (Figure 19). But this logic extends beyond the institutional 
structures of the death penalty. Today, images are deeply implicated in sovereign killing—for 
example, in the hyper virtualized space of drone warfare (to which we will return in our final 
chapter)—while being subject to the greatest prohibition under the Department of Homeland 
Security. This should serve to remind us that regardless of whether a nation-state still deploys the 
death penalty, current conceptions of sovereignty are still largely defined in accordance with a 
sacrificial logic that stakes a claim over the life and death of its citizens. So long as the logic of the 
death penalty and its attendant conceptions of sovereignty remain intact the deconstructive project 
is as imperative as ever. 
This brings us to the “turn around” or the “counter-shot”—to the B-Camera running all the 
while in the hierarchical world of the film set. Photographer-1, also photographs something that 
exceeds and supplements our first reading. This is the SECOND ANGLE. It will also be our 
second approach to the phantasm, which now takes on the ghostly pallor of an etymological chain 
that links it back to the Greek φάντασµα (phántasma): image, apparition, specter.  
At the same time that the photographer takes a picture of the execution from the point of 
view of the State, he uncovers the spectrality at work in the image of death. In addition to the entire 
judicial-political paradox framed through the little window of the guillotine, photographer-1 registers 
the representational problematic that haunts the death penalty seminars. This involves a certain 
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structural asymmetry, which in the dialect of the image-maker we might call “reciprocity failure”: 
whereas the guillotine attempts to master death in an instant without time and without vision, 
photography seeks to master the elided instant by materializing it as a visible point. 
The iconoclastic instant of the guillotine provoked a representational crisis: eyewitnesses 
complained that everything was over in the blink of an eye (en un clin d’oeil), the blade acting faster 
than the “speed of sight (la vitesse du regard).”260 The guillotine frustrates vision right at the “capital 
instant” by striking heads off faster than the eye can see. At the heart of the guillotine’s operation 
was the proper impossibility of representing the instant of death.261 This was considered part of the 
machine’s mechanical sublimity: “By its instantaneous action,” says Arasse, “the guillotine sets 
before our eyes the invisibility of death at the very instant of its occurrence.” The little window of 
the scopic machine of the guillotine “might be considered the blind spot around which there 
crystallizes a terrible visibility.” If sovereignty is erected or reflected in the “transcendental” image of 
death in the structure of the “seeing punish,” the punctum temporis of the blade’s descent nonetheless 
installs a laconic blindness in the sovereign empire of the gaze.262 This blind spot both institutes 
power and disorients it, calling forth more and more images.263 To reflect death, one needs images. In 
seeking to reveal something that was not visible in the first instance, technical images supplement 
the phantasmatic drive to master death through a magisterial witnessing of  the instant of  death. As 
a kind of  deferred sight, this offers another way of understanding François de La Rochefoucauld’s 
maxim: You cannot stare straight into the face of the sun, or death (Le soleil ni la mort ne se peuvent 
regarder en face).264  
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Let’s return for a moment to the capital moment in shifting place of power from 
monarchical to democratic sovereignty. Claude Lefort famously argues that this mutation in the 
form of political sovereignty has two aspects: first, as we have seen, power is now based on the 
people, and second, “the locus of power becomes an empty place.”265 Under the monarchical model 
of sovereignty, power was embodied in the King who was considered the earthly representative of 
God. The image of the King’s body was part of a visual iconocracy that served to symbolically unify 
the kingdom. As a visible manifestation of God’s power, the King’s bodily form provided a visual 
image of divine right and power: the King was considered an image of God (imago Dei), his body 
condensing within it a visual regime. By attacking the King, the revolution also attacked the empire 
of the gaze. If the iconoclastic moment of the guillotine links popular sovereignty to the image of an 
empty place, photography arrives to put power back in its visible place. Images of legal putting to 
death supplied one mechanism for supplementing the empty place of power left with the demise 
of monarchical sovereignty. In other words, images of death afforded a material technique for 
localizing, identifying, and symbolizing power. In a sense then, the new medium was born from the 
guillotine’s need to invent symbolizations of power for a new headless body politic.  
The technical image thus emerges as a kind of fetish that makes the instant of death visible 
as a point of fascination made accessible for the mastery of what Laura Mulvey calls “scopophilia” in 
her foundational work “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema.”266 The first wave of cinematic 
experimentation manifested an intense fascination with representing the point at which the living 
body becomes a corpse. Early filmmakers produced a series of “actuality” films that played a crucial 
role in framing and thus determining our understanding of death as an instantaneous event.267 Scott 
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Combs extends this line of analysis when he says that the early genre of the execution film “worked 
to create the impression of death as happening instantaneously, visualizing the relation between the 
“before” and “after.”268 Contributing to this scopic drive to master death by fixing it as visible point, 
the short film of Weidmann’s execution sharpens the limit between life and death into the 
conceptual opposition: Life/Death. This “paradigm,” writes Barthes, “is reduced to a simple 
click.”269  
Yet, the capacity of the image to mechanically reproduce the singular event of death—to 
make it reappear over space and time, problematizes the very divide it seeks to stabilize. The 
photograph provides a visual index that confirms death, while paradoxically making repeatable in 
another time what is said not to have taken time. At the same moment that photographer-1 registers 
the singularity of Weidmann’s death, he simultaneously frames the possibility of repeating that 
which “could never be repeated existentially.”270 Bazin describes the possibility of representing death 
as an ontological obscenity: death, the instant par excellence, cannot be represented “without violating 
its nature … We do not die twice.”271 Yet, on the screen, Weidmann dies every afternoon. With each 
viewing, he comes back as if living, as a phantom or a phantasm to re-enact his final coup de grâce once 
again in an uncanny temporality that pluralizes the instant, infecting life with the death that 
photography was supposed to hold at bay. Siegfried Kracauer was already aware of this paradox 
when, in his 1927 essay “Photography,” he wrote: “Seemingly ripped from the clutch of death, in 
reality [photography] has succumbed to it all the more.”272 Derrida says something similar when he 
argues that “mortuary sculpture, death masks, and impressions, wills, embalming, and the crypt, 
everything that preserves the dead, at the same time living and dead, beyond life and beyond death,” 
paradoxically dislocates the limit between life and death.273  
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Weidmann’s screen-death exposes us to a paradoxical experience of being “dead but not 
dead” or “living dead (mort vivant)” (DP1 37). It introduces a kind of anachronism that disrupts the 
understanding of temporal instant we have been tracing. At the same time as the photographer takes 
a picture of the execution from the point of view of the State—in the same breath—he produces a 
spectral force that marks the death in life, transporting life beyond the immediacy of its living 
present. Derrida thus refigures the Barthesian formula as a relationship of haunting: “Neither life 
nor death, but the haunting of the one by the other. The ‘versus’ of the conceptual opposition is as 
unsubstantial as the camera’s click.”274 This silent slippage from classical ontology (ontologie) to 
deconstructive hauntology (hantologie) reformulates the impracticable opposition of Life / Death. 
Displacing the topology of Barthes’ formulation, the front-slash gives way to a spectralized 
photographic lifedeath (lavielamort) that compromises life and death in a relationship of cryptic 
incorporation. Death, on this reading, cannot be contracted into a spatial border or temporal instant, 
but is at work structuring and haunting the rhythms of life. The philosophical dream of a rigorous 
purity of life is a fantasy: “Life,” Derrida says in the Grammatology, is an “economy of death.”275 The 
prohibition against the image of death can thus be understood as an attempt to anathematize the 
ghostly powers of the image that threaten the presumed instantaneity of death and with it any 
“imagined mastery of the sense of the word ‘death’” (DP1 238).  
Weidmann’s execution leaves us suspended between two angles that mark the chiasmic 
crossing of the scopic apparatuses of lifedeath as visible/invisible doublets on the stage of the death 
penalty. Photographer-1 registers a double paradox. On the one hand, he registers a juridical-
political problematic that coalesces questions about the institution and maintenance of sovereign 
power: images of death are both necessary and paradoxically controlled. On the other hand, he 
frames a representational problematic that crystallizes questions about the technical image: the image 
of death gives irrecusable testimony of death and yet in making this moment repeatable it 
paradoxically mobilizes a phantomatic power. These intertwined problematics co-articulate a double 
exigency of photography and the death penalty. Visibility immunizes the State against the incursion 
of death and finitude thus aiding and abetting the power of the phantasm. But it can equally be seen 
to complicate the relation between vision (voir), knowledge (savoir), and power (pouvoir) in ways that 
weaken and parasite the conceptual demarcation between life and death, amplifying spectrality in 
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ways that disrupt the claim of the phantasm. In short, sovereignty tries to master death by 
representing it as an instantaneous event, but the image’s iterability paradoxically amplifies 
spectrality—the photographer’s images of death are at once the locus and transmission of sovereign 
power, as well as a spectral force that destabilizes the instant. 
This returns us to the question of the “now” or the punctual moment. Derrida’s major 
contribution to photographic theory is his critical rethinking of the temporal notion of the instant as 
internally divided. The present, as we saw in chapter 1, is only made possible by différance, iterability, 
or spectrality. According to Derrida’s critique, this interpretation of the instant and time more 
generally as dominated by the succession of present “nows” is phantasmatic. Derrida has challenged 
this relation between the present and the nonpresent past and future since his earliest works, for 
example, in his texts on mourning where the dead find their place as an image within the living and 
where images open time to a kind of ghostly anachronism. In his rereading of the photographic 
instant, he expresses this struggle with the primacy and authority of the present, when he argues that 
the instant is not atomic or self-identical, but “spectrally structured.”276 He follows Barthes’ reading 
of the instant here in many regards, however, his reading differs on one critical point: for Derrida, 
the instant is always a differential duration. Derrida complicates the “punctiform” structure 
presumed by Barthes. This structure announces haunting in two times, or two modes: the “now” of 
the living-present is exposed to the alterity of death from the past and future (Husserlian 
protensions and retentions). Photography exposes us to the dead of history in the form of haunting, 
but also equally to death in the future. This double solicitation provides another understating of the 
instant which is always haunted by the memory and prospect of death. Photography qua light-writing 
becomes yet another non-synonymous substitution for différance, another way of thinking the infernal 
movement of the trace as that which is inhabited by alterity—another way of thinking the self-same 
as paradoxically constituted by iterability, repetition, or what we have been calling spectrality.  
According to Derrida’s reading of the temporality of the photographic instant, the concept 
of punctuality, the now, or the stigmē is always divided at the origin: as soon as the image is captured it 
divides itself. In the moment when I am photographed, I am distanced or spaced out from myself, 
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so that I am both seer and seen, living and dead. The hiatus or space between myself as seer and 
myself as seen remains invisible. It inscribes a kind of blindness into the instant or “the blink of the 
eye” (Augenblick). Derrida concludes that “there is a duration to the blink of the eye and the duration 
closes the eye.”277 Writing in 1895 as a spokesperson for the Instantaneous Photography movement, 
William de Wiveleslie Abney similarly concedes that “the epithet ‘instantaneous,’ as applied to 
photography, is, of course, incorrect.” A photograph, he admits, “taken by a flash of lighting is not 
instantaneous, for the exposure takes a time.”278 This spacing or blindness is structurally essential to 
visual auto-affection: it destroys the possibility of self-identity understood as simplicity. Rather, the 
spectrality of the instant looks a lot like différance, as discussed in the first chapter, as the operation of 
differing-deferral that both splits and delays presence, “subjecting it to originary division and 
originary delay” (VP 75). To return to the aporetics of time detailed in the last section, for Derrida, 
who thinks time on the basis of differential iterability, the now is not an indivisible unit, but rather, 
emerges from originary repetition which originary division or split means that the now is infinitely 
divided within itself, and therefore that it can never be fully present as such. This is why it is 
impossible to grasp, seize or master the now as a fixed point.  
This basic argument has two important implications. First, there is no truly instantaneous 
image and no shutter speed, as de Duve rightly notes, “that will operate as a borderline” between life 
and death.279 For Abney, as much as for Derrida, the faith in the simplicity of the instant is a 
phantasm impelled by a subterranean desire to know the time of life in its purity and immediacy, as 
self-presence, clearly divided from death. The upshot of the deconstructive reading of  the 
temporality of  the photographic snapshot: the instant is a phantasm.  
Second, if the instant is a phantasm, if there is no instant as such, that is, if the instant is always 
constituted through differential iterability, then death is never clean-cut. Rather, death is a protracted 
and messy affair—a “differentiated, slow process” whose duration is impossible to measure and 
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Lawlor (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2011), 56.  
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calculate (DP1 235). Derrida finds empirical confirmation of this indetermination of death in 
anthropology and medicine. In an important footnote, he points out that the criterion used by the 
medical profession to determine of the state of death fluctuates between cultures and even within a 
given one. No one knows what death is nor where we could locate it (DP1 239).280 We can point to 
further evidence of this indetermination in ongoing accounts of “botched” executions that fuel 
debate around current American lethal injection protocols.281 Consider for example, the 29 April, 
2014 execution of Clayton Lockett at Oklahoma State Penitentiary, in McAlester, Oklahoma, who 
according to eyewitness testimony, writhed against the restraints that bound him to the executioner’s 
table for a protracted forty-three minutes before suffering a heart attack, after the first drug 
administered (the controversial midazolam) failed to render him unconscious. In another twist of 
events, in recent years, death penalty opponents have sought to subpoena audio and video 
recordings in order to falsify the phantasmatic faith in an instant death. For example, “sound 
portraits” of the execution of twenty-two inmates recorded by the Georgia Department of 
Corrections were brought before the court in a 1998 case challenging instantaneity—and therefore 
the constitutionality—of the electric chair. In a second case, also from Georgia, defense attorneys 
were authorized to record the 2011 execution of Andrew Grant DeYoung in an attempt to furnish 
evidence against the state’s controversial “protocol” for lethal injection, comprised of a single dose 
of pentobarbital. Not only do these applications of the death penalty fall into the US Supreme 
Court’s criterion of “cruel and unusual punishment,” which led to the suspension of the death 
penalty in America between 1972 and 1977, but more importantly (for we are seeking a principled, 
rather than merely circumstantial grounds for the abolition of capital punishment), they interrupt the 
fantasy of control over an objective instant of death. 
The whole concept of the death penalty relies on the belief that “the state, its legal system, 
its justice, its judges and executioners” are able to “know, calculate, operate the time of death” right 
down to the very instant (DP1 220). In the tenth session, Derrida argues: 
 
280 Derrida argues along similar lines in Aporias, 24-25. While Baudrillard, in Symbolic Exchange and Death, argues that “the 
irreversibly of biological death, its objective and punctual character, is a modern fact of science. It is specific to our 
culture. Every other culture says that death begins before death, that life goes on after life, and that it is impossible to 
distinguish life from death.” Baudrillard argues for the “radical indeterminacy” of life and death in the symbolic order 
(159). 
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The death penalty, as the only example of a death whose instant is calculable by a 
machine, by machines (not by someone, finally, as in murder, but by all sorts of 
machines: the law, the penal code, the anonymous third party, the calendar, the clock, 
the guillotine, or another apparatus [including the cold and implacable mechanism of 
the camera’s shutter]), the machine of the death penalty deprives me of my own 
finitude; it exonerates me, even, of my experience of finitude. It is to some finitude 
that the madness of the death penalty claims to put an end, by putting an end, in a 
calculable fashion, to some life […] The calculating decision, by putting an end to 
life, seems, paradoxically, to put an end to finitude; it affirms its power over time, it 
masters the future, it protects against the irruption of the other. In any case, it seems 
to do that, I say it only seems to do that, for this calculation, this mastery, this 
decidability remain phantasms. (DP1 257-8 my emphasis) 
To put it another way, the argument that death can be contained in an anaesthesial instant depends 
on a theory of time that treats the past as something that was once present (but is no longer) and the 
future as something that will be present (but is not yet). This concept of time depends on a series of 
atomistic or indivisible points. If, as Derrida suggests in Copy Signature Archive, the present divides 
itself between a past that has been (Barthes’ that-has-been) and a past that has never been present 
(Derrida’s absolute past), then this divisibility of the living present disrupts the unity of the line 
between before/after. The fundamental divisibility or spectrality which the present is also conditions 
the future. It is this future, this ineradicable finitude, that the death penalty tries to put an end to. 
The real cruelty of the death penalty has nothing to do with the speed of the machines of death, but 
with the calculating fascination that aims to master time, by depriving the other of finitude. But 
wherever a clear instant of death is lacking, we can no longer presume to have the power or ability 
to master it, or to deliver the other over the limit. With this, the scaffolding of the death penalty 
begins to tremble.  
 
This chapter has examined the production and consumption of images of death in the specular mise-
en-scène of the death penalty. The film of Eugene Weidmann’s 1939 execution facilitated a double or 
stereoscopic analysis of the Western philosophy of time shared by the guillotine and the early 
photographic ontologies, while suggesting a reading of photography’s spectral structure that helps to 
deconstruct the phantasmatic dimension of sovereignty at work in the death penalty. The optic of 
spectrality helped us sketch the aporetic logic at work in sovereign technicity. Pulling at one of the 
threads that guides the first year of the death penalty seminars, I traced what Derrida calls “a certain 




execution, the move to lethal injection, modes of visibility, publicity, theatricality, sacrificial 
rituality,” which trouble Foucault’s thesis about the progressive de-spectacularization of punishment 
(DP2 xv). This led me to the theme of the instant and the empirical attempts to frame death as an 
instant, both through the implementation of a series of machines of death that aimed to humanize 
the death penalty from the guillotine through lethal injection, as well as through the development of 
the photographic instant in the nineteenth-century imagination as a symbolic site for the modern 
confrontation with finitude. The death penalty tries to master the instant of the other’s death, but 
the instant turns out to be a phantasm. I have subjected this phantasmatic dimension of the instant 
to a deconstructive operation. Derrida’s critique of the temporality of the photographic snapshot 
helped me to trace another understanding of the instant and its power that allows me to trouble the 
putative instantaneity of  death, which posits life as that which happens only before death.  
I have tested the hypothesis that technical images are one of the sites where death is 
confronted and controlled in the context of Derrida’s claim that the hallmark of sovereign power 
involves the right to command death in public spectacles that are more visible, even though more 
virtual, than ever with today’s accelerated tele-technologies. I have examined the relation between 
sovereignty, instantaneity, and technicity. I have seen that sovereignty needs to extemporalize death 
in technical images in the era of analogue photography. This specific form of sovereign technicity 
serves a double function. By freezing and annulling time images aim to “master” death and 
finitude. At the same time, prosthetic images of death amplify spectrality and thus the 









What place is given to life, death, and the human body (in particular the wounded or slain body)?   
How are they inscribed in the order of  power?  






The grainy dash-cam video feed from vehicle 8779 tracks through the dark Archer Heights streets. 
It’s shortly after nightfall on 20 October, 2014. Police have been called to investigate reports of  a 
black man breaking into vehicles in a trucking yard at 41st Street and Kildare Avenue in Chicago. 
One minute into the video, the words “LBR ON” flash on the screen, signaling the activation of  in-
car recording system, accompanied by random, high-pitched beeps that saturate the audio-track. 
Voices are disfigured by digital artifacts and audio compression, but two muffled sirens can be heard 
engaging in a frenetic counterpoint that announces the cruiser at the intersection with staccato 
attacks. A familiar sound on the South Side, the siren signifies different things depending on who 
hears it: for some, it announces the restoration of  the law; for others, it warns of  an imminent threat 
of  death.283 For those trying to decipher the cues encrypted in the video, this digital timbre is yet 
another haunting aspect of  sovereignty. The image picks up speed as it passes a string of  single-floor 
suburban row-houses; a spotlight oscillates left-to-right scanning the treelined boulevard. The 
scrambled siren cuts abruptly as the camera’s predatory gaze catches sight of  a figure on the curb, 
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who points offscreen. (“There!” says the deixic shifter directing the roaming camera towards the 
impending hail of  “sixteen rounds and a cover up.”284 ) Following his stage-directions, the camera’s 
ghostly POV cuts left across a deserted parking lot, catching up with 17-year old Laquan McDonald 
as he walks down the center of  the 4100 block of  South Pulaski Road towards two police cruisers 
that have just arrived on the scene. The image comes to a halt. Blue light splashes across the 
pavement. McDonald appears agitated. He tugs at his pants. His step quickens as two officers 
descend from their Chevrolet Tahoe, guns drawn. He keeps moving as though to pass them. His 
right arm swings absently, revealing a three-inch blade. Officer Jason Van Dyke opens fire. 
McDonald spins in a contorted pirouette under the force of  the first volley of  bullets, collapsing 
backward onto the pavement. A puff  of  smoke silently explodes from his body. For a moment, his 
arm twitches. Then come more bullets. Another cloud of  debris kicks up behind his head. And then 
it’s over. The time-stamp flashes in the lower right-hand quadrant of  the screen: “OCT 20 
2014/09:57:38PM.” Thirty seconds have elapsed since McDonald appeared in the frame. The legal 
system pronounces him dead in the ambulance on route to Mount Sinai Hospital (Figure 20).285 
But then again, it’s not over. Because spectacular images of  black death are part of  an 
ongoing litany of  lethal force captured on video that continue to tear at the fabric of  black life. 
Karryn Gaines, Trayvon Martin, Tamir Rice, Walter Scott, Eric Garner, Kajieme Powell, Mike 
Brown, Eric Garner, Natasha McKenna, Freddie Gray, India Kager, Ramarley Graham, Harith 
Augustus, Sandra Bland. “It is a bitter reality,” writes Roxane Gay in the aftermath of  Alton 
Sterling’s shooting in Baton Rouge, “that there will always be a new name to that list. Black lives 
matter, and then in an instant, they don’t.”286 Each of  these proper names marks what Derrida, in his 
final seminar, calls “the end of  the world” (BS2 170). Each measures the degree to which “we” are  
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Figure 20. Dashcam video, shooting of Laquan McDonald in Chicago. 2014. 
Screenshot from police video. 
 
and are not what Derrida, borrowing from Michel de Montaigne, calls “codiers” (commourans) (BS2 
263).287 We all die. This much is certain. But we do not die alike. As Michael Eric Dyson puts it in his 
New York Times Op-Ed: “We don’t all think the same, feel the same, love, learn, live or even die the 
same.”288 White subjects are not confronted by the same conditions of  living under the threat of  
“social and civil and/or corporeal death.”289  
 
In the last chapter, I mobilized the double-eyed optic of  spectrality to examine the relation between 
sovereign technicity and time in the context of  death penalty in the analogue era and beyond. The 
short film of  Weidmann’s execution brought the camera and the guillotine together—on the same 
stage—as scopic machines of lifedeath. These technologies of  time afforded a first “take” from which 
to examine the connection between political power and images of  death. I examined how 
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sovereignty attempts to control the cut between life and death, which it tries to organize vis-à-vis 
images of  death as a “sharp” division: Life/Death. My deconstruction of  the “time of  death” 
revealed the double logic at work in sovereignty, whereby sovereignty is made possible by the alterity 
of  death and time, which it nonetheless attempts to master and control when it executes a death 
penalty. As we saw in the last chapter, this drive for mastery over death manifests in various 
attempts to take life.  
In this chapter, I argue that in the context of  the white supremacist US police state, the 
phantasm (recall that “phantasm” is a technical term that is not opposed to the real) of  an ostensibly 
objective instant of  death—which the state tries to organize and legislate through images of  death 
and extrajudicial executions—is a racial caesura. The drive to master death is deployed literally 
through extralegal execution of black lives, and symbolically, through what Orlando Patterson calls 
“social death” inflected through the exclusion from opportunity or the relegation of social life to 
what Mbembe calls forms of “living death” (mort vivant), for example, in mass incarceration and 
through the circulation of images that frame black life in close proximity to death. In both cases, as 
Mbembe writes, “To exercise sovereignty is to exercise control over mortality and to define life as 
the deployment and manifestation of power.”290 What these very different accounts share is to 
confront and “master” death, albeit in radically different ways and with different effects. White 
supremacist sovereignty attempts to “master” death by meting it out under colour of  law that 
requires black exclusion and death, as normative.291 The fact that the (sharp) cut can be racially coded 
shows that the phantasm involved in the sovereign relation to death can be made politically real.  
How is McDonald’s slain body framed—as disposable and disposed—white supremacist 
power? What critical possibilities for rupturing sovereign power does it produce in relation to the 
“requirement” for black death?292 How can the quasi-concept of  spectrality help deconstruct the 
specific extension of  white supremacist sovereignty that functions through modes of  police 
surveillance and antiblack terror? Extending Derrida’s account of  the deconstruction of  sovereignty 
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in the death penalty seminars, this chapter draws on critical race theory and Black visual cultures to 
examine the relation between sovereignty and race, technicity and time, in the specific extension of  
white supremacy vis-à-vis the proliferating digital archive of  dash-cam and body-cam video utilized by 
an increasingly militarized and death-prone US police state.293 I examine this extension of  
technological sovereignty—or sovereign technicity—that manifests as police power through digital 
images of  antiblack violence circulating—or withheld from circulating—across decentralized, 
mobile platforms.294 This archive of  quotidian violence allows me to interrogate the refiguration of  
slavery and its afterlives as they are lived in black social life.  
I approach the phantasmatic formation of  the white supremacist police state first, from the 
perspective of  sovereignty, through a reading of  Mbembe’s theorization of  “necropower” as the 
deployment of  race in the production of  living dead ghosts at the intersection of  sovereign and bio 
power. Mbembe’s theorization of  necropower provides an account of  race that specifies who can be 
killed and who cannot in the specific context of  the “terror formation” of  white supremacist 
policing in the United States. Derrida’s quasi-concept of  spectral lifedeath and Saidiya Hartman’s 
account of  the “scene of  subjection,” help further specify the place of  visibility, and more 
specifically, of  the spectacle of  the slain black body in the formation of  power through a double 
critical and quasi-transcendental reading of  the itinerant video of  McDonald’s perfunctory 
execution, which served as pivotal evidence in the 2018 indictment and conviction of  Chicago 
Police officer Jason Van Dyke.  
Facilitating an analysis of  the deathly trajectories of  sovereign power that mark subalternity 
in the US, I redeploy the stereoscopic optic of  spectrality to examine the double role played by the 
spectacle of  black death as a mechanism of  antiblack violence that regulates the dissymmetrical 
distribution of  death and produces the black subjectivity as a form of  “living death” (mort vivant) and 
 
293 This chapter is indebted to a number of important texts in Black visual cultures. Foremost among these is Saidiya 
Hartman’s pathbreaking work Scenes of Subjection. Following in her legacy, Christina Sharpe articulates “wake work” as a 
critical and experimental practice that generates new ways of living in the afterlife of slavery; Aranke investigates the 
generative capacity of images of executed members of the Black Liberation Army in the historical and theoretical 
context of Black revolutionary praxis in “Black Power/Black Death”; and Kimberly Juanita Brown, explores the 
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Repeating Body: Slavery’s Visual Resonance in the Contemporary (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015). 
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discursive and performative gestures that encourage and enable the subjugation of black life, structural violence refers 
to the force of philosophies, institutions, libidinal, political, economic, and social investments (2-3). My investigation of 




as a site of  critical resistance in radical black politics that exposes the phantasmatic dimensions of  
white supremacy. McDonald’s video (which stands in here metonymically for a number of  deaths 
that accrue to this singular image of  death dated OCT 20 2014/09:57:38PM) serves to focalize a 
problem, which is not the brutality of  rogue police actions per se, nor the law’s disproportionate 
shooting of  black Americans. Rather, I argue that white supremacy disavows its ineluctable relation 
to spectrality, by tethering it to “blackness” as racial alterity that can be brought under material and 
symbolic control through a series of  terrorizing strategies, including extralegal state violence, as well 
as the circulation of  images of  death. Extending Derrida’s account of  the violent origin of  the state 
in the scopic structure of  the “primal scene” of  the execution, I examine the spectrum of  antiblack 
violence, which reaches from the spectacular to the quotidian. I argue that the spectacle of  black 
death haunts the phantasm of  sovereign closure; white supremacy tries to master spectrality by 
projecting onto blackness, which extrojects to an imagined “outside” aligned with alterity and death.  
 
Sovereignty & Race 
In the first year of  the Death Penalty Seminar Derrida marks the juncture of  sovereignty and race as a 
pivotal point from which to approach the deconstruction of  the death penalty in the US context. 
Derrida gestures towards the uneven “socio-historical and political distribution” of  the death 
penalty across the topography of  the US killing states, which carves “a scar or a still open wound” 
along the old frontier of  the Civil War—a war waged over the abolition of  slavery: the states that 
continue to kill most are by and large Southern states (DP1 73, my emphasis). He gives statistics to 
support this claim. Of  the 1,477 executions carried out since the 1976 reinstatement of  the death 
penalty 509 (34.5 percent) were black, while black people comprise 17.9 percent of  the nation’s total 
population. Moreover, of  current death row populations 1,135 (41.4 percent) are black.295 Whereas 
white bodies are more likely to be exonerated or granted exceptional stays of  execution for similar 
crimes, black bodies are more likely both to be sentenced to death and killed by the state both within 
and outside its juridical apparatuses. In short, those condemned to death, executed, and living on 
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NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.,” April 1, 2018, 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/files/pdf/DRUSASpring2018.pdf and Death Penalty Information Center, “Race of 





death row are disproportionately black (DP2 143). We cannot understand the situation of  the death 
penalty in the US, Derrida agues, “without taking into account” a number of  historical facts, 
“including the history of  the federal state, the history of  racism, the history of  slavery, and the long 
interminable struggle for civil rights and the equality of  blacks, the Civil War …etc.” (DP1 74). 
These statistical legacies survive on the fault-line documented by Gardner and O’Sullivan’s Civil War 
stereoscopy. 
This still leaves much to be accounted for in terms of  the place of  race, and specifically 
blackness, within the logic of  the death penalty in the context of  United States.296 The 
deconstruction of  the “time of  death” needs to reckon with the whiteness of  the executioners and 
the racial alterity of  the executed; with the multiple ways in which the afterlives of  slavery intersect 
with the death penalty, as well as the ways the death penalty—with its subterranean desire for 
cruelty—bleeds out of  its “proper” legal bounds into the summary execution of  citizens by an 
increasingly militarized US police that disproportionately targets so-called “people of  color”—black 
or otherwise.297 While the state-sanctioned extralegal executions circulated in social media are not 
stricto sensu, contained under the legal concept of  the death penalty (for reasons I will discuss in the 
next chapter), the distinction between formal death penalty (with tribunal, verdict, executioner, and 
public structures of  witnessing) and the broader category of  these “impure” phenomena of  
“sovereign killing” perpetrated under simulacrum of  legality, as Derrida suggests, is always 
problematic.298  
Derrida does not examine how or why sovereignty becomes fixated on race as a visual marker 
of  domination in the Death Penalty Seminar. The deconstruction of  sovereignty needs an account of  
the role of  images of  death in politics with respect to the death penalty, which can explain why race 
is such a critical site for the articulation of  political power. What is the historical and geopolitical 
specificity of  race in this constellation of  sovereignty? To address the afterlives of  slavery as they 
intersect with the history of  sovereignty and the juridical and legal institution of  punishment (capital 
 
296 See Lisa Guenther, “An Abolitionism Worthy of the Name: From the Death Penalty to the Prison Industrial 
Complex,” in Deconstructing the Death Penalty: Derrida’s Seminars and the New Abolitionism (New York, NY: Fordham 
University Press, 2018), 239-257. 
297 According to Amnesty International USA, “Deadly Force & Police Accountability,” Amnesty International USA, n.d. 
https://www.amnestyusa.org/issues/deadly-force-police-accountability/, unarmed Black Americans are five times 
more likely to be shot and killed by police than unarmed white Americans.  





or otherwise) in the US, I mobilize Mbembe’s theory of  “necropolitics,” as the contemporary 
politics of  putting to death and “necropower,” as the production of  living “death-worlds” alongside 
Derrida’s quasi-concept of  spectral lifedeath. Mbembe’s theory of  necropower helps flesh out the 
function of  race in the dissymmetrical distribution of  death in the topos of  contemporary 
sovereignties, and specifically in the “terror formation” of  the white supremacist US police state.299 
This specificity will set the stage for my double (critical and quasi-transcendental) analysis of  white 
supremacist sovereignty through the dash-cam video of  McDonald’s execution in the final section.   
 
Necropower: Mbembe 
Cameroonian philosopher and political scientist, Achille Mbembe’s theories of  “necropower” 
(necropouvoir) and “living death” (mort vivant) specify the role of  race in the work of  death at the 
intersection of  sovereignty and biopolitics. Mbembe’s account is advanced as a critical rejoinder to 
Foucault’s biopolitics that seeks to account for the sovereign exercise of  the right to kill in 
contemporary forms of  domination, war, subjugation, and antiblack violence. In the last chapter, I 
reconstructed Derrida’s implicit engagement with Foucault in the first year of  the Death Penalty 
Seminar. As we saw, Foucault argues for a historical shift between modalities of  power from the 
sovereign right over death to the biopolitical control over life through disciplinary mechanisms. 
Sovereignty’s “making die and letting live” gives way, according to Foucault, to “making live and 
letting die.”300 Mbembe’s interventions draw on Foucault’s analysis of  race in Society Must Be Defended, 
the last of  his College de France lectures in 1975-6. Here Foucault argues that there is, in fact, no 
clean cut between biopower’s right to manage life and sovereign power’s right to assert death, and 
 
299 In the United States, as Norman Ajari writes, the constant risk of death by police or private security forces, is the 
most salient position from which to pose the question of blackness. On the other side of the Atlantic, afrodescendants 
are familiar with these practices of putting to death, as well as myriad systematic forms of destruction and privation of 
black life. See Norman Ajari, La dignité ou aa mort: Éthique et politique de la race (Paris, France: Éditions La Découverte, 
2019), 22. For Ajari’s discussion of the sexualized violence deployed by French police in the 2016 rape and beating of 
Théo Luhaka in the Parisian suburb of Aulnay-sous-Bois following a race-based identity check, see Kader Attia’s 2018 
film The Body’s Legacies Pt.2: The Postcolonial Body, http://kaderattia.de/the-bodys-legacies-pt-2-the-postcolonial-body-
2018/. See also Robyn Maynard, Policing Black Lives: State Violence in Canada from Slavery to the Present (Winnipeg: 
Fernwood, 2017) for an analysis of state-sanctioned violence against black bodies in Canada beginning with 
seventeenth-century criminalization and surveillance in New France (present-day Québec) through current realities of 
antiblack police violence. 
300 Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France 1975–1976, trans. David Macey (New York, 





thus no simple prioritization of  life over death. Rather, biopower asserts itself  gradually in the 
twilight of  the sovereign state. The tension between biopower and these lingering vestiges of  
sovereignty come to a head in Foucault’s discussion of  state killing. Under what conditions can 
biopower—a regime invested in making live (faire vivre)—put to death? Race provides the answer to 
this dilemma. Race is the condition for waging war and putting to death (what Foucault describes as 
typically sovereign actions that persist as the underside of  biopolitics).301 On Mbembe’s reading, 
power operates on a “split between the living and the dead” as a power defined in relation to a 
biological caesura. It is this cut that Foucault calls racism.302  
Racism performs a double function. First, it produces a partition that marks one part of  the 
population as expendable. Racism is the way power is exercised to break up the population into 
those who can be killed and those who can’t. It introduces “a break into the domain of  life that is 
under power’s control.”303 This break separates and divides the population into categories and 
subcategories, producing hierarchies of  meaning and value through the establishment of  biological 
boundaries. Race specifies the condition under which sovereignty continues to wield its power to 
make die. Second, race establishes a relation between these two groups (i.e. killable/unkillable), insofar 
as the deaths of  the latter authorize the survival of  the former.304 According to Foucault, the 
biopolitical state authorizes the putting to death of  certain segments of  the population so that the 
real body politic can live. Race construes certain bodies as intrinsically ill, and potentially a lethal 
contaminant to the general health, such that they must be extracted to guarantee the security of  the 
polity. For Foucault, the Nazi state is the paradigm instance of  sovereign right to kill (droit de glaive) 
under biopolitics. Nazism represents the culmination of  colonial imperialism; the death chambers, 
the culmination of  the serialized mechanisms for taking life; and race provides the rationalization for 
a “calculus of  life that passes through the death of  the Other.”305 In short, for Foucault, the right of  
death continues to survive in the biopolitical field, vis-à-vis race (as the “condition of  acceptability of  
putting to death”).306 Mbembe’s necropower extends this account of  state racism in two ways that 
 
301 This suggests that Foucault himself  may not have held a sharp and principled division between the paradigms of  
sovereignty and biopolitics, nor even perhaps, between visibility and invisibility. 
302 Mbembe, “Necropolitics,” 17.  
303 Foucault, Society Must be Defended, 254. 
304 See Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 254-263. Cf. Esposito discussion of “lethal logic” of “thanatopolitics” in Nazi 
Germany in Bíos: Biopolitics and Philosophy, 110-145.  
305 Mbembe, “Necropolitics,” 18.  




help to specify my account of  the white supremacist police state: these involve his theorizations of  
historical “terror formations” and “living death” (mort vivant). 
 
Terror Formations: The Police State 
First, Foucault’s logic is too specific for Mbembe. The Foucauldian analysis doesn’t account for the 
way killing has been delegated across colonial spaces including the plantation and the colony. The 
rationalizing rhetoric of  health pivotal to the nineteenth-century biopolitical lexicon is not helpful in 
these instances. Race is still a marker that separates who lives and dies, but it is not a matter of  
purification of  the body politic, as it was in Nazi state, which Foucault takes as paradigmatic. 
Mbembe’s discussions of  postcolonial necropower diversifies Foucault’s account. According to 
Mbembe the “phantom like world of  race” is and “ever present shadow in Western political thought 
and practice.”307 He details the multiplicity of  ways the necropolitical right over death is organized 
and deployed through mechanisms of  state functioning. Mbembe traces the links between 
modernity and terror through a series of  shifting “terror formations” including the Ancien Régime; 
the revolutionary Terror of  the guillotine, with its ever-quickening mechanisms of  taking life; the 
plantation system of  slavery; Apartheid South Africa; and the late-colonial occupation of  the West 
Bank.308 In each of  these specific historical contexts, race functions to determine otherness and to 
mark that otherness for death, through a number of  terrorizing mechanisms, which include: the 
demarcation of  new spatial relations, the manufacture of  cultural imaginaries, and surveillance 
operations.  
 These topographies are by no means exhaustive: the US police state is yet another 
necropolitical spatiality. This specific terror formation functions through the partitioning of  urban 
space through ongoing practices of  spatial segregation; the manufacture of  cultural imaginaries that 
align “blackness” with criminality and death; and techniques for surveillance and policing of  
blackness, or “blackveillance.”309 These mechanisms are historically linked to colonial plantation 
slavery: the first forms of  policing in (what would become) the United States developed in the 
context of  the economic system of  slavery. In the colonies of  the Northeast, informal systems of  
 
307 Mbembe, “Necropolitics,” 17. 
308 Mbembe, “Necropolitics,” 22.  





“night-watch” (volunteer policing) and “lantern laws” (the regulation of  Black and Indigenous 
mobility through mandatory carrying of  lighted candles after dark) were deployed as private security 
operations aimed at protecting the economic order of  white supremacy.310 In Antebellum Southern 
states, policing included legally sanctioned, armed slave patrols, or “paddy rollers” comprised of  
predominantly white men who monitored and disciplined black slaves.311 Post-emancipation terror 
strategies—Jim Crow laws and spatial segregation, extralegal vigilantes groups like the Ku Klux 
Klan, lynching as a structurally acceptable exercise of  power “outside” the law—replaced legally 
sanctioned slave patrols.  These early mechanisms survive in the structural legacies of  slavery’s 
afterlives in the racial segregation of  low-income neighborhoods (“the writing of  new spatial 
relations” by setting internal boundaries and frontiers) the ghettoization of  “million dollar blocks” 
marked for incarceration312; racialized policing that includes stop-and-frisk policies, racial profiling 
and subjection to a disproportionate number of  (potentially lethal) traffic stops; a crippling system 
of  bail-bonds; a carceral system that tears apart generations; and obliteration by police violence in a 
state of impunity; but also, in the various ways “blackness” is marked and coded for death vis-à-vis 
the circulation of  spectacular and yet quotidian images of  black death. This specific terror 
formation of  the police state is built on the memory and mechanisms of  slavery.  
 
 Mort Vivant & Social Death 
Second, Mbembe introduces necropower to account for the specific ways corporeal and/or living 
death (mort vivant) is racially distributed in the contemporary world. Biopower, Mbembe asserts, fails 
to give an account for the practical conditions under which “the right to kill, to allow to live, or to 
expose to death is exercised” in our contemporary world, where “weapons are deployed in the 
interest of  maximum destruction of  persons and the creation of  death-worlds, new and unique 
forms of  social existence in which vast populations are subjected to conditions of  life conferring 
upon them the status of  the living dead.”313 Mbembe’s concept of  the mort vivant erodes the border 
 
310 For an account of lantern laws and the surveillance of blackness see Browne, Dark Matters, 77-79. 
311 See Sally Hadden, Slave Patrols: Law and Violence in Virginia and the Carolinas (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2003), and Ben Fountain, “Slavery and the Origins of the American Police State,” Medium, 2018. 
https://medium.com/s/story/slavery-and-the-origins-of-the-american-police-state-ec318f5ff05b. 
312 Mbembe, “Necropolitics,” 25. 





between life and death, rendering black life ghostly. Racism, as the “state-sanctioned and/or extra-
legal production and exploitation of  group differentiated vulnerabilities to premature (social, civil 
and/or corporeal) death,” is the condition for the acceptability for relegation to living death.314 
Rather than simply reversing the hierarchy from a biopolitical “making live” (faire vivre), back to 
“making die” (faire mourir) as juridical power over death that Foucault associates with sovereignty, 
necropower describes the ways black life is regulated so as to make it unlivable through a series of  
mechanisms of  life negation that subject large swaths of  the worlds’ populations to “death worlds” 
(des mondes des mort), as a form of  death-in-life.  
Mbembe’s mort vivant challenges Foucault’s insistence on the efficacy of  biopower as a 
theoretical model premised on power dominance of  life. However, Mbembe’s insistence on death 
needs to be understood within the tradition of  critical Black studies, which pivots around the 
concept of  “social death,” as its elliptical center.315 In his pathbreaking study, Slavery and Social Death, 
anthropologist Orlando Patterson defines “social death,” as a form of  negation achieved through a 
series of  structural and symbolic practices including subjection to systemic violence, the revocation 
of  civil rights, and “natal alienation” (i.e. the destruction of  bonds to family, ancestors, and 
descendants, as well as the mechanisms of  inheritance, such as those established through the Roman 
imago).316 As opposed to corporeal death, social death is a kind of  liminality; it entails a kind of  civil 
and political death. Patterson refers to the “liminal state of  social death” as “institutional 
 
314 I have reproduced Fred Moten and Stefano Harney’s citation of Ruth Wilson Gilmore’s definition of racism in “The 
University and the Undercommons,” 114 in order to retain their attenuation of death, not only as a corporeal event, 
but also as a social process described by Patterson, in his important study of slavery and its afterlives, as a form of 
alienation from civil society.  
315 The theorists informing this section are loosely constellated under the term “Afro-pessimism,” coined by Frank B. 
Wilderson. Informed by Left-Heideggerianism and Franz Fanon’s existential psychoanalysis, Afro-pessimism 
encompasses series of interventions at the intersection of political and libidinal economies of white supremacy that 
aims to draw out a political ontology of black life. See Frank B. Wilderson III, Red, White & Black: Cinema and the 
Structure of U.S. Antagonisms (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013). 
316 Orlando Patterson, Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985). 
The concept of social death is pivotal in contemporary in black studies and black visual cultures. See for example, 
Frank B. Wilderson III, “Grammar and Ghosts: The Performative Limits of African Freedom,” Theater Survey 50, no. 1 
(2009): 119-125; Jared Sexton, “The Social Life of Social Death: On Afro-Pessimism and Black Optimism,” InTensions 






marginality.”317 Mbembe argues that social death “constitutes an expulsion from humanity.”318 
Turning the table on the question of  how the living organize their relation to the dead vis-à-vis 
images, slavery had to answer a new dilemma: how is political power to incorporate the still living that 
are already socially dead? According to Patterson this required modes of  “liminal incorporation.”319   
Building on Patterson’s analysis of  the ways in which the slave was kept alive “but in a state 
of  injury, in a phantom-like world of  horrors and intense cruelty,” Mbembe examines the 
specificities of  how “black life is lived in social death”320 as an ever-present reality of  death within life 
in postcolonial Africa, Kosovo, and the West Bank.321 Living death is as much death as it is living: it 
is an experience of  liminality punctured and striated by quotidian experiences of  terror that include 
spectacular images of  suffering as well as more innocuous and less visible forms of  quotidian 
violence that mark certain populations for death at the expense of  others. Such an enlargement of  
the concept of  death parallels Saidiya Hartman’s expansion of  the life-term of  slavery. If  slavery 
persists in the political life of  black America after conferral of  “rights,” it is “because black lives are 
still imperiled and devalued by a racial calculus and a political arithmetic that were entrenched 
centuries ago. This is the afterlife of  slavery – skewed life chances, limited access to health and 
education, premature death, incarceration, and impoverishment.”322 These structural legacies are part 
of  the aftermath of  chattel slavery as contemporary forms of  social death.  
This account of  mort vivant helps explain the warehousing of  life in the sprawling US prison-
industrial complex, and the necessity of  “abolishing what abolition has produced,” namely, the life 
sentence without the possibility of  parole, or what the Philadelphia coalition Decarcerate PA calls 
“death by incarceration.”323 Broadening the work of  death to include social death allows for a 
 
317 Patterson, Slavery and Social Death, 46. 
318 Mbembe, “Necropolitics,” 21. 
319 Patterson, Slavery and Social Death, 45-51 and 293. 
320 Jared Sexton, “Ante-Anti-Blackness: Afterthoughts,” Lateral: Journal of the Cultural Studies Association 1 (2012), n.p., 
doi:10.25158/L1.1.16. 
321 Mbembe, “Necropolitics,” 21. 
322 Saidiya V. Hartman, Lose Your Mother: A Journey Along the Atlantic Slave Route (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux, 2008), 6. 
323 Elizabeth Roudinesco asks Derrida about the necessity of abolishing “life in prison” without possibility of parole or 
release, but she does not go far enough in recognizing this as social death. Derrida evades this aspect of her question 
(FWT 161). For a recent discussion of Derrida’s analysis of the death penalty in relation to the whiteness that 
structures US carcerality see Andrew Krinks, “The Color of Transcendence: Whiteness, Sovereignty, and the 





reading of  mass incarceration as another instance of  what Derrida, towards the end of  the first year 
of  the death penalty seminars, enigmatically calls the “survival of  the death penalty,” which will be 
the focus of  the next chapter (DP1 282).324  The phantasm of  mastery over death and time is 
accomplished, in this instance, not by cutting life short, but by conferring on the imprisoned a form 
of  living death that breaches the distinction between life and death, not as deconstructive lifedeath, 
but as death-in-life. In both capital punishment and life imprisonment sovereignty arrogates to itself  
power over the other’s time of  life. Both seek to “put an end to finitude” (DP1 257). As discussed in 
the last chapter, the calculating decision of  the death penalty tries to affirm its power over time by 
determining the time of  the other’s death. Yet, as we saw, these attempts to calculate and master 
death “remain phantasms”  (DP1 258).  
In short, life without parole is also a death sentence and death-by-incarceration is the 
paradigm for all acts of  incarceration—including the strategy of  detaining and terrorizing black life 
in the image. The image of  black death—framed and multiplied by apparatuses of  state 
surveillance—make all social spaces a prison in which black people are marked as socially dead. The 
image of  black death, in this context, repeats a carceral logic that extends death through all of  life: it 
is a mechanism of  liminal incorporation that effects living death. Even when the formerly 
incarcerated person is released from prison, the prison (which constitutes the contemporary 
experience of  slavery), continues to survive within that person. The prison, as Derrida notes in 
Faxitexture, belongs to the “places of  death” that are both “circumscribed and dissociated places, 
included and excluded, at the same time in and outside social space.”325 Insofar as Western political 
space is related to history the African slave trade in a repressed way, slavery is absolutely central to 
the discussion of  sovereignty and white supremacy in the US context.  
 
137–56; Lisa Guenther, “An Abolitionism Worthy of the Name: From the Death Penalty to the Prison Industrial 
Complex,” in Deconstructing the Death Penalty: Derrida’s Seminars and the New Abolitionism (New York, NY: Fordham 
University Press, 2018); and Geoffrey Adelsberg, Lisa Guenther, and Scott Zeman, Death and Other Penalties: Philosophy 
in a Time of Mass Incarceration (New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 2015). 
324 In Ontological Terror (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2018) critical race theorist Calvin Warren notes that the 
“prison industrial complex is the modern form of  reenslavement of  an entire generation” (41). Ava DuVernay traces 
the mechanisms of this reenslavement in her analysis of the eponymous Thirteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall 
have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States”), which abolished slavery with the exception of slavery 
as legal punishment in her 2017 documentary 13th. See also Lisa Guenther, Solitary Confinement: Social Death and Its 
Afterlives (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2013), and Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Golden Gulag Prisons, 
Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing California (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2006). 






As discussed in chapter 1, the desire for sovereignty is constitutive and therefore never simply 
eliminable. Yet, Derrida’s deconstruction of  “ipsocratic” sovereignty shows that self-identity can 
only ever be attempted, never presupposed. Sovereignty gives rise to phantasms when self-identity is 
presupposed, rather than attempted—that is, when the spectrality, which is sovereignty’s quasi-
transcendental condition is repressed or denied. If  the phantasm involves a kind of  “necessary 
illusion” of  purity that we need to function in the world, insofar as it is co-constitutive of  
sovereignty, it need take this exact form of  white supremacist state power. How then are we to 
contest the phantasm, which is not opposed to the real, all the while understanding its necessity and 
ineliminability? Even if  we will never be done with this desire for identity (and thus with phantasms), 
our task is to critique the phantasm by way of  a double, deconstructive gesture. This gesture is both 
critical and quasi-transcendental. The first deconstructive gesture is critical: it seeks to explain and 
recognize the emergence of  specific contextual, historical, and geopolitical forms of  the phantasm 
with its shifting mechanisms for organizing technicity and time vis-à-vis the visual field. This first 
move calls for critical awareness of  the specific historical form the sovereign repression of  
spectrality takes in white supremacist sovereignty. The second deconstructive gesture is quasi-
transcendental: it aims to expose the double and paradoxical logic of  possibility and impossibility 
(i.e. spectrality) that structures sovereignty. The quasi-transcendental move involves showing that 
sovereignty’s identity is always related to mortality, finitude and spectrality, which it tries to master 
and control through various mechanisms of  sovereign technicity.  
 
Sovereign (Dis)closure 
How is this specific terror formation of  white supremacy related to spectrality? In chapter 1, I 
schematized “ipsocratic” sovereignty with five interlinking traits: indivisibility, autonomy, closure, 
instantaneity, and spontaneity. In this account of  the phantasm of  sovereignty under white supremacy, I 
am centrally concerned with the third feature: closure, as well as its relation to technicity and time. 
Sovereignty imagines itself  as a spatial closure without exposure to alterity and death. This self-ruled 
circularity designates an economic principle of  re-appropriation, according to which the self  affects 
itself  by returning to itself  as though through the closed economic system of  “auto-affection.” Yet, 
as we saw, Derrida argues that the circle is never closed: each time the self  returns to itself  as living it 




necessary condition of  life exposed to and affected by the other “hetero-affection.” 326 Sovereign 
identity involves the self  returning to ‘itself ’ as different each time, and each differential repetition 
introduces an alterity that is constitutive of  all identity over time. 
Mbembe’s postcolonial critique of  identity similarly diagnoses the phantasmatic dimensions 
of  sovereignty’s humanist heritage. Like Derrida, Mbembe (who, incidentally inherited Derrida’s 
position at the University of  California, Irvine, following Derrida’s death in 2004) argues that the 
Western colonial tradition believes that “there can be no subject other than in the circular, 
permanent referral to oneself, to an essential and inexhaustible singularity.”327 “The romance of  
sovereignty,” he asserts, is “defined as a twofold process of  self-institution and self-limitation (fixing 
one’s own limits for oneself).328 Mbembe stresses the phantasmatic dimensions of  this desire for 
insularity and spatial self-enclosure: “Identity,” he asserts, “arises from multiplicity and dispersion … 
self-referral is only possible in the in-between, in the gap between mark and demark, in co-
constitution.”329 Mbembe too is a thinker of  difference who understands self-identity as the result of  
an originary differential iterability, or spectrality. Identity always involves a detour through the other 
and the “outside,” which conditions of  identity over time. Yet, in his critique of  European colonial 
humanism, Mbembe argues that this alterity is marked as blackness; every return—as revenant or 
spectral—involves “altrucide,” or “the constitution of  the other not as similar to oneself  but as a 
menacing object from which it must be protected or escape, or which must be destroyed if  it cannot 
be subdued.”330 Alterity is quickly associated with a threat—even a lethal threat. Mbembe’s account 
of  the “topos of  sovereignty” affords an understanding of  the emergence of  the specific 
phantasmatic extension of  sovereignty known as white supremacist police power in the US polity.  
 
326 For Derrida’s account of auto-hetero-affection see, for example, Derrida’s account of “the technical possibility of the 
wheel, as a circular, auto-hetero-affective machine” (BS2 83), as well as BS2 170, where Derrida discusses the auto-
hetero-affective dimension of the phantasm. 
327 Achille Mbembe, Olivier Mongin, Nathalie Lempereur, and Jean-Louis Sclegel, “What Is Postcolonial Thinking?: An 
Interview with Achille Mbembe,” trans. John Flectcher, Esprit / Eurozine (2009): n.p. 
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The phantasm of  white supremacy involves a panicked “acting out” in response to its own 
self-realization that spectrality is constitutive of identity over time.331 This necropolitical terror 
formation involves a pathological return of  the repressed acknowledgment that identity is never 
fully closed or self-present, but rather involves an originary exposure to alterity and death.332 These 
are already uncanny territories: much like Derrida’s analysis of  totalitarianism in Specters, “as a 
reaction of  panic-ridden fear before the ghost in general,” white supremacy is an affective response 
to an originary and ineliminable ungroundedness (i.e. spectrality) that conditions all attempts at 
identity. White supremacy is a terror formation that emerges in response to the repressed 
acknowledgment of  sovereignty’s ineliminable relation to spectrality. As Warren notes: “affect runs 
both ways”: the acknowledgement of  the erosion of  metaphysical assurances incites terror and this 
terror is redoubled through terrorizing mechanisms with which this metaphysical insecurity can be 
brought under control.333 White supremacy defends itself  against spectrality that is the originary 
differential ground of  identity; it tries to shore up its boundaries as spatial closure cut off  from alterity 
through a kind of  transference of  death and negativity onto blackness. Antiblackness is a function of  a 
pathos of  panic before the specter of  lifedeath.334 In this way, white supremacy aims to “master” 
death, but this time by proxy of  the subordination and domination of  blackness, which is visually 
marked and “extrojected” to an imagined “outside” of  sovereign closure. 
How is the spectral field of  visibility negotiated by this reactive terror formation? This need 
for assertion and mastery over death has a particularly strong relation to attempts to master the 
visual field. Spectrality can help unfold the visual forces in this context. It can help us explain why 
this reassertion of  power is so visually focused on the identifiable. Here is a paradox: white 
 
331 Jean Laplanche and Jean-Betrand Pontalis describe Freud’s concept of “acting out” in the following terms: 
“If past events are repressed from memory, they return in the present by expressing themselves in actions; when 
the subject does not remember the past, therefore, he is condemned to repeat it by acting it out.” See The Language of 
Psycho-Analysis, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (London: Hogarth Press, 1973), 4. See also Sigmund 
Freud, “Remembering, Repeating, and Working-Through,” in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of 
Sigmund Freud. Vol. XII (1911-1913), trans. James Strachey (London, UK: Vintage: Hogarth Press, 2001), 150. 
332 In “What is Postcolonial Thinking?” Mbembe argues that European colonial humanism is possessed by a kind of 
death drive, but this desire for its own dissolution is projected via a kind of transference onto the other (n.p.). 
333 Warren, Ontological Terror, 4. 
334 This is close to what Warren argues in Ontological Terror: “nothing… is the source of terror, violence and domination 
for blacks. Heideggerian anxiety transforms into antiblack violence when Dasein flees the anxiety nothing stimulates 
and projects it as terror onto blacks” (9). In my account however, it the logic of spectrality rather than “nothing” at the 
heart of my analysis, moreover, the stakes must be drawn around how one interprets this causal relation (spectrality, on 
my account does not cause antiblack violence, rather it is the denial of spectrality as the ineliminable condition of all life 




supremacy as a panicked reaction to spectrality and death, is made possible by the very spectrally it 
attempts to throw onto the black other. Sovereignty is constituted through spectrality or differential 
iterability and this means that it needs to reassert itself  spatially and temporally. Images of  death are 
one of  the modes of  technicization that sovereignty deploys to install itself  and give itself  stability. 
Images of  death materialize sovereignty as power over death. In the analysis of  the temporality of  
the guillotine and the camera in the last chapter I emphasized how this reassertion functions 
temporally when it focuses on determining the time of  the other’s death. In this context, the attempt 
to master the line between life and death, so as to assert itself  as life unmarked by death, seeks a 
specifically visual manifestation in its field of  operation. It tries to mark where life ends and where 
death begins, and this is a literal way of  enforcing spatial segregation through visual operations. 
Blackness affords sovereignty a particularly visual way of  marking and determining the boundary 
where temporal and spatial operations are connected. In a sense then, the racialization of  the 
connection between sovereignty and images of  death is prepared for by the deconstructive analysis of  
sovereignty as finite and spectral 
This extension of  white supremacy makes particularly obvious the relation to the attenuated 
forms of  social death, which it marks visibly as blackness. Race—and specifically blackness—is not 
the only marker, but in the context of  the US policing it comprises a particularly prominent visual 
marker of  alterity, negativity, nonmeaning, and death. Blackness provides a central mechanism which 
determines certain populations as potentially killable. In his August 1963 sermon at Nation of  
Islam’s Temple 7 in Harlem, Malcolm X traced this conscription of  blackness through a folk 
etymology that links the term “negro” to the Greek necro, or “death,” then to necrology and necropolis 
(literally “city of  the dead”) and necrology, and finally to the figure of  the nekros, or “corpse” (Figure 
21).335 In this way, the Black Power leader underscored how white supremacy fatally entangled black 
corporeality with death. In these cases, there is no need for the juridical and legal structure of  the 
death penalty, because blackness is already marked as socially and politically dead: they are, in a 
 
335 Malcolm X: “Negro comes from the Greek word “necro,” meaning a dead, inanimate object. Interestingly, necro 
derives from “necromancy,” the Ancient Egyptian ritual for communicating with the dead. Many of  us were taught 
that “negro” is Latin for black, and of  course, black people were called Negroes because of  this ... Negro (necro —> 
death) came to mean “black” because in Western culture black has always been symbolic for death (...) Thus, the Greek 
word necro (death) when translated to Latin becomes negro (black). Historically, in feudal Europe, black was the universal 
description for impurity. So slave owners, believing their African slaves were impure and socially dead, had no better 




sense, outside of  the logic of  the death penalty, which following a certain Kantian rationality, marks 
the access to what is proper to the dignity of  the human (DP1 8-9). 
 
 
Figure 21. Richard Saunders, Deconstructing “Negro.” August 1963. Photographic print. 
Photo courtesy of the AP Photo/Getty Images. 
 
Scenes of Subjection: Hartman 
How is death framed and disseminated within the necropolitical contours of  white supremacist 
sovereignty? How are images of  black death instrumentalized to determine the dispossession that 
structures black life? To return to Mbembe’s question, which serves as the exergue of  this chapter: 
“What place is given to life, death, and the human body (in particular the wounded or slain body)?  
How are they inscribed in the order of  power?”336 Mbembe poses this question, but he does not 
provide an answer. Saidiya Hartman’s analysis of  the “scene” of  antiblack violence affords an 
account of  the overdetermined function of  the slain body in this account of  white supremacy as an 
expression of  ontological panic in a racially coded visual field.  
 In the last chapter, I examined the visible spectacle of  the “seeing punish” (voir-punir) of  
the death penalty as a “new primal scene” that binds “the people” under the new regime of  popular 
sovereignty through the operations of  vision and visuality in the public staging of  the execution. 
Drawing on Derrida’s reflexive construction of  the “il se voit,” I argued, “with and against 
 




Foucault” (DP2 45), that sovereignty is confirmed in the instant that the people “having become the 
state,” see the condemned die: the visibility of  punishment is integral to the constitution of  
sovereignty. I examined the scene of  Weidmann’s execution to illustrate how sovereignty deployed 
methods of  technicity to materialize and supplement the phantasm of  an objective moment of  
death that can be mastered and controlled. Hartman opens new lines of  sight in relation to the 
vexed question of  the visibility of  punishment and its role in the institution of  power. In Scenes of  
Subjection—her pathbreaking examination of  the interconnected workings of  violence, spectatorship 
and witnessing, power and pleasure in the formation of  black subjectivity—Hartman critically 
reframes the “scene” to explain the force of  the spectacle of  antiblack brutality, in which “black 
torture, dismemberment, fatality, and fracturing are reutilized and ritualized.”337 This itinerary takes 
as its foundational moment the spectacle of  lynching, which historically played a central role in 
constituting and disciplining the meaning of  blackness.  
 Hartman interrogates the function of  the scene of  antiblack violence in fixing the 
identity of  the racial “other” vis-à-vis the gaze. Taking up feminist theorizations of  scopophilia as a 
mechanism deployed in racial subject formation, she argues that the “scene of  subjection” is the 
“primal scene” that transformed human life into a “fungible” object. As Jamaican-American poet 
and essayist Claudine Rankine argues in her Op-Ed to the New York Times, following the Charleston, 
South Carolina church massacre that left nine dead:  
We live in a country where Americans assimilate corpses in their daily comings and 
goings. Dead blacks are a part of  normal life here. Dying in ship hulls, tossed into the 
Atlantic, hanging from trees, beaten, shot in churches, gunned down by the police or 
warehoused in prisons: Historically, there is no quotidian without the enslaved, chained 
or dead black body to gaze upon or to hear about or to position a self  against.338  
 
Hartman asserts that these quotidian spectacles of  black pain are “primal,” or originary, both 
because they structure the racial foundations of  America, but also because they produce black 
subjectivity as a terrain of  dispossession. In her analysis of  Narrative of  the Life of  Frederick Douglass, 
an American Slave, she argues: 
The passage through the blood-stained gate is an inaugural moment in fate formation 
of  the enslaved. In this regard, it is a primal scene. By this I mean that the terrible 
 
337 Warren, Ontological Terror, 2. 






spectacle dramatizes the origin of  the subject and demonstrates that to be a slave is to 
be under the brutal power and authority of  another.339 
 
Hartman therefore refuses to recount the narrative scene in which Douglass’ aunt, Hester, is beaten, 
which she identifies as the “original generative act” of  antiblack terror that symbolizes Douglass’ 
passage into the institution of  slavery.  Her strategic “redaction” calls our attention to the casualness 
with which scenes of  the black corporeal violation are reproduced, repeated, and circulated.340 
Hartman asks how are we called upon to participate in scenes of  black suffering: “Are we witnesses 
who confirm the truth of  what happened in the face of  the world-destroying capacities of  pain, the 
distortions of  torture, the sheer unrepresentability of  terror, and the repression of  the dominant 
accounts? Or are we voyeurs fascinated with exhibitions of  terror and sufferance. What does the 
exposure of  the violated body yield?”341 Yet, as Fred Moten suggests, even Hartman’s decision not to 
reproduce the account of  Aunt Hester’s beating is “in some sense, illusory.” 342 Why? Because it is 
reproduced just the same, in her refusal of  it and in every scene of  subjection that follows from it, 
including the video of  McDonald’s perfunctory execution. There is a kind of  ineluctability of  the 
(re)production even in and through its denial.  
 
Take 2: OCT 20 2014/09:57:38PM  
This brings us to the second “take” of  the double optic of  spectrality. The two-eyed optic will guide 
my interrogation of  the “double-consciousness”343 of  the 20 October, 2014 dash-cam video of  
McDonald’s death.344 I approach this second deconstruction of  sovereignty through images of  
 
339 Hartman, Scenes, 3. 
340 Hartman, Scenes, 22. “Black redaction” belongs to a series of strategic moves in radical black aesthetics that seek to 
disrupt the panoptic qualities of the visual. See Sampada Aranke, “Material Matters: Black Radical Aesthetics and the 
Limits of Visibility,” e-flux 79 (February 2017), n.p., https://www.e-flux.com/journal/79/94433/material-matters-
black-radical-aesthetics-and-the-limits-of-visibility/. 
341 Hartman, Scenes, 3. 
342 See Moten, In the Break, 4. 
343 “Double-consciousness” was coined by W. E. B. Du Bois in his 1897 essay in the Atlantic, “Strivings of the Negro 
People,” later republished in The Souls of Black Folk (1903) to describe the experience of inner “twoness,” “second-
sight,” or internal conflict experienced by African-Americans as a result of their racialized oppression. See W. E. B. Du 
Bois, “Strivings of the Negro People,” The Atlantic, August 1, 1897, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1897/08/strivings-of-the-negro-people/305446/. 
344 Lee Raiford briefly invokes the stereoscope in her study of the shifting relations between black activism and 
photography. She quotes Oliver Wendell Holmes’ celebratory account of the stereoscope: “Every conceivable object 





death, first, “through the colonizing gaze of  the white supremacist eye” that (re)produces blackness 
as dispossession and death in an exchange meant to purify and prioritize white life through the 
spectacle of  black death and second, through the quasi-transcendental eye that aims to expose the 
double and paradoxical logic of  possibility and impossibility (i.e. spectrality) that structures white 
supremacist sovereignty.345 The first deconstructive angle is critico-diagnostic: how are images of  
black death deployed by this extension of  sovereign technicity to “master” and control death? This 
first angle aims to show the overdetermined and multiple functions fulfilled by images of  the slain 
black body in this specific terror formation of  white supremacist police power. In order to counter 
this phantasm, which has all too real effects for black life, one needs to first account for the ways in 
which quotidian technicity is deployed to reassert white supremacy in an attempt to quell its 
ontological panic. The second deconstructive angle is quasi-transcendental: this move involves showing 
that sovereignty’s identity is always related to mortality, finitude and vulnerability, which it 
nevertheless tries to master and control through various mechanisms of  sovereign technicity. By 
virtue of  its re-contextualizability, the image dated OCT 20 2014/09:57:38PM has been counter-
mobilized as a site of  radical black resistance in oppositional politics that exposes sovereignty’s 
pathological panic. By depicting the black body as grievable, the mobilization of  images of  death 
serves a pivotal role in national coalition building around the contemporary movement for black 
lives, and in the development of  media militancy.  
   
 
Sovereignty Technicity & Police Power 
FIRST ANGLE: What function are images of  police power supposed to serve, from the perspective 
of  the state? How do they institute sovereignty? How does white supremacist sovereignty—
understood as ontological panic—reassert itself  through the necroptopower of  images of  death? As 
 
the cattle in South America, for their skins, and leave the carcasses as little worth” (12). Holmes’ account offers 
Raiford a “compelling, if paradoxical framework for thinking about the relationship between racial ideology and visual 
technology” because, she asserts, this “skinning” of subjects provides an opportunity “for Black Americans to 
reinscribe the meaning of the black body,” yet, this “skinning” remobilizes a disturbing colonial metaphorics of 
predation (13). See Oliver Wendell Holmes, “The Stereoscope and the Stereograph” quoted in Leigh Raiford, 
Imprisoned in a Luminous Glare: Photography and the African American Freedom Struggle (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of 
North Carolina Press, 2013), 16. 





discussed in chapter 1, sovereignty involves a claim to spontaneity that excludes the question of  
technicity. Sovereignty represses its prosthetic dimensions. Yet, sovereignty needs spatiotemporal 
methods of  inscription to install itself  and to give itself  stability over time. Sovereignty claims and 
accrues power through the manipulation and legislation of  the visible field: “Whoever monopolizes 
visibility conquers thought itself  and determines the shape of  liberty,” writes Mondzain. “No power 
without an image.”346 Sovereignty arrogates to itself  the right to “unedited inspection,”; it authorizes 
itself  to capture, accumulate, circulate, order, exploit, and grant access to images of  black suffering 
and death. Conjugating Mondzain’s concept of  “optopower” with Mbembe’s “necropower,” the new 
term “necroptopower,” or visual power over death, will help me theorize the co-implication or 
“double exposure” of  visual and necropolitical cuts at work in this lethal extension of  sovereign 
technicity.   
Police bodycams and dashcams are rationalized as part of  a strategic civil defense against 
police violence. Advocates claim that police-worn cameras are tools for accountability that will serve 
to temper police impunity by subjecting the police to counter-surveillance—or “sousveillance”—
apparatuses. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and Campaign Zero advocate for more 
cameras in hopes that this will make the police more accountable for the use of  deadly force.347 This 
is correct—to an extent. In fact, it is the counter-mobilization of bystander cellphone videos that 
have contributed to the restoration of the capacity for witnessing historically denied to black people. 
Both Mbembe and Hartman note the long legal precedent of suppressing black testimony: both 
slaves and free Blacks were denied legal capacity to act as witnesses against whites in court in the 
United States. Social death establishes legal incapacity including revocation of the right to bear 
witness in court; from the juridical standpoint the black person was a nonperson.348  
Yet, as we have seen, the attempt to master death is given a quickly visually identifiable field 
of  operation and application that marks black bodies as “extrojectable.” These marked bodies can 
be thrown on the “outside” from the “inside” in a gesture that attempts to expel finitude and 
vulnerability by assigning it to blackness. In this specific extension of  sovereign technicity of  police 
 
346 Marie-José Mondzain, “Iconic Space and the Rule of Lands,” Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy 15, no. 4: 
Contemporary French Women Philosophers (Autumn 2000): 64, doi:10.1111/j.1527-2001.2000.tb00350.x. 
347 Campaing Zero includes body-cams in their policy solutions to police violence. See “Campaign Zero,” n.d. 
https://www.joincampaignzero.org/ and “Police Body Cameras,” American Civil Liberties Union, n.d., 
https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies/police-body-cameras. 




power, images of  suffering black bodies are one of  the mechanisms through which the formation 
of  power over black life is articulated. Police body-cam and dash-cam videos afford images from the 
deathly POV of  the police, which are deployed to affect this transference; they are one of  the 
mechanisms of  this scopic assignation. White supremacy’s panicked “acting out” is conditioned by 
and through images of  antiblack violence, including the video of  McDonald’s slaying. In other 
words, the spectacle of  black death effects the necropolitical partitioning that marks blackness for 
death. The process of  extrojection requires material and technical practice for externalizing, 
delimiting, determining, and policing the topos of  sovereignty. Sovereignty needs images routinized 
and normalized production of  images of  gratuitous antiblack violence to reassert its stability in the 
face of  mortal panic, but these images, as we will see, end up exposing white supremacy to the very 
ontological insecurity it is trying to mastery and control. 
These methods of  inscription are also, as discussed in the last chapter, methods for the 
technical constitution of  the experience of  time. This specific technical extension of  white 
supremacist police power extends itself  through modes of  surveillance that frame the (black) other’s 
death in images that are both punctal (i.e. “instantaneous”) representations of  corporeal death and a 
symbolic and interminably extended form of  living death (mort vivant). The date OCT 20 
2014/09:57:38PM that flashes across the screen in the pixelated dash-cam video of  McDonald’s 
death functions both (1) as sworn testimony of  the instant of  death thrown onto an imagined outside 
and (2) a symbolic site for the production of  social death that spectralizes time by opening the 
temporality of  the image to the haunting of  other times. The date punctures and striates time; 
pulling in its wake an anachronistic legacy of  racial violence.349 
 
Times of Death  
As we have seen, due to its spectral constitution sovereignty needs modes of  technicity, including 
images to (re)assert itself  over time: sovereignty is always reasserting itself  through modes of  
differential iterability. One of  the ways this plays out in by attempting to master the instant (of  
 
349 Like the fifteen photo-paintings of the Baader-Meinhof Group that comprise Gerhard Richter’s October 18, 1977, this 
section takes the singular date of McDonald’s shooting as its title. In so doing, I indicate a continuity with Ricther’s 
concern with questions of mourning, historical trauma, and repression. For a discussion of the date in Ricther’s work 





death). In the last chapter we saw how sovereignty tries to “master” the divide between Life/Death 
by contracting death into a punctal point that is aporetically a part of  time and outside of  time.  
This extension of  sovereign technicity also deploys punctal images of  corporeal death: the 
dash-cam video of  McDonald’s death represents the corporeal event of  death as instantaneous. 
OCT 20 2014/09:57:38PM: the time stamp records the time of  death in its singularity. With this 
specific ethos of  cyborganized police, all of  the police are turned into the aide-bourreau-cum-
photographer who register the time of  death by taking pictures for the state 24/7. Like the 
photographer’s “prise de vue,” the dash-cam video of  McDonald’s death gives sworn testimony that 
death has been delivered in a phantasmatic instant that can be mastered and controlled. McDonald is 
framed by the state at the moment he is put to death and this framing reasserts white supremacy’s 
necroptopower over the (black) other’s finitude by literally killing his time of  life.  This ritual 
performance extrojects spectrality onto the (black) other in a scene of  subjection intended to 
confirm the partition: White Life/Black Death. In this way, sovereignty still imagines it is cut off  
from death. Yet, here the point is extended spatially into a line that is drawn into a circular enclosure. 
Black death—McDonald’s and many others, which his image of  death metonymizes—functions to 
scaffold white civic coherence by reaffirming sovereign closure. The dash-cam video frames 
McDoanld at the moment he is thrown over the line of  “life” to “outside” of  death, with which he 
was already marked visually vis-à-vis his blackness. The video “frames” this face-off  with alterity in a 
carceral strategy of  spatial delimitation.350 In short, white supremacy tries to master death, by 
extrojecting punctal images that mark racial difference as spatial delimitation: it tries to throw death 
outside itself—over there and it takes a picture as through to affirm this relation as one of  
exteriorization. Images of  black death are a necropolitical exercise that divides who is on the “inside” 
and who is on the “outside.” “Insularity,” as Derrida notes, “has always been a privileged and, by the 
same token, an ambiguous place, the border of  all hospitalities as well as all violences.”351  
The image of  McDonald’s corporeal death also determines a second symbolic death: images of  
antiblack violence are one of  the mechanisms that mark quotidian exposure to violence within 
 
350 I follow Judith Butler and Domietta Torlasco, in defining the operation of “framing” as a critical, aesthetic, and 
political practice that determines the parcelling out of visibility and invisibility, inclusion and exclusion, which regulates 
and determines knowability and greiveability, as well as modes of temporality. See Domietta Torlasco, “Impossible 
Photographs: Images of War from Rossellini to DOCUMENTA 13,” Discourse 40, no. 1 (Winter 2018): 110–31. 





everyday black life. Images of  death are a technique of  race and power that frame and thus produce 
black life as mort vivant. Social death is conditioned by the proliferating archive of  digital images of  
antiblack violence circulating—or withheld from circulating—across decentralized, sometimes “real-
time” mobile output platforms that include for-profit police archiving services like Taser 
International’s cloud-platform evidence.com, as well as social-media networks (what Steve Mann 
calls “swollag,” or “gallows” inverted).352  
The date OCT 20 2014/09:57:38PM flashes across the screen as a warning light or an 
indicator that pulls in its wake an anachronistic legacy of  racial violence. The date is an index of  the 
state’s testimony about the time of  death; it signals to the absolute singularity of  the “here-and-
now” of  the instant of  McDonald’s death. But the video also makes the singular “now” of  the date 
repeatable. It pluralizes the date. McDonald dies more than once—in many times—with multiple and 
overdetermined effects. The date is haunted by other times that are encrypted within its modality of  
visual capture. As Derrida suggests, the date is a “specter.”353 This tele-technological amplification of  
spectrality signals regressive and progressive movement: it points to the past, as a rhetorical mode of  
analepsis (a kind of  virtual memory or aftershock that haunts the image) and to the future, as a kind 
of  prolepsis (as a kind of  anticipatory relation death in the future).354 
First: spectral analepsis. The video is recursively haunted by a visual archive of  state-
sanctioned killing. The video effects a kind of  visual cathexis that condenses within it the afterlives, 
or après-coups (to use Derrida’s term) of  a litany of  past antiblack violence. The date points to other 
dates: to the 6 July 2016 dash-cam video of  a Minnesota police officer abruptly firing seven shots 
into a car during a routine traffic stop in the Falcon Heights suburb of  St. Paul, leaving Philando  
  
 
352 See Steve Mann and Joseph Ferenbok, “New Media and the Power Politics of Sousveillance in a Surveillance-
Dominated World,” Surveillance & Society 11, no. 1–2 (July 16, 2013): 18–34, doi:10.24908/ss.v11i1/2.4456 and “ACLU 
Apps to Record Police Conduct,” American Civil Liberties Union, n.d. https://www.aclu.org/issues/criminal-law-
reform/reforming-police-practices/aclu-apps-record-police-conduct. Mann coined the term “swollag” to describe  
output modalities in conjunction with “sousveillance” as an input modality: “Just as the efficacy of surveillance relies 
on ‘la potence’ (potency, e.g. ‘the gallows’), the efficacy of sousveillance requires a different kind of ‘potency’ or 
reciprocal concept, i.e. another force to make the undersight an effective social mechanism for political action and 
change. We name this force ‘swollag’ (‘gallows’ spelled backwards)” (25). “Axon Evidence,” Axon, n.d. 
https://global.axon.com/products/evidence. 
353 See Derrida, “Shibboleth: For Paul Celan”, 389-390. 
354 Interestingly, both rhetorical devices are etymologically linked to the Greek lambanein “take”: prolēpsis, signals  pro 
‘before’ + lambanein ‘take’ and analēpsis, from ana ‘up’ + lambanein ‘take’. These two temporal-rhetorical devices are 





Figure 22. Police body-cam video, shooting of Sylville Smith in Milwaukee. 13 August 2016. Screenshot from police video. 
 






Castille, an unarmed black motorist dead, as his girlfriend and her young daughter watch from inside 
the car; to the shaky 13 August, 2016 body-cam video of  the 12-second foot chase showing Sylville 
Smith lobbing his gun over a fence, then falling backward with his hands in the air, as a Milwaukee 
police officer Dominique Heaggan-Brown fires a second fatal shot into his chest (Figure 22). More 
recursively, it points back to 3 March, 1991, the day amateur cameraman George Holliday used his 
new Sony Handycam to record LAPD officers beating Rodney King from the balcony of his Lake 
View Terrace apartment (Figure 23) 355 and further yet, to 28 August, 1955, the day Emmett Till was 
abducted from his uncle’s house, beaten, shot and tossed in the Tallahatchie River with a 200-pound 
cotton gin motor tied to his neck. The fracturing torsion of  McDonald’s pirouette pulls into itself  
an archive of  images that swarm around it, adumbrating the meaning of  his image of  death.  
The digital video keeps vigil for all these noncontemporaneous names and dates. It 
communicates with the virtual archive of  lynching photographs that supplement the “il se voit” of  
sovereignty seeing-itself  through the eyes of  its constituency in an instant of  self-reflection that is 
repeated each time McDonald is resurrected to roam the feeds of  mobile screens.356 As fetish, the 
image of  death can be “kept in the pocket” like the pieces of  clothing and hair removed from 
lynched bodies, which formed part of  the political economy of  the Southern lynching spectacle. It 
 
355 Derrida discusses the discusses the aftermath of the Rodney King beatings in “Faxitexture,” and subsequently in 
Echographies and Copy, Archive, Signature (46-48). On 29 April, 1992, a Ventura County jury acquitted four LAPD officers 
of the use of excessive force in the 1991 arrest and beating of Rodney King. In the wake of the King verdict, South 
Central Los Angeles erupted in six days of violence that left fifty-three dead and 2,400 injured. 5,000 were arrested and 
1,000 buildings reduced to ashes. Surveying the destruction from San Bernardino prison following the suppression of 
the insurrection by the National Guard, incarcerated members L.A.’s two major gangs produced a conjoint plan for 
urban reconstruction: “Give us a hammer and nails,” they wrote in a Rousseauian tenor, “and we will rebuild L.A.” 
Responding to the failure of the American justice system to address systemic institutional abuses of power and 
structural racism at the level of governance and in the construction of urban space, the inmates issued a five-page list 
of demands including the “Blood/Crips Law Enforcement Programme,” which advocated grassroots community 
policing and the “constant recording and immediate archiving” of all police activity by ex-gang members armed only 
with video cameras.355 Derrida, who was teaching at USC Irvine at the time of the LA riots, voices trepidation about the 
“quasi-panoptic” powers of operational supervision: he worries that the constant and imminent surveillance invoked 
by the democratic “building plan” threatens to transform civic and political space into an “ontopolitological” totality: 
“what binds the political to the topological and politics to space in the present (on, onto) would be gathered together in 
the present, devoid of any shadow, beneath the gaze, exposed to an all-powerful photographic apparatus” (Copy Archive 
Signature, 46-47). See Bloods and Crips, “Bloods/Crips Proposal for LA’s Face-Lift,” n.d. 
http://gangresearch.net/GangResearch/Policy/cripsbloodsplan.html. 





was common practice throughout the 1940s and 1950s to circulate photographic postcards of  the 
ritual performance by post. These images served to supplement to the specular structure of  the 
“original” scene, which functioned as a mode of  social, racial, and economic control and as one of  
the mainstays of  performatively reasserting white supremacist power in America. As Raiford writes: 
“the lynching is about visibility, about spectacularizing white supremacy and the cohering of  white 
subjectivity through and against the spectacle of  the dead black other.”357 Just as one act of  lynching 
traveled with “sinister force down city streets and through rural farms, across roads and rivers,” 
McDonald’s killing circulates a specter of  violence.358 The desire to “see punished” (voir punir) is 
displaced through a viral culture of  digital death that makes sovereign killing available on-demand. 
The familiar visual rhetoric of  images portraying the summary execution of  fleeing black men—
images shot from the POV of  the pursuing officer—support identification with white positionality.  
Second: the date’s untimely archive of  virtual images belongs to the future. At the same time 
that the date converses with the past, it frames a future archive of  potential violence. It signals a 
political prolepsis that points to the imminent possibility extermination that is the ever-present 
horizon of  black life. As we saw in Barthes’ reading of  Louis Payne in the last chapter, the image 
evokes the structural possibility of  “my own” death before my death: it unleashes mourning before 
death as a structural possibility within life. Here, however, haunting unleashes what Warren calls 
“ontological terror.”359 The image ensures that black life is traversed by a constant and imminent 
death-threat; it marks the black subject for death. As Rankine incisively notes, “the condition of  
Black life under white supremacy, is one of  mourning.” Images of  black death spread virally across 
social media, amplifying “the daily strain of  knowing that as a black person you can be killed for 
simply being black.”360 What Abdul R. Jan Mohamed calls the “death-bound-subject,” is a subject 
condemned to death in the present.  
McDonald’s image registers a double death that corresponds with the double genitive 
outlined in the introduction. First death: the punctal, corporeal death represented in the iconic image. 
Second death (in chiasmus with the first): the production of  symbolic living death of  Mbembe’s mort 
vivant. Images of  antiblack police violence, such as McDonald’s, need to be understood in the 
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context of  a lineage of  images that present black bodies as fragmented and dismembered, as 
inherently exposed to physical and psychic violence. In other words, as an ongoing mechanism of  
capture and perdition that frames black life as potentially killable and thereby renders it ghostly. These 
images detain black life within the frame and effect symbolic violence outside the frame. In this sense, 
the video of  McDonald’s death approaches what Blanchot describes in The Instant of  My Death. 
Blanchot’s short, loosely autobiographical, narrative revolves around the moment a young man is 
brought before a firing squad during World War II and is then suddenly released by an exceptional 
act of sovereign decision. His (non)experience of death has the effect of dispossessing him of life. In 
this case, the black subject who witnesses McDonald’s death is thereby condemned to death, is 
always about to be shot, or already virtually shot and symbolically deadened.361 This specific 
extension of  sovereign technicity, or “differential deployment of  technē” (SM 169) is enmeshed in a 
phenomenology of  violence that both confirms the instant of  death and disrupts it through analepsis 
and prolepsis, which exploits the spectrality of  time to further entrench black dispossession.362  
McDonald is condemned to repeat the spectacle of  his death with Promethean cruelty that 
does not simply, as Jared Sexton writes, render black bodies “subject to death in an economy of  
disposability,” but rather, subjects them to “the interminable time of  meaningless, impersonal 
dying.”363 McDonald is never allowed to die. Death rains down like malediction in a hail of  bullets, time 
after time, and there is no escape from this visitation of  arbitrary and catastrophic violence. His 
death survives in a compulsion to repeat the living dying experience of  harassment and execution 
across a disseminated network of  social media devices. This death cannot be contained the punctal 
instants that make up the Western philosophy of  time. Rather, McDonald’s ghost is condemned to a 
form of  living death or spectral dying. Death—and this is perhaps getting close to Blanchot’s 
intuition—is impossible. But whereas Blanchot aims to demonstrate a radical inability to lay hold of  
death and make it work as an affirmation of  life, this deathlessness amounts to a dispossession of  
futurity. In McDonald’s mort vivant image, death never arrives, but never stops arriving. Every time 
McDonald is resurrected to perform his death, like Bazin’s matador, time is torn open, betraying the 
very instant that is supposed to contain it. Mbembe’s theorization of  the mort vivant provides us with 
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an account of  how race orders the distribution of  death, not only across the clear-cut division of  
black death/white life, but also as the production of  living-dead ghostliness amplified by the 
disseminated structure of  digital networks and media platforms. This ghostly condition of  black life, 
as a kind of  life that is lived in and as dying, is amplified by the digital culture as a kind of  death-in-life 
that both frames the time of  the black other’s death, while simultaneously rendering that life liminal. 
What space is there for a black political ontology—or hauntology—lived in the wake of this 
deluge of punishing images? Whereas the “calculated decision” of the death penalty dictates (and 
this, for Derrida, is what is most objectionable) that one will die “on such and such a day, at such 
and such an hour, in that calculable place, and from blows delivered by several machines, the worst 
of which is perhaps neither the guillotine nor the syringe, but the clock and the anonymity of 
clockwork” (DP1 256), the image of black death are there “to frighten, to show men their futures.”364 
This is their pedagogic value: you can die at any moment. For Derrida, the value of life is conceived not 
in terms of human dignity (both retentionist and abolitionist positions for and against the death 
penalty, he argues, hinge on the mobilization of a humanist concept of dignity), but rather, in terms 
of having a future. To be a living being is always to have a future, it is this openness to a fundamentally 
unknowable future—or l’avenir (to come).365 It is this condition of having a future that images of 
black death seek to interrupt and hold in paralysis: “The lesson will stay with you: blackness 
afflicted, mutilated, a fatal way of being alive.” 366 Antiblack police violence, as an institutional and 
necropolitical dispostif, functions through a double—physical and ontological—destruction of black 
existence that displaces the boundary between life and death and produces black life as mort vivant, or 
what French critical race theorist, Norman Ajari calls a “forme-de-mort” characterized by existence 
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The first line of  defense against this production of  the mort vivant might still be to reprioritize a 
vitalism of  black life without death. Consider, for example, how Black Lives Matter puts the emphasis 
on the materiality of  black life. This strategic move involves a critical practice of  “insisting” black life 
into a present shaped in the face of  the ongoing threat of  death.368 However, this reframing could 
lead towards a political ontology of  black life without exposure to finitude. The attempt to recover 
for blackness the status of  Being vis-à-vis an access to an “authentic dying” (sterben) could always lead 
to more phantasms. Yet, because there is no end to phantasms—because the desire for identity is 
ineliminable—this strategic move to recover black life, as living, is not wrong. Indeed, it is a strategic 
necessary. 
What can Derrida’s account of  spectrality hold up against this potential objection? And what 
exactly is the relation between Mbembe’s living death (mort vivant) and Derrida’s spectral lifedeath 
(lavielamort)? Both theories co-implicate life and death. Whereas Mbembe mort vivant, as we have seen, 
critically diagnoses the black experience of  dying-living under white supremacy, Derrida’s lifedeath 
names the spectral and iterable constitution of  all identity, including the reactive terror formation 
that gives rise to white supremacy.369 However, Derrida’s lifedeath does not mark social death like 
Mbembe’s mort vivant. Lifedeath is ineliminable, but it need not give rise to this particularly brutal—
and widespread—expression of  phantasmaticity. On the one hand, Mbembe’s mort vivant provides a 
model for thinking through the quotidian corporeal and symbolic violence of  black social life under 
social death. His account of  necropower has helped flesh out the historical and critico-diagnostic 
account that specifies how race works in the “terror formation” of  white supremacist police power, 
as a system of  techniques that regulate the meaning of  blackness through spatial, cultural, and visual 
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mechanisms. Mbembe’s necropolitical ghost is the effect of  the instrumentalization of  death in a 
present in which “interruption has become routine.”370 
On the other hand, Derrida’a account of  lifedeath can help respond to mort vivant by offering 
critical and quasi-transcendental potential to analyze the white supremacist production of  living death. 
If  you “had” life until death (that is if  life where really cut off  from death), then it is hard to explain 
why life is vulnerable to begin with. Both Derrida and Mbembe agree that the mort vivant violates this 
vulnerability. Yet, lifedeath accounts for this vulnerability. If  every life is already exposed and related 
to death as that which relates it to an “outside” or hetero-affection from the beginning, then we 
cannot ever be rid of  the spectrality that conditions identity over time. We are constituted by a 
shared living-dying structure of  spectrality we are able to appropriate this movement of  the self  
back to itself  over time. This means that our time of  life is always traversed by alterity and death. 
Derrida’s account of  spectral lifedeath, thus extends Mbmebe’s critic-historical account by developing 
its quasi-transcendental implications (and this again, is a question of  Foucault and Derrida’s different 
conceptions of  the Kantian inheritance of  critique). Derrida’s account of  the deconstruction of  
sovereignty gives us a quasi-transcendental accounting of  the logic of  spectrality at work in this 
historical and geopolitical terror formation. Recall that the quasi-transcendental argument seeks to 
show how that the conditions of  possibility (i.e. spectrality) is simultaneously the conditions of  
impossibility of  the purity of  sovereignty and life, etc. This is the SECOND ANGLE of  the 
infrastructural logic of  spectrality.  
What possible responses to these displays of  ontological panic does McDonald’s image of  
death afford? What possibilities of  rupture or breakage emerge from the image—understood as a 
form of  differential iterability? What productive disruptions and displacements are produced? What 
critical force can be counter-mobilized by these quotidian modes of  technicization of  black 
spectacle? As we saw in the last chapter, there is always a phantasmatic dimension of  sovereignty 
that can be deconstructed by showing that spectrality is both necessary to sovereignty, while 
simultaneously rendering it unstable. This specific extension of  white supremacist sovereignty needs 
images of  black death for mastery, yet all these attempts on the part of  the sovereign representatives 
of  the contemporary police state to seek mastery over blackness and death simultaneously expose its 
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ontological panic. The critical force of  the image of  the slain black body comes into play in a 
number of  ways. I will outline two. The first involves a Levinasian moment of  empathy; the second 
a Butlerian approach to frames and framing.  
Before doing so, I want to point out that this double articulation focuses on the role of  a 
phantasm of  blackness for white power. It is grounded in other words, in a stereoscopic model that 
still risks absenting the position of  blackness within its two critical and quasi-transcendental angles, 
and thus rearticulating the very violence it seeks to contest. I want to further complicate this, by 
offering another possible slippage of  the double optic in this specific empirico-historical context, 
another double vision or better yet, “double consciousness” to use W.E.B. Du Bois’ term, that 
exposes how whiteness has framed and determined the onto-theological concept of  sovereignty 
“we” have inherited from political modernity, which is rooted in the heritage of  Europe’s colonial 
projects, which is always gendered, racialized and classed, and which in different historical and 
geopolitical context, specifies which images of  death are prohibited and which are circulated (no 
dead soldiers, for example, but an ongoing deluge of  black deaths).  If  “we” are haunted by images 
of  death, in what specific contexts, for what specific audiences, does this haunting take place 
differentially? What different effects are produced in the bodies of  those who are haunted? How can 
a political hauntology of  the image attend to these specificities? 
In his important text On Black Men, Afropessimist theorist, David Marriott examines the 
psychic effects of  images of  dead and murdered black bodies on black spectatorship and specifically, 
black masculinity.371 According to Marriot, who examines an array of  images including those of  
Southern lynchings, images of  the black death produce two splits: between white and black subjects, 
and within the black subjectivity. On the one hand, they serve to produce a necropolitical cut, 
between dead black men (and the living ones produced through identification), and their white 
executioners who stage spectacles of  black violation as a defense against phobic anxiety about 
finitude, and against which white political community is performatively defined: in the case of  
lynching photographs, as in the case of  antiblack police violence, “the camera lens is a means to 
fashion the self  through the image of  the dead black man.” In other words, an image of  the “we” 
of  white political community is consolidated through black annihilation: “the act of  lynching is the 
primal scene of  racist culture in the Southern States of  America,” writes Marriott.372 The law 
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operates through terror and requires black men, tortured, killed, and preserved in images that 
prolong death. 
But what of  the position of  blackness? What does it mean, on the other hand, to be a black 
man looking at images of  mutilated black masculinity when the black imaginary is haunted—even 
colonized—by white fantasy? Images of  black death register the power of  that mutilation on the 
psychic lives of  black men.  Marriott examines the ways in which “the transference of  white fantasy 
to black experience continues to haunt the black imaginary.373 White anxieties about black 
masculinity “slice like a knife through the eyes of  petrified black men.” What emerges through his 
interrogation of  white fascination with “looking at themselves through images of  black desolation, 
of  blacks intimately dispossessed by that self-same looking,” is an account of  the role of  images in 
producing the black male psyche as divided. 374 Lynching photographs produce identification with the 
dead black body. Forced to engage with this “fantasmatic legacy,” the black male viewer is doubly 
positioned as victim and spectator looking at oneself  through the eyes of  another, and this doubling 
produces a psychic rupture.375 
What possibilities then, in view of  this psychic rupture, do images of  black death offer for 
oppositional politics? Is there yet another possibility, grounded in black positionality, for viewing 
images of  black death? What militant viewing practices can be generated for what Sampada Aranke 
in “Black Power/Black Death” calls the radical capacity of  black death to mobilize political 
community of  resistance? And what resources can the model of  stereoscopic vision marshal for 
such an oppositional politics? What work has and must be done within radical black politics to 
unmake the work of  sovereign capture in the political sphere?376 What is entailed by the politico-
aesthetic work of  opening a space for specters of  black death, in this specific context of  white 
supremacy and how can this transform the conditions of  black life? How, in other words, can these 
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Figure 24. Unidentified photographer, Mamie Till-Mobley weeps at her son’s funeral on Sept. 6, 1955, in Chicago. 1955. Photographic print. 
Photo courtesy of AP Photo. 
 
The Precariousness of Empathy 
The image of  antiblack brutality also generates an impulse towards revulsion. It haunts. It evokes 
horror in multiple registers, for different audiences: “We have the memories before the photos, they 
have the photos before the memories,” says Ajari.377 A Levinasian reading of  the affective 
dimensions of  the image suggests that in evoking vulnerability, the image issues a call to respond to 
the other. When McDonald’s image tears open the flow of  time it introduces a moment of  
diachronic exposure to the absolute alterity of  the other. It issues an ethicopolitical and 
hauntological injunction: it calls for responsibility before the other’s vulnerability. Can this impulse 
account for the strategic deployment of  images of  black pain by anti-lynching campaigns and the 
 




movement for Black lives? In her 1895 anti-lynching tract A Red Record: Tabulaated Statistics and Alleged 
Causes of  Lynchings in the United States, 1892-1893-1894, Civil Rights leader Ida B. Wells reproduced a 
photographic postcard of  Ray Porter’s lynched black body in Clanton, Alabama.378 For Wells, 
photographic images of  lynched bodies were a critical component of  exposing the brutality of  
white supremacy.379 This attempt to break white supremacy’s control over black death with 
antilynching photography is repeated across the Black Civil Rights movement, from Wells through 
the contemporary movement for Black lives.  
Demonstrating the protean nature of  photographic meaning, Mamie Till-Mobley famously 
called the country’s leading Black newspapers—Chicago Defender, Ebony and Jet—to take photographs 
of  her dead son’s slain body. She believed exposure to these images would invoke empathy and hold 
the nation accountable for the interminable mourning that conditions black life. Rejecting the 
mortician, for five days Till-Mobley held an open casket wake attended by tens of  thousands. Jet ran 
a series of  photos of  Till’s disfigured corpse, which fractured the “white racial frame,” catalyzing the 
civil rights movement (Figure 24).380 According to Rankine, Till-Mobley forged a new pathway for 
thinking about the lynched body: 
Mobley’s refusal to keep private grief  private allowed a body that meant nothing to the 
criminal-justice system to stand as evidence. By placing both herself  and her son’s corpse in 
positions of  refusal relative to the etiquette of  grief, she ‘disidentified’ with the tradition of  
the lynched figure left out in public view as a warning to the black community, thereby using 
the lynching tradition against itself. The spectacle of  the black body, in her hands, publicized 
the injustice mapped onto her son’s corpse… In refusing to look away from the flesh of  our 
domestic murders, by insisting we look with her upon the dead, she reframed mourning as a 
method of  acknowledgment that helped energize the civil rights movement in the 1950s and 
1960s.381  
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Till’s beaten body in his coffin—which is more of  a time exposure than snapshot (allied in De 
Duve’s model, with mourning rather than trauma)—is mobilized to evoke empathy and to expose 
how the black body is utilized as an instrument of  visibilization of  violence already internalized 
within the black body. Yet, the image is made to resignify a political, social, and aesthetic challenge to 
depict the black body as grievable. Another iteration of  this gesture in 2016: Diamond Reynolds uses 
her cellphone to broadcast via Facebook Live as her partner, Philando Castille, lay dying next to her 
(Figure 25). Turning the lens on herself, Reynolds lucidly describes the facts of  the encounter in 
“real-time” as the officer keeps his gun trained on Castille’s blood-soaked body in what would be a 
nearly ten-minute broadcast.382  
Whereas for Mbembe, the “cuts and scars” of  slain black bodies cause a wound that 
prevents “the realization of  community,” for Rankine, they open new critical possibilities of  a 
militant politics of  mourning.383 Rankine suggests that black life is constituted politically by virtue of  
the social vulnerability of  living-dying corporeal bodies, as a site at once assertive and generative. 
Till-Mobley’s counter-mobilization of  the image of  black death for black viewers within the Black 
community, breaks the hegemonic frame of  police power, which constructs black positionality 
through the spectral subjection to corporeal violation. For Rankine, as for Till-Mobley, the refusal to 
bury Till within the black political imagination carries an injunction to live with ghosts and with 
spectrality as the necessary condition of  living as vulnerable, exposed to others, at risk of  violence. 
Political responsibility that attends to black critical memory, should not on Rankine’s account leaves 
these images on their own. What Ajari calls the “dignity” of black life, which persists outside the 
genealogical of human dignity within the Western political cannon, is defined in the final place, as “a 
capacity to stand in the interstice between death and life, that is, to be haunted by the ambiguous 
specters of the past.”384 In other words, black political ontology is also a political hauntology. 
We can anticipate Hartman’ objection to this empathetic moment: noting the 
“precariousness of  empathy” she argues that the politics of  recognition with its reliance on theories 
of  empathetic identification require that “the white body be positioned in the place of  the black body  
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Figure 25. Diamond Reynolds, shooting of Philando Castile in St. Anthony, Minnesota. 16 July 2016. 





in order to make this suffering visible and intelligible.”385 This makes the appeal to white empathy 
over the video of  McDonald’s slaying structurally complicit with antiblackness. Empathetic 
identification relies on the libidinal economy of  white pleasure, which Hartman argues, has an 
insatiable appetite for black pain. This very indignation focalizes attention on the excess of  black 
suffering, reducing the victim to a screen for an empathetic projection that obscures the pleasure 
garnered through the depiction of  excoriated black flesh.386 The image of McDonald slaying—its 
framing, its content, and even its mobilization for the purposes of empathetic identification by 
antilynching activists like Wells, Till-Mobley and Reynolds—requests spectatorial complicity that 
corroborates the institution of white power over black bodies. This is why Hartman refuses to 
repeat scenes that continue the white (economic and libidinal) traffic in black spectacle. This is why 
Hannah Black issued a letter to the Whitney in 2017 demanding they remove Dana Schulz’s painting 
of Emmett Till, Open Casket (2017) from the Whitney Biennial (Figure 26).387 With each new video 
circulated we participate in the legacy of slavery’s afterlives. These images, as Sharpe contends, do 
nothing to ameliorate suffering. Journalist Steven W Thrasher calls the image of McDonald’s 
execution “genocidal pornography,” recalling Sontag’s argument argues that images of another’s 
pain can never mobilize political action.388  
Yet, these spectral images of  high-profile shootings have spread virally, galvanizing public 
attention, spurring uprisings from Ferguson to Oakland, and unleashing the contemporary 
movement for Black lives. In so doing, they demonstrate the generative potential of black 
corporeality and corpses.389 It has given rise moreover, to forms of  social protest that draw attention 
to the temporality of  black life, lived under black social death. Consider for example, the public die-
in, as a political performance of  co-dying (comourrance) that re-enacts the four and a half  hours that 
Michael Brown’s corpse lay face down on the hot asphalt of  a Ferguson, Missouri street.  
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Figure 26. Scott W.H. Young, Parker Bright protesting Dana Schutz’s Open Casket, Whitney Museum. 2017. Digital photograph via 
Twitter @Heiscott. 
 
 This leaves me suspended between two possibilities. First: insofar as this image is critical to the 
institution white supremacy, to look at it is to participate in a visual legacy of antiblack violence that 
moves along a visible spectrum. As I argued in the introduction, the risk of “return of the worst” 
attends to these conjurations of the ghosts of antiblack violence. Second: to look away, to refuse to 
acknowledge these images of death subjects them to an overdetermined strata of forgetting, and it is 
perhaps this “this accumulation of silence,” which is the worst—the most dangerous (E 22-3). 
Derrida’s quasi-concept of spectrality attends to this double-bind. One remembers these ghosts in 
order to preserve their memory, “out of  respect for memory, the truth, the victims, etc.,” but even as 
we do so the worst threatens to return: “One phantom recalls another,” says Derrida: the ghostly 
image of  Laquan MacDonald’s killing recalls images of  lynching and their role in white supremacist 
sovereignty’s self-realization. These images of  death contaminate one another; they aggravate and 
conjure one another. Yet, we call these images back for our struggle today and, above all for the 
promise that binds it, for the future. Each return of  the image of  death, which always ensures that 






The emphasis on the relation between framing and vulnerability, also leads to a second way to 
approach the critical potential of  the image of  black death vis-à-vis Butler’s account of  the operation 
of  frames and framing in the nexus of  power. Borrowing from the feminist visual ethnographer 
Trin T. Minh Ha, what Butler calls “framing the frame,” describes the way in which the nexus 
between power and knowledge is filtered through techniques.390 This genealogical and critical 
understanding of  “frames” as a power nexus, is indebted to Foucault. Butler demonstrates that there 
is no life and also no death without a relation to some available frame. This is not to say one cannot 
live or die outside of frames, but, rather, that our understanding of the uneven precarity assigned to 
life is governed by images. Butler positions the function of “framing” as a hegemonic and normative 
technique of power.  
However, the iterable structure of  technical images introduces a “structural risk for the 
identity of  the frame itself.”391 The multivalent operations of  police images are one of  the primary 
mechanisms for “framing” and thus determining the meaning of  race and for adjudicating which 
bodies are marked for living death. However, the image never returns without difference. As Butler 
reminds us, technical images can “be instrumentalized in radically different directions” depending on 
how they are “discursively framed.”392 They never repeat the “original” scene. The image of  death is 
a site of  memory, inheritance, and bequeathal. It is always a scene of  repeating, never in an identical 
way—always slightly displaced, deferred. The conditions of  reproducibility (the image’s differential 
iterability, itinerancy, and infinite re-contextualizability) produce a critical shift that makes the limits 
of  the frame vacillate in ways that expose the alterity “encrypted” within the frame.393 Within this 
specific frame of  power, the specificity of  black bodies—McDonald’s and all the other’s that are 
invoked by his singular image of  death—are caught up with a political call.  
 The dashcam video of  McDonald’s assassination returns to haunt and affect various subject 
positions differently, and this haunting is a spur to collective action. But what work must be done to 
remobilize the image in the context of  the mediated social justice movement for black lives, both to 
expose the threat of  police violence for white viewers (a threat that hardly needs confirmation for the 
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black subject), and more importantly to theorize practices of  media militancy, and build new 
national and transnational coalitions? How do the image’s circulatory dynamic and deconstructive, 
interpretive framework overdetermine, disidentify, and resist their interpretation within the 
framework of  white power in ways that are critical to how they become contestatory? This “scene 
of  objection” exposes new possibilities of  resistance.394 Its afterlives circulate across digital 
platforms, formats, screens, files, torrents and burns: this new form of  “digital death” circulates as a 
“poor image”—as a third, fourth, and fifth generation migrant, militant, and fragmented image. The 
video entered into evidence at the trial of  Officer Jason Van Dyke in the Cook County circuit as 
“People’s exhibit 46,” circulates through time and space accruing multiple meanings: it functions in 
different contexts as forensic evidence; as a scene of  dispossession and ongoing racial terror; as a 
technique of  race and necroptopower that creations divisions of  meaning and value; as mode of 
black testimony and a politics of  (critical black) mourning that catalyzes a renewed understanding 
generative capacity of  black death.395  
This analysis shows that the images of  death can always serve a dual role in the reassertion 
of  power as well as its critique. The more sovereign power visually determines living bodies as 
killable—as sites of  living death—the more it exposes itself  to this logic of  finitude. Sovereignty’s 
compulsion to repeat images of  brutalized black bodies across a multitude of  screens, is at once a 
powerful affective technique by which it affirms its roguish and terrorizing authority that 
determinates black life as mort vivant and the symptom of  its own undoing. In creating more and 
more panicked images of  brutality white supremacist sovereignty ends up exposing its own 
pathology. Killing blackness—literally and symbolically through frames—will never make whiteness 
invulnerable to death. Instead, it lays bare its panicked pathology all the more. The dissemination of  
McDonald’s slaying preserves the violent event and in so doing only prolongs white supremacy’s 
exposure to vulnerability. Rather than mastering death, the image deepens an investment with and 
responsibility for the dead. The necessity of  learning to live with ghosts is amplified by the mort 
vivant image. The mortality of  McDonald’s living dying body is a force of  alterity that delivers an 
injunction to attend to the dead of  history. Read this way, it exposes white supremacy to its own 
vulnerability: its self-realization—its making real, as the materializing of sovereignty through modes of 
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technicity by way of the subjection of blackness—ends up exposing it to its own finitude and 
mortality. Even as images of  death reassert white supremacist sovereignty, they simultaneously 













In the preceding chapters, I mobilized the optic of spectrality as a critical and quasi-transcendental 
infrastructure to read (1) death penalty photography in the analogue era and beyond and (2) 
dashcam recordings of antiblack police violence circulated on mobile platforms. In this final chapter, 
I deploy the double-sided stereo-optic to examine the relation between sovereignty, war—in the 
broadest possible sense—technicity, spectrality, and the “survival” of the death penalty in the 
context of global electronic warfare in the Greater Middle East.397 I argue that the figure of the 
drone marks a new intensified extension of necroptopower, or visual power over death, and a new 
phase in the convergence of technologies of vision, military-industrial power, spectacle, and 
surveillance. I approach this chapter from two fronts. First, from the perspective of sovereignty. 
Second, from the perspective of images of death. Returning to the triadic axis sovereignty-spectrality-image, 
I show that spectrality is the thread that connects these two “fronts” or “angles.”  
I begin, on the side of sovereignty, with Derrida’s enigmatic claim at the end of the first year 
of the death penalty seminars that the death penalty will survive its abolition. This involves a 
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thinking of “afterlife,” which I began to unravel in the last chapter, through an examination of the 
re-figuration of slavery and its afterlives as they are lived in black social life under black social death 
vis-à-vis the image of black death. Turning here to the second year of the death penalty seminars, I 
argue for a widening (and pluralization) of the concept of the death penalty that admits acts of 
sovereign killing, including the expanded field of late modern warfare. Drawing on David Wills’ 
argument that the deaths perpetrated by Hellfire missiles are the “primary instance of the American 
attachment to the death penalty,”398 I examine the visual dimensions of the “drone penalty” as a 
mode of sovereign technicity that deploys new media vision technologies. Building on Wills’ 
discussion of the drone’s spatiotemporal and racial dimensions, I argue that the drone’s optical 
configuration can help us understand the phantasmatic dimensions of this specific historical and 
geopolitical configuration of “sovereign superterrestriality.”399 
Drawing on discussions in visual cultures and contemporary media practice, I consider the 
scopic regime of mobile, fluid, and flexible images (including remote sensing apparatuses, satellite, 
geolocation, electronic surveillance, mapping and object recognition systems) deployed in remote 
killing operations in the Greater Middle East. Specifically, I mobilize media theoretician and 
filmmaker Harun Farocki’s concept of the “operative image,” coined in the context of his discussion 
of automated warheads, “intelligent” image processing and weapons technologies in his 2001-2003 
video installation Eye/Machine. I sketch a genealogy of image operations and argue that this “post-
representational” regime of machine vision calls for a new understanding of the image and its labor 
in late modern war. Introducing a new twist in my genealogy of images of death, the “images” I 
examine here do not represent death as iconic content. Whereas chapter 2 focuses on the classical 
ontology of analogue photography and chapter 3 on the distributed circulation of digital images 
from police body-cams and dash-cams, this final chapter considers the “post-photographic” ethos of 
“virtual” and “invisible” images encoded by increasingly illegible forms of machine vision.400 These 
images remain largely as data to be scanned and interpreted by mechanical eyes. They do not simply 
represent death iconically but are “actionable” in the expanded field of global electronic warfare.  
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I read these polyvalent, virtualized technologies of in/visibility in the context of Derrida’s 
thesis of the death penalty’s survival. Extending Farocki’s media archaeology through an analysis of 
“drone vision,” I argue that this “contemporary form of mediatic instantaneity” represents an 
intensified, phantasmatically driven expression of the sovereign attempt to seek mastery and control 
over death and spectrality in the visible field. Farocki’s interventions frame my final approach to the 
double optic of spectrality. In this final “take” I show that sovereignty tries to appropriate spectrality 
via a regime of invisible images that aim to control the cut between visibility and invisibly, activity 
and passivity, life and death, but in so doing, the drone’s regime of invisible images exposes 
sovereignty’s phantasmatic (but nonetheless real) attempts at mastery over global space.401 I show 
that the drone, as a specific historical and geopolitical extension of sovereign technicity 
superimposes Derrida’s two implicit engagements with Foucault in the first and second death 
penalty seminars, in relation to the visibility of power and the question of act and activity.  
 
Sovereignty & the Survival of Capital Punishment; or, the Afterlives of the Death Penalty  
At the end of the first year of the death penalty seminars, Derrida enigmatically claims that the death 
penalty will survive its abolition. During the last session, delivered on 22 March 2000, he makes the 
following remarks: 
Even when the death penalty will have been abolished, when it will have been purely 
and simply, absolutely and unconditionally, abolished on earth, it will survive; there 
will still be some death penalty. Other figures will be found for it; other figures will 
be invented for it, other turns in the condemnation to death, and it is this rhetoric 
beyond rhetoric that we are taking seriously here. We are taking seriously here all that 
is condemned, whether it be a life or a door or a window—or whatever or whoever it 
may be whose end would be promised, announced, prognosticated, decreed, signed 
like a verdict.  
Let us harbor no illusion on this subject: even when it will have been abolished, 
the death penalty will survive; it will have other lives in front of it, and other lives to 
sink its teeth into. (DPI 283 my emphasis) 
What are we to make of this difficult claim announced in the future anterior? Even though the 
abolition of the death penalty is at hand, still yet, it will survive, just as cruelty survives the 
“spectography of lethal red” (DP1 230), which Foucault associates with the pre-modern paradigm of 
 





sovereignty. The death penalty will have an afterlife—or afterlives, as Ronald Mendoza-de Jesús 
says.402 Derrida is haunted by a future in which the “process of deconstruction will and will not lead to 
the end of the death penalty just as it will and will not lead to the end of blood (le sans sang) and to 
the end of cruelty with which the death penalty is always associated.”403  
  A number of empirical signs do in fact point to the waning of the death penalty today. 
Statistical analyses presented by the Death Penalty Information Centre show that the number of 
new death sentences have dropped dramatically in the US in the years since Derrida’s seminars 
(from 279 in 1999, to 39 in 2017—the fewest since 1972, the year the Supreme Court declared the 
death penalty statutes unconstitutional). The number of executions has similarly declined (from 98 
in 1999 to 23 in 2017). A total of 19 US states have abolished the death penalty, including seven 
since 1999 (New Jersey and New York in 2007, New Mexico in 2009, Illinois in 2011, Connecticut 
in 2012, Maryland in 2013, and Delaware in 2016). Today, 2,817 inmates remain on death row in 
31 retentionist states. Of these, 12 states (Arkansas, California, Colorado, Kansas, Montana, 
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania and Wyoming) have 
not carried out executions for at least a decade. The governors of Colorado, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
and Washington have established official moratoriums on executions. Federal authorities have not 
carried out executions since 2003; military authorities since 1961.404 In addition, more than 20 
American and European pharmaceutical companies have barred the sale of their drugs (including 
barbiturates, sedatives, and agents that can cause paralysis or heart failure) to correctional facilities, 
closing the last remaining open-market sources of drugs used in executions by lethal injection.405 
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These statistics, drawn from a US context, support the abolitionist claim that we are witnessing a 
trend towards death penalty abolition. “The death penalty is itself living on borrowed time,” notes 
Salil Shetty, Secretary General of Amnesty International, in a recent blog post.406 According to 
Shetty, the fate of the death penalty is ineluctably sealed—just as Eugène Weidmann’s fate was 
somehow sealed from the moment Jean de Koven photographed him in the garden of his Saint 
Cloud villa. The death of the death penalty, according to this emancipatory, Enlightenment 
narrative is only a matter of time.  
Yet, according to Derrida, even if we put the death penalty to death, it will survive. 
According to Mendoza-de Jesús, the claim that the death penalty is caught up in an irreversible 
movement towards global abolition implicitly relies on a Christian humanist heritage. According to 
this “teleo-theology” (which Derrida aligns with Victor Hugo) abolition is the aim of Christian 
humanist history. “Within this eschatological framework” writes Mendoza-de Jesús, “the essence of 
traditional abolitionism comes forth most visibly in and as the desire to de-capitate capital 
punishment once and for all, to put to death all state-sanctioned putting to death.”407 Derrida urges 
us to suspend this eschatological premise of abolitionism, which relies on a progressive and 
teleological account of history. He is similarly suspicious of other discourses on the end. In Specters, 
for example, he argues contra Fukyumama’s teleological end-of history thesis about the death of 
Marxism with the triumph of liberal democracy. Both discourses of ends (the final eradication of the 
specter of communism and the abolitionist dream of the death of the death penalty) are rooted in a 
refusal of spectral thematics of the return (revenance), sur-vie (living on), and sur-vision (seeing on). 
This repetition bears something of the death drive’s compulsion to repeat and to return as 
revenant. Rottenberg therefore argues that the survival of the death penalty should be understood 
against the backdrop of psychoanalysis and Derrida argues in the second year of the seminar that 
one can abolish the death penalty but one can never outlaw the desire for cruelty from which it 
springs. This desire will always give rise to new visible and visual forms and new technical modalities 
for taking life and giving death, and thus new attempts to master death and spectrality. Reading 
Derrida’s claim against the history of psychoanalysis, Rottenberg argues that the death penalty and 
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its abolitionism point to “to a more originary history at the heart of the cruelty, namely, the 
possibility of psychical cruelty.” Re-inscribing the death penalty in the “abyssal and inexhaustible 
question of cruelty” (DP2 186), she argues that “the end of bloody cruelty does not signal the end of 
cruelty but rather a shift in both the form and the visibility of cruelty.”408 Cruelty dissimulates itself 
into new topographies of bloody or non-bloody aggression, while inventing new forms of virtualized 
visibility. “One can put an end to murder by the blade, by the guillotine, in the classical or modern 
theatre of bloody war,” says Derrida in conversation with Roudinesco, yet “psychical cruelty will 
always take its place by inventing new resources.”409 The compulsion for mastery that drives the 
death penalty will survive. This is not to suggest that the desire or even intent towards cruelty would 
count as the survival of the death penalty, but that simple abolition will not quell “the desire or the 
compulsion that drives the death penalty, and that presides over it sovereignly?” (DP2 7), namely, 
the desire to kill in the name of some sovereignty.  
In his 2014 article “Drone Penalty,” Wills argues that this desire and compulsion for mastery 
takes new technological form in virtual warfare in the aftermath of 9/11. According to Wills, “the 
extrajudicial killings that are Obama’s exquisite moments of reflective decision and federal capital 
punishments of choice, represent, in overwhelming statistical terms, the primary instance of the 
American attachment to the death penalty.”410 The death penalty survives in the teletechnological 
“revenant-survivant” (SM 185) extension of the Unmanned Arial Vehicle (UAV) and the 
transcontinental drone trade. At the same time that the last decades have witnessed a generalized 
decline in the administration of death sentences, we have seen the tactical advance of a 
transcontinental drone trade that targets suspected insurgents for kill or (at least theoretically) for 
capture under the post-9/11 US drone program. Wills gives us statistics to back this claim: 1,343 
judicial executions since 1976, compared to a staggering 4,000-4,500 killed in state-sanctioned 
extrajudicial drone strikes. This tendency has escalated under the current administration. According 
to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism and the NGO Airwars, current running totals put the 
death toll for US led drone strikes between 8,289-11,792, with a minimum of 5,861 confirmed 
strikes—more than double the reported statistics when Wills published his text. Whereas Bush 
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sanctioned, on average, one drone strike every 47 days and Obama one strike every four days, under 
Trump, the current average is one strike per day.411 In Yemen alone, there have been at least 328 
strikes, leading to a devastating outbreak of cholera in Houthi-controlled areas of the country, while 
in Afghanistan, the number of strikes is approaching levels last reported during 2009-2012, despite 
combat operations officially ending in 2014.412 “The military engagements unleashed in the 
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks have become ever deeper, more geographically dispersed and 
murkier,” notes the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, who have just launched the project Shadow 
Wars to investigate Trump’s expanded counterterrorism infrastructure.413 
 
Acts of War 
Derrida presented the second year of  the death penalty seminar first at the École des hautes études 
en sciences sociales in Paris, then a second time at UC Irvine, and finally, for a third time at the New 
School for Social Research in New York in the days following the events of  September 11, 2001. 
The final presentation of  the seminar is thus concurrent with a series of  pivotal events in global 
politics, including the 14 September, 2001 passing of  the Authorization for Use of  Military Force 
(AUMF) allowing President George W. Bush to authorize the deployment of  the United States 
Armed Forces against those responsible for the attacks and any “associated forces”; the 7 October, 
2001 US  invasion of  Afghanistan and with this, the beginning of  the so-called “Global War on 
Terror” (GWOT); the 8 October, 2001 establishment of  the Office of  Homeland Security; and the 
26 October, 2001 establishment of  the USA PATRIOT Act, which allowed for the expansion of  
presidential powers, as well as significant extension of  surveillance and security operations.  
In his introduction to this third presentation of  the seminar at the New School, Derrida 
reframes the discussion of  the death penalty in a new network of  problems including terrorism, war, 
and presidential power as a form of  sovereign power. The question of  the death penalty, he notes, is 
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“indissociable from the problem of  such classical concepts such as ‘war,’ ‘state sovereignty,’ etc. 
which should be at the center of  our seminar on capital punishment.” Derrida promises to return to 
these topics in the seminar and in discussions “even if  the reference remains indirect or implicit” 
(DP2 xv-xvi).414 What is the relation between the survival of  the death penalty and war—in its 
broadest possible sense?  
To better understand this sliding of  the death penalty into war, we need to unfold the 
broader concept of  the death penalty that emerges in the second year of  the seminar. We act as 
though we share some common sense of  what the “death penalty” means (just as we act as though 
we know what we mean when we say the word “death”). Derrida complicates this fiduciary act of  
ascribing to the death penalty a unitary and singular meaning. He speaks of  “death penalties” in the 
plural (FWT 139-65), as a “nonunifiable multiplicity of  concepts and questions” (DP2 20). He 
distinguishes different registers, including what I will call legal putting to death, sovereign killing, and letting 
die.  
1. Legal putting to death. This first narrow meaning refers to the juridico-political apparatus we call 
the death penalty, as a pure and rigorous concept in European law that requires visibility, jury and 
legal witnesses, as well as the “rational and calculated possibility of  deciding sovereignly, of  making 
the decision to make die … the other who is deemed responsible and guilty” (DP2 211). This 
common sense understanding of  the meaning of  the death penalty is one we isolate and presume 
when we refer to the death penalty. In his interview to Roudinesco, Derrida similarly argues that the 
death penalty must in principle, “be accessible to the public in its procedures of  judgment, verdict, 
and execution. It must be the subject of  an official announcement (proper to the execution). Where 
this is not the case … it is not certain that we can in all rigor, speak of  the “death penalty” (FWT 
154). Yet, there is an irreducible multiplicity or “dissemination” concealed behind this apparent 
identity and rigor. 
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2. Sovereign killing. The second wider meaning refers to the ways state sovereignty affirms its power 
by deciding who lives and who dies: “The death penalty is not a question of  life or death, of  the 
difference between living and dying or even between killing and not killing; rather it is a question of  
the different ways the state has of  affirming its sovereignty by disposing of  the life of  certain 
subjects” (DP2 19). This sovereign arrogation of  the right to command death and to assign what 
Butler, in Frames of  War, calls differential “grievability” to the dead, was exemplified in the last 
chapter, by the everyday necrotactics of  antiblack police violence that subject black social life to the 
constant threat of  corporeal and/or social death and, as we will now see, by the extraterritorial state 
violence conducted under the perpetual stare of  the drone’s global surveillance systems.415 Abolition 
of  the death penalty would not end these manifold forms of  disposing of  some life (ostensibly to 
protect life), including the right of  the state to kill on the front during war. “One can abolish the 
death penalty within a society or a nation-state,” Derrida continues, “without in the least infringing 
on the right to kill an enemy at the front in wartime” (DP2 19).  
3. Letting die. This pluralization of  “death penalties” slides even further into the ostensibly 
“passive” letting die. Derrida offers the examples of  AIDS and world hunger to demonstrate the 
survival and complication of  the penalty in myriad forms of  non-assistance. I provide yet another 
example, in Sea of  Images, one of  the curatorial projects I organized as part of  this interdisciplinary 
study of  sovereignty and images of  death. In this public film program, the making/letting-die 
distinction is interrogated in relation to the trajectories of  illegalized migration traced by the 
Goldsmiths-based collective Forensic Oceanography in “Left-to-Die-Boat” (2014).416 In this 
counter-forensic human rights report, Lorenzo Pezzani and Charles Heller use surveillance metadata 
and survivor testimony to reconstruct the deadly drift of  a migrant vessel off  the coast of  Libya. 
Glossing Foucault’s biopolitical formulation, they argue that the sea is transformed into a deadly 
weapon that is constructed by mobile, militarized, maritime border regimes shaped and enabled by 
surveillance metadata and long-range infrared imaging systems that “makes flow and lets drown” 
(Figure 27).417 Although the EU’s lethal practices of  non-assistance in the Mediterranean do not 
“actively” inflict destructive force, they refrain from helping those caught in the liquid trap of  the  
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Figure 27. Forensic Oceanography, Left-To-Die Boat. 2014. Screenshot from vide. Photo courtesy of Forensic Oceanography. 
 
sea, asymmetrically exposing one part of  the population to mass death. This also constitutes a death 
sentence. The distinction between “condemning to death” (making die), and “condemning to die” 
(letting die) is not always “airtight [étanche]” (DP2 198).418 The waters of  the Mediterranean, which 
are among the most surveilled on earth, exemplify a porosity of  the division between making and 
letting, which is at the center of  Foucault’s account of  a shift from sovereignty to waning power over 
death in at the cusp of  modernity with the emergence of  capitalist biopolitics.419  
While not a formal death penalty, those “condemned to die” in ten-meter polyvinyl 
chloride boats manufactured in China and trans-shipped by cargo container through Malta and 
Turkey, to the African coast of Libya for the express purpose of an immensely profitable and 
lethal traffic in migrants, thoroughly complicates what constitutes an “act” of killing.420 As YoHa, 
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the UK-based artist group led by Matsuko Yokokoji and Graham Harwood, have shown in their 
multimedia installation, Plastic Raft of  Lampedusa (2017), a “deadly logistics” of  capitalist violence 
links markets and militaries. This global commerce is exemplified by the circulation of  plastic 
rafts. YoHa’s installation critically interrogates EU’s necropolitical logistics.421 Rejecting the 
spectacular forms of  the representation of  the so-called “migrant crisis,” they examine the place 
of  the technical object of  the plastic raft within the “machinery” of  global capitalist violence. 
Their installation traces  a critique of  global capitalism via the logistics of  maritime shipping. 
The traffic in plastic boats belongs to what Wills calls “the international translations of  death 
penalty commerce”; the “letting die” of  thousands of  African migrants in the Black 
Mediterranean is an intensified expression of  “unacknowledged complicity with this national or 
worldwide criminality” (DP2 200), that is content to condemn to die.422 
According to Derrida, even if  the death penalty (as a “pure” and rigorous concept) were to 
be abolished, it would survive vis-à-vis all the “impure” phenomena of  sovereign killing and letting 
die. Moreover, Derrida complicates these two “impure” phenomena, which are implicitly related to 
the Foucauldian distinction between “making” and “letting” die. As Fritsch argues, the second year 
of  the seminar is concerned in this respect, “not so much with the visibility of  political-legal putting 
to death, but with the distinction making die vs. letting die.”423 Whereas in the first year of  the 
seminar is concerned with the visibility of  punishment and its virtualization with contemporary 
teletechnologies, the second year is concerned with the question: “what is an act?” (DP2 3-4; 110-
114). The survival of  the death penalty needs to be understood in terms of  a blurring of  a number 
of  related metaphysical oppositions of  act/nonact, actuality/potentiality, actual/virtual, 
activity/passivity, conscious act/unconscious desire, etc., which Derrida traces to “capitalist 
violence”:  
Where there is capital, the distinction between act and non-act, active and passive, 
actual and virtual, act and desire, activity and nonactivity, labor and nonlabor, etc. all 
of these distinctions between the act and its others lose all credibility…the law and 
the respect for the law of capital, for capitalist property, is the very place where the 
 
421 See also Noel Burch and Alan Sekula’s 2012 essay film The Forgotten Space, which examines the sea as the “forgotten 
space” of globalization.  
422 On the “deadly logistics” of capitalist violence that links markets and militaries through the global trade of Chinese 
plastic rafts, see YoHa, “Plastic Raft of Lampedusa,” 2017, http://yoha.co.uk/node/1076. 
423 Matthias Fritsch, “Killing and Letting Die: Foucault and Derrida on Sovereignty and Biopower,” (paper presented at 





distinction between the actual and virtual, the active and the passive, the intentional 
and the non-intentional, the act and its other. (DP2 199-200). 
So long as there is capitalist violence, he argues, there will be this contamination of  the act and 
nonact.  
This complication of  making/letting is, according to Derrida, indissociable from the 
“techno-scientific” (DP2 199). The linkages between capitalist violence, the techno-scientific, and 
“letting die” are demonstrated in the case of  the EU’s practices of  non-assistance in the Black 
Mediterranean. However, the technical modality of  “taking life” extended through the drone’s 
extended network of  operators, image analysts and networked data collection also blurs the 
distinction between act/nonact in a number of  ways, which I will draw out towards the end of  this 
chapter.  The drone—as an increasingly autonomous optical killing machine, acting on the order of  
a democratically elected presidential sovereign endowed with the exceptional right to grant pardon 
or clemency and to pursue war, even in countries where the US has not officially declared war 
(Yemen, Pakistan, and elsewhere), and where these killings are in violation of  international 
humanitarian law (IHL) and the law of  armed conflict (LOAC) codified by the Geneva 
Conventions—complicates these two general registers of  sovereign killing and letting die.424 This 
historically and geopolitically specific extension of  sovereign technicity, with its virtual ethos of  
global surveillance and state-security, co-implicates this discussion of  the borders of  the act and 
action, making/letting, activity/passivity with Derrida’s the earlier discussion of  the visibility of  
punishment and its virtualization as discussed “with and against” Foucault’s thesis of  the 
despectacularization of  punishment in chapter 2 (DP2 45). The question of  “act” is tied up with the 
scopic machines of  death and time, which are an integral part of  the disseminated structure of  
capitalist globalization. The drone penalty complicates what counts as an “act” and “nonact” of  late 
modern war, whose necropolitical spatiality is characterized by the global flow of  images and capital. 
 
424 For Derrida the right to pardon and clemency are two absolute and exceptional decisions, see DP2 24 and 54. For an 
examination of the status of US drone policy in relation to the Geneva Conventions and other international norms see 







Sovereignty is increasingly detached from territory and theater of  war is extended and virtualized via 
“quasi-panoptic” networks that aim to master death from a distance.425 
 
Sovereign Technicity 
As discussed in chapter 1, ipsocratic sovereignty has five interlinking traits: indivisibility, autonomy, 
closure, instantaneity, and spontaneity. In the last chapter, I examined the linkages between closure, 
instantaneity, and sovereign technicity. Here, I am interested specifically in technicity and its relation 
to time. According to my argument, sovereignty projects an image of  itself  as pure and spontaneous. 
This claim to spontaneity typically excludes automaticity, mechanism, and machine-like repetition. 
Sovereignty denies its prosthetic and technological dimensions; it fails to give an account of  power 
as technē—or sovereign technicity. Yet, I have argued that sovereignty needs spatiotemporal methods 
of  inscription to install itself  and to give itself  stability over time. Sovereignty needs to reassert itself  
and this reassertion is tied up with the effects of  prosthetic repetition; it lives off  differential 
iterability, or modes of  mechanical inscription, including images, and specifically images of  death. 
These processes of  technicization supplement sovereignty, while exposing its phantasmatic attempts 
at mastery and control.  
I have argued throughout this dissertation for the empirico-transcendental imbrication of  
sovereignty and images of  death. I have engaged different configurations of  sovereign technicity: in 
chapter 2, I interrogated the relation between technics and time by way of  a discussion of  the 
phantasm of  the instant of  death in the ethos of  analogue photography at the advent of  a new form 
of  popular or democratic sovereignty; in chapter 3, I focused on white supremacy through the 
specific mode of  sovereign technicity of  police power and how its asserts (and also undermines) its 
attempts at self-enclosure through images of  antiblack violence circulated across mobile platforms. 
In this chapter, I examine a new spatiotemporal organization of  global or geopolitical sovereignty. 
The supra-national status of  the global economy makes the nation-state sovereignty an outdated 
 
425 For discussions of late modern warfare and its relation to visual culture, see Mbembe, Critique of Black Reason, 22-23; 
Derek Gregory, “From a View to a Kill: Drones and Late Modern War,” Theory, Culture & Society 288 (2011): 188–215, 
doi:10.1177/0263276411423027; Christine Agius, “Ordering Without Bordering: Drones, the Unbordering of Late 
Modern Warfare and Ontological Insecurity,” Postcolonial Studies 20, no. 3 (2017): 370–86, 
doi:10.1080/13688790.2017.1378084; and Nasser Hussain, “Air Power,” in Spatiality, Sovereignty and Carl Schmitt: 





principle of  organization. As Richard Beardsworth suggests, the capitalist globalization of  national 
economies is, at the same time, the economic-technicization of  the globe.426  
This organization of  global sovereignty asserts itself  through a technical extension that takes 
the form of  global surveillance industries as well as forms of  techno-temporal punishment, of  
which the drone—with its diffuse, networked, and increasingly virtual imaging-processing 
apparatuses—stands as the primary metaphor and means. The drone, as Wills argues, which 
“appears to be a technology that we produce, at will and of  necessity, in order to wage war or wage 
executions, is in fact a technics that is always at work” in sovereignty, even as sovereignty presumes 
to be immune from prosthetic intervention.427 A number of  phantasmatic effects (recall that 
“phantasm” is a technical term which is not opposed to the real) emerge from this intensified 
organization of  sovereign technicity, including the attempted mastery of  world territories through 
global surveillance operations; of  time, by way of  what Wills calls the drone’s “electronic 
instantaneism”; and of  the necropolitical divide that separates who lives and who dies. According to 
Wills, the supervisory apparatus of  the drone penalty re-poses questions about spatiotemporal and 
racial dimensions of  the “prosthetic structure of  onto-theological sovereignty.”428  
Extending this argument, I will sketch the ways in which in/visibility intersects with each of  
these phantasmatic dimensions before turning to my second “front”—images of  death. Vision and 
visuality, I argue are thoroughly imbricated in each of  these dimensions, even tying them together 
into the structure of  the “seeing punish” (voir-punir) that aims to control visibility as much as 
invisibility. This attempt at mastery plays out not as an attempt to repress spectrality (chapter 2), nor 
as panicked reaction of  white supremacy that attempts to master spectrality under proxy of  the 
black other, who is subjected to a spectrum of  spectacular and quotidian violence (chapter 3). 
Rather, in this capital mutation, sovereignty attempts to master the differing and deferring 
movement of  spectrality that conditions it, by harnessing and even making a profit from spectrality 
through the exchange of  lethal images. This intensified mode of  sovereign technicity tries to put 
itself  in the place of  the spectre in order to appropriate its powers: sovereignty becomes spectral, but 
in so doing it ends up undermining itself.  
 
 
426 Beardsworth, Derrida and the Political, 96. 
427 Wills, “Drone Penalty,” 182. 




Global Surveillance, Electronic Instantaneism & the Necropolitical Cut 
By extending itself  technologically, sovereignty seeks both to arrogate to itself  the control over life 
and death, as well as the control over its environment, which is now identified not with the 
Westphalian closure of  the nation-state, but rather as the entire globe writ large. This takes on new 
dimensions that Derrida associates with the military “panopticization of  the earth.”429 This mode of  
geopolitical sovereignty deploys increasingly dematerialized images to master global space. The 
drone’s techniques of  surveillance connect sovereignty with this gaze from above with its attempts 
to master space by surveying territory.  
This attempt to bring the globe under control via visual mastery connects with the figure of  
the island as a paradigmatic trope for thinking the autonomy and closure of  ipsocratic sovereignty 
which Derrida examines in the second year of  the Beast and the Sovereign seminar, in the context of  
his discussions of  Robison Crusoe’s colonialism. In her discussion of  the Apollo missions and 
surveillance technologies, Kelly Oliver argues that the famous photographs of  the earth seen from 
space transmitted during the Cold War lunar missions gave rise to a new metaphor of  the earth 
itself  as a solitary island “floating alone in the darkness of  space.” The 12 December 1972, “Blue 
Marble” photograph shows the disk of  our terraqueous planet spinning round its axis, just as 
Crusoe circled his island to bring its contours under his control (Figure 28). Not only had the world 
become a picture—but a picture of  an island. The Apollo missions were supposed to unite humanity 
under a common globalized world, yet they did so only by staking a claim to the control of  space 
under the flag of  American imperialism. The photograph taken from Apollo 17 signifies secular 
mastery through spatial control.430 This image of  a globe connected through telecommunications 
technologies follows a familiar model and ideal of  conquest through global military technologies 
(the first satellites were Cold War espionage technologies). As Mondzain puts it: “the one who is the 
master of  the visible is the master of  the world and organizes the control of  the gaze” as well as 
global power relations.431  
The drone is a powerful metaphor and mechanism for this drive to global mastery. Recalling 




429 Derrida, Aporias, 21. See also, Derrida, Copy, Archive, Signature, 47. 
430 Oliver, Earth and World, np. 





Figure 28. Eugene Cernan, Ron Evans and Harrison H. Schmitt, Blue Marble - Image of the Earth 
from Apollo 17. 1972. Photo courtesy of NASA. 
 
 
that aims to optimize the visible into an “ontopolitological” totality, the drone tries to make itself  
“present” in a remote location via live video feed in order to eliminate the threat of  physical 
violence, while maximizing the other’s exposure.432 This spatial displacement aims to master death 
from a distance. As Gregory puts it: “The death of  distance enables death from a distance.”433 The 
drone operates optical space to effect ontological security and global control; its operationalization 
of  global surveillance technologies in telepresent kill systems aims to elide space in order to deliver 
death without exposing sovereignty to precarity in ground war operations. As Wills notes, the drone 
involves a teletechnological expansion of  the spatial parameters of  war that troubles Schmitt’s 
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definition of  political conflict.434 Yet, this distancing of  the face-off  with the enemy does not change 
the fundamental structure of  warfare: “There is thus greater or lesser distance but never anything 
other than a degree of  closeness.”435 This is another way of  saying that the elision of  distance 
involves another phantasmatic attempt to shore up sovereignty’s ineluctable exposure to death. 
This militarized panopticization of  the earth “seen, inspected, surveyed, and transported by 
satellite images … affects time, nearly annuls it.”436 The possession of  global territory relies on a 
logic of  speed tied up with the circulation of  increasingly virtualized images. In chapters 2-3, I 
argued for an understanding of  the technical constitution of  our experience of  time: time is only 
experienced through processes of  technical organization. This tele-technoscientific extension of  
sovereignty with its “live effect” (un effet de direct) of  “real time” killing via satellite and GPS gives yet 
another manifestation of  the phantasm of  an anesthetizing instant organized by the guillotine and 
camera as scopic machines of  death.437 The drone is yet another of  the ever-quickening democratic 
machines of  death: “One is reminded,” writes Wills, “of  the mechanical blade of  the guillotine.” 
This post 9/11 expression of  temporalization revives the old phantasm or fantasy of  mastering 
death in a “telepresent” instant that kills time: “More dramatically than the blade, the missile strikes 
with lightning speed out of  the sky, a rainbow meteoric arc of  fire next time and the time after that, 
sent from executive executioner to those condemned.”438 This “electronic ‘instantaneism” effects an 
idealized simultaneity between the moment of  exceptional decision when the executioner-cum-
presidential sovereign commands the strike from the safety of  Washington, the moment the button 
is pushed in Creech Air Force Base in Nevada (the ancestral territories of  the Western Shoshone 
and the Southern Paiute), and the critical instant when the 500lb laser-guided air-to-ground Hellfire 
missile is released above Waziristan (Pakistan), Afghanistan, or Yemen etc..439 Yet, the “infinite 
speed—or no time—of  a “secretive black hole” contracts within it a disseminated series of  nows—
“judgment,” “trial,” “verdict,” collection of  data etc. As Wills argues, this is a “relative” rather than 
“absolute” instant that derives its power from its secrecy. 
 
434 See Edward Fairhead, “Carl Schmitt’s Politics in the Age of Drone Strikes: Examining the Schmittian Texture of 
Obama’s Enemy,” Journal for Cultural Research 22, no. 1 (2017): 39–54, doi:10.1080/14797585.2017.1410991. 
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This specific geopolitical attempt to master death by contracting time into an instant is also a 
necropolitical caesura; the cut in time is also a technique of  race and power that divides who lives 
and who dies. Examining the intersection of  technicity, the slave trade and the “international 
transactions of  death penalty commerce” in the age neoliberal globalization, Wills traces the “trans-
Atlantic blood meridian” that stretches from Mogadishu to the Americas. Remote bombing 
campaigns waged in the Greater Middle East are one of  the afterlives of  the history of  slavery as the 
history of  sovereignty qua death penalty: “The history of  capital punishment will have always 
intersected,” he writes “in the period following the Enlightenment, with the history of  slavery as a 
history of  sovereignty.”440 Reversing the path once traversed by slave ships, the flight path of  a 
transcontinental drone re-inscribes the death penalty in global capitalist violence linked with 
histories of  racist expropriation.441 The drone flies—ghost-like—in the wake of  the slave-ship. 
Each of  these dimensions discussed by Wills (i.e. space, time, and race), is intertwined with 
visibility, such that tracing these visual dimensions allows new perspectives. By supplementing Wills’ 
discussion of  the spatiotemporal and racial dimensions of  this intensified extension of  sovereign 
technicity with an analysis of  the drone’s visual operations, I will show that these phantasmatic 
aspects of  the drone’s techno-temporal punishment are thoroughly intertwined with the visible field, 
and hence, with spectrality. The double movement of  spectrality affords me with a conceptual tool 
to understand the drone’s phantasmatic operations. As I will show, the drone penalty presents an 
intensified tarrying with death in the visible realm that proceeds by way of  yet another attempt to 
master the differing and deferring movement of  spectrality, which is sovereignty’s condition. What 
happens to instantaneity and anesthesia, to cruelty, and to the theatrical “scene” of  punishment 
(capital or otherwise), and finally, to spectrality, when cameras installed in bombs are deployed by the 
sovereign figure of  the democratically elected president? This attempt at mastery plays not as an 
attempt to repress spectrality (chapter 2), nor to “extroject” it onto a radicalized other (chapter 3), 
but rather, through an attempt to appropriate, capitalize on, and profit from, spectrality. Having 
examined the relation between surveillance, technicity, war, and the survival of  the death penalty 
 
440 Wills, “Drone Penalty,” 177; 175. 
441 For an account of the intersecting analytic categories of race and capital, see Cedric J. Robinson, Black Marxism: The 
Making of the Black Radical Tradition (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000) and Gargi 





from the perspective of  sovereignty, I will now turn to the second “front,” namely, images of  death, 
before returning to the double optic of  spectrality, which will thread these two fronts together.  
 
A Genealogy of Visual Instrumentality 
 
Without any doubt, we know less and less what an image is. 
—Raymond Bellour442  
 
Theorists from Jünger to Virilio have traced the co-imbrication of  cinematic and military devices as 
potent weapons of  destruction and exposure.443 As Mbembe incisively notes: “The mobilization of  
airpower and the destruction of  infrastructure, the strikes and wounds caused by military action, are 
now combined with the mass mobilization of  images.”444 The expanded field of  late modern warfare 
is characterized by teletechnological virtualization made possible by the interpenetration of  military 
and entertainment technologies and counterinsurgency campaigns without clear geographical, 
temporal, or legal boundaries. Before deploying the double optic of  spectrality to analyze how this 
intensified global extension of  sovereign technicity is both instituting and deconstructing 
sovereignty through images of  death, I will turn to Harun Farocki’s theorization of  the “operative 
image.” This account will provide a framework for understanding how this specific mode of  
sovereign technicity attempts to master death and time vis-à-vis its operations on the visual field. 
 
Operative Image / Phantom Image: Farocki 
Farocki’s three-part video installation Eye/Machine I-III (2001-3) and its subsequent 58-minute 
version released for German television as War at a Distance (2003) trace developments in surveillance 
and military imaging that developed out of  strategizing for the first Gulf  War (1990-1), when bombs 
with “eyes” began to document and enact war. German sociologist Klaus Theweleit describes these 
missiles deployed by US troops as “filming bombs.”445 Farocki’s double-channel essay-film 
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juxtaposes material collected from different archives and visual databases, including industrial 
laboratories, civilian and military surveillance cameras, reconnaissance systems, instructional videos, 
military simulation and training videos, propaganda and news footage, in order to examine the 
production, techniques, strategic uses, and effects of  images in political conflict.446 His double-eyed 
image sequences move between two screens that comment on one another. On the first screen: a 
laser-sensor scans the sky for enemy aircraft; an infra-red camera mounted inside a missile head 
searches the terrain below, tracking and identifying bridges and other landmarks of  military 
importance for aerial reconnaissance; a computer-animated recreation of  a cruise missile’s path 
flashes across the screen calculating its trajectory. On the second screen: a POV-shot from a laser-
guided camera-bomb captures its descent through cross-hairs as it hurdles towards a target, 
detonating in a blinding flash. The image abruptly cuts to static—the connection is lost. The image 
dies along with its target (Figure 29). Farocki’s image-sequences are punctuated by instructional inter-
titles and voice-over commentary that give the viewer cues for decoding an emerging regime of  
“intelligent” image-processing techniques that includes electronic surveillance, locative media 
mapping, and object recognition software designed to track and destroy landscapes. In 1991, the 
titles inform us, “images like these from the war against Iraq were shown on television.”447 
According to Farocki, the Gulf  War implemented a new policy on images—as well as a new 
regime of  vision and visuality. The “thunder and lightning”448 of  Operation Desert Storm made 
public a dimension of  contemporary techno-warfare, while engendering investigations from a range  
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of  theorists from Baudrillard to Virilio.449 In War and Cinema, for example, Virilio details a historical 
progression of  “flying bombs” and “stratospheric rockets” that laid the ground for the Hellfire 
missiles of  today’s logistical era of  war. These real-time “light-weapons” of  instantaneous 
communication, or “seeing bombs”—to use Farocki’s term—came to dominate the logic of  warfare 
with the Gulf  War, reawakening the proto-cinematic memory of  Marey’s chronophotographic gun 
along with its desire for the temporal instant. “With the advent of  electronic warfare,” Virilio writes, 
“projectiles have awakened and opened their many eyes: heat seeking missiles, infrared or laser 
guidance systems, warheads fitted with video-cameras that can relay what they see to pilots and to 
ground-controllers sitting at their consoles.”450 The French poet Guillaume Apollinaire produced a 
surreal and macabre body of  modern war poetry between 1914 and 1916 while serving in the 38th 
Regiment of  the French field artillery. At the heart of  its hallucinatory military analogies is the image 
of  the eye as an image of  death. In his poem “April Night 1915,” during his first months in the war 
zone, he described projectiles as “dead eyes”: “It’s raining my dear it’s raining but it’s raining dead 
eyes.”451 According to Virilio, with contemporary virtual warfare, the fusion of  eye and projectile (or 
eye/machine) is complete: “Nothing now distinguishes the functions of  the weapon and the eye; the 
projectile’s image and the image’s projectile form a single composite.”452  
Eye/Machine catalogues the development of  this new policy on images. Farocki constructs a 
visual taxonomy of  aerial reconnaissance. Coco Fusco compares his methodological approach to 
this archival detritus to that of  a “forensic pathologist,” carefully reconfiguring fragments in order to 
uncover the role of  images in the exercise of  power, while Hal Foster describes Farocki as a 
genealogist of  “visual instrumentality.”453 From Farocki’s taxonomy of  divided images emerges a 
 
449 Baudrillard famously argued that the Gulf War was not really a war, but an atrocity that masquerades as war. Using 
overwhelming airpower, the American military avoided direct combat with the Iraq army and suffered few casualties. 
Almost nothing was made known about Iraqi deaths; what spectators saw by way of television propaganda was a 
‘clean’ war with weaponized images from the nose-cameras of ‘smart bombs.’ Baudrillard concludes that the conflict 
“did not take place,” at least not from the point of view of the West. See Jean Baudrillard, The Gulf War Did Not Take 
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new theoretical category of  “operational” or “operative images.”454 According to Farocki, operative 
images are not meant to entertain; they are neither propaganda nor spectacle.455 Rather, this new 
“cinematography by devices” fulfills a specific instrumental function in military and civilian logistics. 
Operative images give machines instructions for action. They are meant for the technicians of  war: 
“To guide the projectile. To check whether a target was hit.”456  Farocki’s installation provides 
explanatory instructions for this new morphology of  technical images that are increasingly able to 
function autonomously of  human intervention. The result is a kind of  “cinematic-archeology” of  
machine operations—or “vision machines,” as Virilio calls them.457  
Farocki links operative images to an amplification of  phantomaticity. In fact, he also calls 
operative images “phantom images” because they move through space as though by their own 
ghostly volition. The operative image recalls the old category of  the “phantom shot,” a popular 
form of  early cinematic spectacle taken from a perspective that the human eye cannot normally 
occupy, for example, from the buffer of  speeding trains or carriages (Figure 30).458 The video feed 
from the seeing bomb is a “phantom-subjective” view because it gives us the perspective of  the 
explosive projectile as it hurtles towards strategic targets (barracks, shelters, bridges, or individuals 
marked by government kill lists).459 (The dated dash-cam video of  McDonald’s death also belongs to 
the category of  the phantom-subjective.)  
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Invisibility: Harun Farocki’s Life Manuals,” Animation 12, no. 3 (2017): 214–29, doi:10.1177/1746847717740095, for 
an account of Farocki’s contributions to media archaeology and the prehistory of digital images. 
458 Harun Farocki, “Phantom Images,” Public 29 (2004), 12-22. For a historical account of the phantom image see 
Christian Hayes, “Phantom Rides,” BFI Screenonline, 2013. http://www.screenonline.org.uk/film/id/1193042/. 





Figure 30. Unidentified photographer, Cameraman Billy Bitzer prepares a Phantom Ride. 1900. 
Publicityfoto. Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons. 
 
These images function in a manner similar to Althusserian interpellation: they call out to the 
person who receives it, like a command or a statement of  fact.460 Reinforcing structures of  
identification with the militarized state vision, the bombs-eye-view, identifiable from the familiar 
crosshairs that guide our trajectory through the visual mise-en-scene, asks us to identify with the 
suicidal flight path of  the projectile. The viewer is both “here” in the safety of  their homes and 
“there”—living the perspective of  the cruise missile as it descends on Kuwait or Iraq. The viewer 
becomes a spectator of  their own death. Absorbing them into its logic, the phantom image produces 
a new “bearer of  the look” that provides “voyeuristic” and “fetishistic” modes of  scopic control 
over death and punishment.461 At the same time, the operative/phantom image amplifies the spectral 
 
460 Cf. Wills, The drone penalty mocks this temporal relation which detains the time of the other, which from the “first 
hailing or greeting, is an instantaneous death sentence” (189). 
461 These are Laura Mulvey’s terms. In her influential analysis of the scopophilic structures of Classical cinema, Mulvey 
offer two alternate possible responses to the threat of castration embodied by the female character on screen: 
voyeurism and fetishism. Drawing from Freud and Lacan, she argues that the gaze is pivotal in both. First possibility: 
the woman as icon is displayed for male gaze for voyeuristic pleasure obtained by asserting control and punishment. 
Second possibility: anxiety is overcome through substitution of a reassuring fetish object. See Mulvey, “Visual Pleasure 
and Narrative Cinema,” and Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” in The Norton Anthology of 





effects of  cinema, exposing the viewer to a repetition compulsion. Farocki recognized the irony of  
this mode of  visual pleasure that effects our identification with the camera’s drive to self-
destruction: “the pleasure of  sharing the point of  view of  a camera-bomb had a price: it was 
deadly.”462 
 
Invisible Image: Paglen 
UK-based artist Trevor Paglen draws out the contemporary consequences of  Farocki’s theory of  
machine vision. Today’s increasingly ubiquitous and sophisticated vision machines have no need of  
traditional “images.” New methods of  encryption developed after US military personnel in Iraq 
discovered insurgents intercepting US drone networks, inaugurated a “post-representational” regime 
of  “invisible images” that complicate visibility with another mode of  invisibility.463 According to 
Paglen—whose work documents the vast and often invisible infrastructures of  power in the digital 
world—the descendants of  Farocki’s operative images emulate traditional images.464 However, this 
turns out to be a secondary function extended by machines to humans. Whereas Farocki’s operative 
images were intended first for war technicians were secondarily extended to the televisual spectator, 
today’s operative images, made by machines for machines, have to be decoded for human vision. 
They are for no one to see. “The computer,” Paglen argues “does not need the image.”465 Like the 
spectre of  Marx’s commodity discussed by Derrida in Specters, the operative image is a thing without  
  
 
462 Thomas Elsaesser and Alexander Alberro, “Farocki: A Frame for the No Longer Visible: Thomas Elsaesser in 
Conversation with Alexander Alberro,” e-flux 59 (November 2014), 
http://www.eflux.com/journal/59/61111/farocki-a-frame-for-the-no-longer-visible-thomas-elsaesser-in-
conversation-with-alexander-alberro/ 
463 In 2009, US military apprehended files of an intercepted drone video feeds on the laptop of a Shiite militant. Noah 
Shachtman, “Insurgents Intercept Drone Video in King-Size Security Breach (Updated, with Video),” Wired, 
December 17, 2009, https://www.wired.com/2009/12/insurgents-intercept-drone-video-in-king-sized-security-
breach/. 
464 For Paglen’s account of the new regime of invisible images see Trevor Paglen, “Invisible Images (Your Pictures Are 
Looking at You),” The New Inquiry (blog), December 8, 2016, https://thenewinquiry.com/invisible-images-your-
pictures-are-looking-at-you/; Invisible Covert Operations and Classified Landscapes, ed. Rebecca Solnit (New York, NY: 
Aperture, 2010); and “Operational Images,” e-flux 59 (November 2014), 
http://www.eflux.com/journal/59/61130/operational-images/. 
465 Paglen, “Operational Images,” n.p. Cf. Farocki, “Phantom Images.” Farocki does not agree with Paglen about this 
“post-human operativity.” He argues that “there are no pictures that do not aim at the human eye. A computer can 





Figure 31. Laura Poitras, ANARCHIST: Power Spectrum Display of Doppler Tracks from a Satellite 
(Intercepted May 27, 2009). 2016. Pigmented inkjet print mounted on aluminum. 
 
 
proper phenomenon. Like the spectre (and the vampire), the operative image is “deprived of  a 
specular image” (SM 195).  
Calling for a post-human documentary of  “invisible images,” German video artist and media 
theorist Hito Steyerl similarly argues that the spectrum of  human vision has become a “minority” of  
what is accessible to machine vision.466 Shrouding the operations of  the National Security Agency 
(NSA), today’s operative images are not primarily optical, but rather operate as a kind of  interface 
that plays an active role in synchronic data exchanges that can then be converted into visualizations. 
US documentary filmmaker Laura Poitras’ “ANARCHIST Snapshots,” presented in her exhibition 
Astro Noise (2015) at the Whitney Museum of  American Art, demonstrate this virtualization of  
images in digital warfare. The “snapshots,” which were intercepted from hacked Israeli drone feeds 
by the UK’s classified data collection program code-named “Anarchist” and then leaked by Edward 
Snowden to Poitras, can only be visualized as conventional “images” using decryption software that 
 






filter “signal” (or information) from “noise” (or snow), resulting in a now-familiar aesthetic 
paradigm of  the drone feed, with its abstract poetics of  encryption (Figure 31).467 
 
Drone Vision 
Extending this genealogy of  visual instrumentality to the theatre of  drone warfare will help explain 
the virtualized modes of  sovereign killing as one of  the “afterlives” of  the death penalty. A number 
of  visual theorists have analyzed the military drone’s visual operation in regimes of  violence.468 In 
The Right to Look, Nicholas Mirzoeff  traces the ways visual power is performatively embedded in 
image networks that have weaponized processes of  data-capture, inscription, and global surveillance 
into a form of  seizure, occupation, and absorption of  the other. Following W. J. T. Mitchell’s claim 
that power shapes the visual field, while the visual conversely executes power, Kathrin Maurer 
interrogates the drone’s ocular operations of  visual sensing and data capture.469 What Daniel Greene 
calls “drone vision” encompasses not only the view captured through a drone’s visual feeds, but “a 
globally distributed apparatus for finding, researching, fixing and killing targets.”470 Drone vision 
refers to the onboard payload of  full-motion, high-definition, “image-intensified” daylight electro-
optical cameras, infrared night-vision sensors that designate targets for deployment of  500lb laser-
guided Hellfire anti-tank missiles; a disseminated network of  satellites, radar systems, geolocation 
algorithms, data encryption servers, cellphone metadata, digital processors and data-links that 
 
467 Poitras produced three feature-length documentary films in response to the post-9/11 US invasion of Iraq: My 
Country, My Country (2006), The Oath (2010), and CITIZENFOUR (2014), which details Poitras’s meetings with Edward 
Snowden as he revealed the massive scale of the NSA’s global surveillance program. 
468 The following analysis of drone vision is informed by the pioneering work of George Chamayou, Daniel Greene, 
Derek Gregory, Nicholas Mirzoeff, the Forensic Architecture team, as well as by more recent investigations by Tom 
Holert and Kathrin Maurer. See Gregoire Chamayou, Theory of the Drone, ed. Janet Lloyd (New York, NY: New Press, 
2014); Daniel Greene, “Drone Vision,” Surveillance & Society 13, no. 2 (2015): 233–49, doi:10.24908/ss.v13i2.5346; 
Derek Gregory, “Imag(in)Ing Drones,” Geographical Imaginations, April 5, 2014. 
https://geographicalimaginations.com/2014/04/05/dreaming-of-drones/; Tom Holert, “Sensorship: The Seen 
Unseen of Drone Warfare,” in Image Operations: Visual Media and Political Conflict, eds. Jens Eder and Charlotte Klonk 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017), 102-117; Kathrin Maurer, “Visual Power: The Scopic Regime of 
Military Drone Operations,” Media, War & Conflict 10, no. 2 (2016): 141–51, doi:10.1177/1750635216636137;  
Nicholas Mirzoeff, The Right to Look: A Counterhistory of Visuality (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), 276–342; 
and Forensic Architecture, “Drone Strikes: Investigating Covert Operations Through Spatial Media,” 2018, 
https://www.forensic-architecture.org/case/drone-strikes/. 
469 Maurer, “Visual Power” 141. 





remotely transmit a live-stream of  “actionable” intelligence—by way of  commercial Ku-Band 
satellite, encrypted transceivers, and a network of deep-sea fiber-optic cables—to a team of  remote 
pilots, sensor and intelligence operators, image analysts who process global surveillance metadata 
using artificial-intelligence (AI) systems housed in ground operations centers located thousands of  
miles away in the Nevada desert; as well as the lethal modalities of  surveillance, hunting, and capture 
that direct these operations (Figure 32).471 This intensified form of  sovereign technicity extends 
through a disseminated network of  processes that support the drone’s viewpoint, including a broad 
interface of  synchronic data exchanges that can locate targets, collect, process, and store data, while 
generating algorithms that allow for the real-time adjustment of  sensor payload systems in-flight. 
This introduces another thanatographical twist in my genealogy of  images of  death. Today’s 
operative images are not images of  the dead, in the sense of  iconic representations of  the corpses 
that these seeing bombs have left in their wake (the first sense of  the double genitive laid out in the 
introduction). They no longer (or no longer simply) represent death as iconic content. In contrast to 
the images of  death examined in the last chapter—where the “scene” of  the execution is made 
available for scopic mastery—these weaponized images remain as data to be scanned and interpreted 
by mechanical eyes. But neither do these images aid an existential analysis of  death (the second sense 
of  the double genitive). Displacing the piercing force of  Barthes’ punctum out of  the image and into 
the world, these images produce death as part of  their operation. Whereas the last chapters 
examined attempts to master death by “framing” it first as instantaneous, and second, as an 
extended form of  living death thrown onto the black other, this historically and geopolitically 
specific post-representational regime are virtual images that act—images that kill.472 As media theorist 
Rui Matoso puts it, operative images are “proactive, not just superficial and passive.”473 These 
technologies of  in/visibility do things in the world—they are part of  a killing machine.  
 
471 Mirzoeff, The Right to Look, 280; Derek Gregory, “Gorgon Stare,” Geographical Imaginations, 
https://geographicalimaginations.com/tag/gorgon-stare/, and Greene, “Drone Vision,” 236. For a visual analysis of 
the structure and function of the laser-guided AGM-114R Hellfire II air-to-surface missile see Forensic Architecture’s 
video report, “The Architecture of Hellfire Romeo: Drone Strike in Miranshah, Pakistan, 2012,” 
https://www.forensic-architecture.org/case/drone-strikes/. 
472 This regime of virtual images has been theorized as active by a range of thinkers including Paglen,  Mondzain, and Lev 
Manovich. The later provides a brief history of “actionable” visual representations in “To Lie and to Act: Potemkin’s 
Villages, Cinema and Telepresence. Notes around ‘Checkpoint ’95 Project,’” in Ars Electronica 1995, Linz, Austria. 
473 Matoso Rui, “Operative-Images / Phantom-Images: The Synthetic Perception Media in the Late Harun Farocki,” in 












Figure 32. Unidentified photographer, MQ-9 Reaper, Armed with Gbu-12 Paveway II Laser Guided Munitions and Agm-114 












Take 3: Images that Kill 
What has the development of  the US drone program in the aftermath of  9/11 meant for the 
shifting modes of  visual and sovereign power? And for the structures of  seeing-punish (voir-punir) 
and the virtualization of  visibility we interrogated “with and against” (DP2 45) Foucault’s thesis of  
the despectacularization of  punishment in chapter 2? How do images “keep watch [veiller]” or 
“mount surveillance” over the survival of  the death penalty? (DP1 283) and what does this mean for 
spectrality? How can this new regime of  invisible images of  death help us to deconstruct 
sovereignty?  
My genealogy of  visual instrumentality has set the stage for a third, double-sided “take” on 
the optic of  spectrality—according to which sovereignty needs images to install itself, even as 
images deconstruct sovereignty. Farocki’s double-channel installation Eye/Machine mobilizes a 
deconstructive reading of  the lethal instrumentalization of  images in late modern air war. Farocki’s 
atlas of  machine vision will help us assess the drone’s necro-tactics—its transformations in the 
virtuality of  war and the death penalty. This will guide my stereoscopic analysis of  the drone’s 
deployment of  image operations to performatively reassert its power over death. This intensified 
technical extension of  sovereignty needs images for security, control, and mastery, yet all these 
attempts on the part of  the sovereign representatives of  the state to seek mastery simultaneously 
expose sovereignty. This stereoscopic analysis of  the drone’s execution of  necroptopower will help 
expose the phantasmatic (but nonetheless real) nature of  these intersecting attempts at mastery. As I 
have argued throughout, there is always a phantasmatic dimension of  sovereignty we can 
deconstruct by showing that spectrality is both necessary to sovereignty, while simultaneously 
exposing its attempts at mastery.  
This  critical and quasi-transcendental analysis will precede along two intersecting paths: the 
first focuses on the drone’s attempt to master death and time by asserting control over the divide 
between the visible/invisible via this system of  global “quasi-panoptics”; the second turns to the 
question of  the act, and to the ontological oppositions of  the actual/virtual, act/non-act, 
act/desire.474 These two paths correspond to Derrida’s two Foucauldian interventions in the first and 
second years of  the death penalty seminar: in relation to the visibility of  punishment and the time 
of  death and the question of  what constitutes an act or action. As we saw in chapter 2, in the first 
year of  the seminar, Derrida is concerned with the visibility of  legal putting to death and the 
 




performative power of  the image of  death: even where visibility is transforming and becoming 
“more virtual,” it is nonetheless critical to the structures of  witnessing and the experience of  time 
(i.e. the phantasm of  the end of  finitude) it authorizes. In the second year, Derrida confronts the 
problem of  the death penalty from another direction through the leading question: “What is an act, in 
the sense of  action?” (DP2 4). Derrida turns his attention to the status of  the act and its relation to 
non-act, desire, to virtual, which is no longer clearly opposed to the actual, etc.  
These two concerns (with the visibility of  punishment and the deconstruction of  the 
metaphysical notion of  activity) are co-implicated in late modern air war, with its virtual ethos of  
global surveillance and state-security. Examining multiple linkages between visibility, time, death, and 
sovereign power, I will argue that the survival of  the death penalty in the drone’s optic machinery of  
death complicates the senses of  an act, or action in multiple ways.  As such it can help us think 
through the complication of  act/non-act under capitalist violence, linking Derrida’s question “What 
does it mean to act, to act on [passage à l’acte]” to the discussion of  the virtualized visibility in the first 
year of  the seminar (DP2 7).475 
 
Quasi-Panoptics: InVisibility & Technopunishment 
In chapter 2, I examined the sovereign decision over the death penalty as a phantasmatic attempt to 
master death by dividing it from life in the sharp instant of  decapitation “that cuts the culpable one 
in two [qui couple en deux le couplable]” (DP2 162-3). In this section, I argue that this historically and 
 
475 I have added the original French passage à l’acte, to the English translation of “act on.” The translation of the French 
“passage à l’acte” as “act on” (rather than “acting out,” as per the conventional translation) effaces the psychoanalytic 
connotations of the French. The term “acting out” is used in the Standard Edition of Freud’s works to translate the 
German agieren. In “Remembering, Repeating, and Working-Through” Freud argues that the subject in the grip of the 
Unconscious repeats and relives phantasies in the present that express themselves not in memory, but through actions: 
“The patient does not remember anything of what he has forgotten and repressed, but acts it out. He reproduces it not 
as a memory, but as an action; he repeats it, without, of course, knowing that he is repeating it” (150). This repetition 
compulsion (Freud’s agieren) is translated by Jacques Lacan, Jean-Bertrand Pontalis and Jean Laplanche as “passage à 
l’acte,” or “mise en acte” (Lacan later retains the English “acting-out”). Rottenberg’s translation as “acting on” suggests 
Derrida’s familiar formulations in the French utilizing the “sur” (sur-vision as “seeing-on,” or sur-vie as “living-on”), but 
misses the dimensions of the term that root action not in conscious intention, but the unconscious in ways that undo 
the very distinction between desire and act that Derrida is seeking to displace in his account of the survival of the death 
penalty. See “Remembering, Repeating, and Working-Through,” in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological 
Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XII (1911-1913), trans. James Strachey (London: Vintage: Hogarth Press, 2001), 150; 
and Jean Laplanche and J.-B Pontalis, The Language of Psycho-Analysis, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (London: 





geopolitically specific extension of  sovereignty technicity tries to master global space and power 
relations through new modes of  techno-panoptic control: the drone tries to determine where the cut 
between the visible/invisible is made, and by whom. It deploys a prosthetic network to produce a 
new distribution of  the visible and invisible that performatively effects a structural asymmetry of  
seer/seen for the purposes of  national—and ontological—security. Theorists of  visual culture have 
argued that the drone’s scopic regime has two aspects: hypervisibility and invisibility.476 This attempt 
to master the divide between the visible/invisible relies on an attempt to appropriate spectrality, 
which as we saw in chapter 1, is the quasi-transcendental condition of  possibility and impossibility of  
the field of  appearance and non-appearance.477 In other words, sovereignty exploits spectrality to 
control the distribution of  visibility and invisibility by producing and controlling what is seen, and 
who can see. Yet, when the image becomes invisible, this ends up exposing sovereignty’s 
phantasmatic dimensions.  
In the first year of  The Beast and the Sovereign seminar, Derrida says that sovereignty is marked 
“by the power to see, by being-able-to-see without being seen” (BSI 293). An essential feature or 
attribute of  sovereign power is its “absolute erection.” Drawing on Bodin’s analysis of  sovereign 
“majesty” in The Six Books of  the Republic, Derrida says that this phallic erection translates concretely 
in the “all-power of  the state over life-death, the right of  pardon, generation, birth, sexual potency 
as generative a demographic power,” but also as “the height from which the state has the power to see 
everything, to see the whole, having literally, potentially, a right of  inspection over everything” (BS1 
215 my emphasis). The capacity to see and survey are among the essential features of  ipso-phallo-
cratic sovereignty: “Today the international power of  national sovereignty is also proportionate to its 
power to see, power to have under surveillance, to observe, take in, archive from super terrestrial 
height, by satellite, the whole globalized surface of  the earth” (BS1 215). The drone asserts global 
sovereignty “by assuming the prerogative of  a universal right of  inspection.”478 Mbembe calls this 
“vertical sovereignty.” He incisively notes: “The mobilization of  airpower and the destruction of  
infrastructure, the strikes and wounds caused by military action, are now combined with the mass 
 
476 See for example, Maurer, “Visual Power,” 141-151. 
477 Wills, “Drone Penalty,” 185. 





mobilization of  images.”479 Drawing on Eyal Weizman’s theorization of  the “politics of  verticality,” 
Mbembe contends that “vertical sovereignty” exercises power through a series of  optical devices: 
Everywhere, the symbolics of  the top (who is on top) is reiterated. Occupation of  the skies 
therefore acquires a critical importance, since most of  the policing is done from the air. 
Various other technologies are mobilized to this effect: sensors aboard unmanned air vehicles 
(UAVs), aerial reconnaissance jets, early warning Hawkeye planes, assault helicopters, an Earth-
observation satellite, techniques of  “hologrammatization.”480  
However, the drone’s erectile verticality is a new technological expression of  an older, non-epochal 
structure of  sovereign visibility with its onto-theological metaphorics of  the all-seeing eye of  God. 
Just as the revolutionary police once chose the eye of  justice as its hyper-vigilant emblem (which as 
we saw in the last chapter is extended through modes of  digital blackveillance), so the “unblinking” 
and “lidless” eye of  the drone’s “persistent stare” attaches itself  to this mode of  sovereign technicity 
that seeks to irradiate all shadows.481 The drone aims for a global hegemony of  vision: 
“Omnivoyance,” writes Virilio, is the totalitarian ambition that seeks to form “a whole image by 
repressing the invisible.”482  
The drone’s operative techno-aesthetic network is critical in framing and determining the cut 
between visible/invisible. Originally designed as an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
(ISR) platform, today’s MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper drones are “hunter-killer” systems 
outfitted with wide-area surveillance sensor systems that allow drones hovering for hours on end 
over Libya, Yemen, Somalia, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, to survey a four-mile radius from multiple 
concurrent angles. The Pentagon’s Defense Advanced Research Project’s Agency’s (DARPA) 
“Gorgon Stare” (2011) and its second phase, “Autonomous Real-Time Ground Ubiquitous 
 
479 Mbembe, Critique of Black Reason, 5. 
480 Mbembe, “Necropolitics,” 29. See also Critique of Black Reason, 23. See also Eyal Weizman, “The Politics of 
Verticality,” openDemocracy, 23 April 2002, https://www.opendemocracy.net/ecologypoliticsverticality/article_801.jsp; 
“Lethal Theory,” Log, no. 7 (Winter/Spring 2006): 53–77, https://www.jstor.org/stable/41765087; and Hito Steyerl, 
The Wretched of the Screen, trans. Franco Berardi (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2012), 23. In his analysis of the “politics of 
verticality,” Weizmann analyzes the spatial turn of sovereignty and surveillance. He argues that sovereignty was once 
distributed on a planar map-like surface on which boundaries were drawn and defended. In contrast, today geopolitical 
sovereignty occupies vertical dimension. “Vertical sovereignty” partitions airspace from ground, and deploys these 
differentiated strata to multiply sites violence.  
481 Bridging legal and art history, German historian Michael Stolleis traces the metaphor of the eye through its various 
manifestation in emblems and icons to demonstrate how the eye attaches itself to the law. See Michael Stolleis, The Eye 
of the Law: Two Essays on Legal History (New York, NY: Birbeck Law, 2009). 





Surveillance Imaging System,” or “Argus-IS” (2014) are video capture technologies comprised of  a 
spherical array of  cameras attached to a drone platform. Recursively announcing the anachronistic 
“survival” of  Albert Londe’s 12-eyed camera (Figure 33), Argus-IS (named after the hyper-vigilant, 
sleepless, hundred-eyed, giant Argus Panoptes), deploys 368 cellphone image sensors to keep real-
time video watch over global territories, an airborne image processing system that handles a torrent 
of  data, and a ground-based visual intelligence processing system called “Mind’s Eye” with object 
and recognition capabilities, which merges images into a mosaic that reconstructs the multiple angles 
into a single synoptic view of  the target area, while retaining the ability to hone into any of  the 
individual image-feeds (Figure 34-35).483 These machines of  death exploit spectrality to reorganize 
and redistribute visibility and invisibility into a new experience of  hyper-visible political space-time 
of  globalization, or “mondialization,” (worldwideification) to use Derrida’s term.484 
Recalling the ancient myth of  Medusa—one of  the winged Gorgon sisters with hair of  
venomous snakes and a mortifying gaze—this intensified technical extension of  sovereignty’s 
erectile power brings together the unblinking eye of  constant surveillance and the lethal force of  the 
sovereignty in a performative display of  power. Appropriating the deathly power of  the Gorgon’s 
severed head (like the revolutionary headsman and our “photographer” at the scene of  Weidmann’s 
execution), whose gaze turned to stone all those who encountered it, the drone freezes the scene in 
time for later analysis.485 Just as the Gorgon’s stare petrified her enemies to death by turning them 
into stone, the drone’s lethal gaze turns “insurgents” into images that trigger remote missile launches 
that take life or “make die” (fait mourir) in a cinematic coup de grace. Two essential features of   
  
 
483 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), “Mind’s Eye,” October 14, 2012. 
https://web.archive.org/web/20121014043008/http://www.darpa.mil/Our_Work/I2O/Programs/Minds_Eye.aspx.  
484 Derrida, Deconstruction Engaged, 44. For a discussion of Derrida’s use of the term “mondialization,” see Victor Li, 
“Elliptical Interruptions: Or, Why Derrida Prefers Mondialisation to Globalization,” The New Centennial Review 7, no. 2 
(2007): 141–54. 
485 Medusa was famously slain by the mythical hero Perseus, the founder of the Mycenae dynasty, whom the gods 
equipped with a reflective shield, curved sword, and helm of invisibility. According to the myth, Perseus used his shield 
to reflect the Medusa’s stupefying power back upon herself, stunning her and thus enabling him to deliver the deadly 
blow of decapitation. After Perseus slayed Medusa, Athena bore her severed head on her shield as an apotropaic 
symbol intended to invoke fear in her enemies. This connects to our reading of the guillotine in chapter 2, for the 
myth of the severed head of the Medusa is frequently invoked both as a metaphor for representation and as an emblem 
of the violent origins on the state. The severed head (of Pompey or Louis Capet) provokes associations with the 





Figure 33. Unidentified photographer, Albert Londe’s Twelve-lens 
Camera, 1893. Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons. 
 
 
Figure 34. Peter Yost, Argus-IS, c. 2013. Video still, Rise of the Drones, Photo courtesy of PBS Nova. 
 
 
Figure 35. ARGUS-IS, surveying Quantico, Virginia, acquired 




sovereignty: the power over life and death and the power over the visible and invisible are 
superimposed in this era of  “winged and armed panoptics.”486   
Again, Foucault is close at hand. In his analysis of  the architectural apparatus of  the prison 
in Discipline and Punish, Foucault famously speaks of  “lateral invisibility” that allows the prison’s 
overseer to see without being seen:   
In order to be exercised, this power had to be given the instrument of permanent, 
exhaustive, omnipresent surveillance, capable of making all visible, as long as it could 
itself remain invisible. It had to be like a faceless gaze that transformed the whole 
social body into a field of perception: thousands of eyes posted everywhere, mobile 
attentions on the alert.487  
Just as invisibility guarantees the order of  the prison, subjecting the incarcerated to a state of  
permanent visibility, so Derrida argues that sovereignty imagines itself  as the invisible source of  its 
own power. In Specters, Derrida calls this power to see without being seen the “visor-effect” (SM 5-
6).488 Invoking the sovereign figure of  the ghost of  Hamlet’s father, who gazes at those he haunts 
through a helmet, he writes: “The king or the king’s spectre sees without his gaze, the origin of  his 
seeing, without his eyes being seen” (BSI 293). This dissymmetrical structure of  visuality takes on 
new technical form in today’s unilateral warfare. The drone-cum-sovereign ghost exploits spectrality 
and arrogates to itself  the right to decide where and how the cut between visibility and invisibility is 
made. In so doing, it produces a structural asymmetry of  seer/seen—this is part of  its “Medusa 
effect.”489 The Gorgon stare and Argus-IS aim at once to totalize the world by making it visible, 
while at the same time making itself  invisible, like the sun as the sovereign source of  visibility in 
Plato’s Republic.490 Extending the structural resource of  the visor, the drone’s optical systems permit 
 
486 Gregoire Chamayou, Theory of the Drone, 44. 
487 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 200-201 and 214. 
488 See also Derrida, Echographies, 120-121. The visor effect connects to Levinas’ discussion of the ring of Gyges which 
renders its bearer invisible, and Derrida’s discussion of the eye of God in Abrhamic traditions, “the one who, in 
absolute transcendence, sees without my seeing. See Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death; and, Literature in Secret, trans. 
David Wills (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008). 
489 For Mirzoeff, the “Medusa effect” refers to visuality’s politics of making the separation between ruler and ruled 
permanent. In Freud’s analysis, the severed head of the Gorgon represents the threat of castration, but at the same 
time (because things stiffen under the Medusa’s gaze), she offers an apotropaic reassurance that defends against 
castration. See Mirzoeff, The Right to Look, 211. For Freud’s account of the attempt to master the anxiety of castration 
and decapitation through the appropriation of the Medusa’s paralytic powers of representation see “Medusa’s Head,” 
in Writings on Art and Literature (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997), 264–68. 





the sovereign both to see without being seen, and to kill without the risk of  being exposed to mortal 
combat. According to Albrecht Meydenbauer, the German inventor of  photogrammetry whom 
Farocki quotes at the opening of  Images of  the World and the Inscription of  War (1988), “the capacity to 
see better is the reverse side of  mortal danger.”491   
The purpose of  operative images is not only to record and preserve—it is not only to make 
visible—but also “to deceive, destroy, render illegible, to obfuscate vision.”492 These calculating 
machines produce invisibility as part of  their operation; the drone invisibilizes death behind a shield 
of  encryption that asymmetrically distributes the right to vision. While the drone arrogates to itself  
absolute power over the visual field, the target hunted through its visual scopes has no power to 
look back. Like the incarcerated of  Bentham’s panopticon, those living under drones are seen-without-
seeing. This distribution of  in/visibility adjudicates who lives and who dies. As Maurer notes, the 
drone’s scopic regime “constructs a place of  heightened visibility, in which one side cannot get out 
of  the frame; this side is petrified by a gaze that predominately seeks to annihilate.” ⁠493 The bodies 
exposed to permanent visibility under the quotidian violence of  drones—those both surveyed, 
surveilled, annihilated, and denied grievability and representation—are divided by a necropolitical 
calculus that is part of  the tactical apparatus of  late modern warfare.494 The drone profits off  “the 
military labor of  invisibility,” which as Thomas Elsaesser notes, includes varieties of  camouflage, 
opacity and redaction, “official disinformation campaigns, secrecy in the form of  national security 
… the invisibility of  casualties in armed conflict” (the media redaction of  collateral damage through 
the ban on images of  the war dead returning to Dover), but also “the invisibility of  the psychic 
wounds,” which are another televirtual mode of  the “inscription of  war.”495  
 
491 Farocki, Images of the World and the Inscription of War, 1988. 
492 Nora M. Alter, “The Political Im/Perceptible: Farocki’s Images of the World and the Inscription of War,” in Harun 
Farocki: Working on the Sightlines, ed. Thomas Elsaesser (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2004), 218. 
493 Maurer, “Visual Power,” 147. 
494 See Jamie Allinston, “The Necropolitics of Drones,” International Political Sociology 9, no. 2 (June 2015): 113–27, 
doi:10.1111/ips.12086. 
495 Elsaesser, “Simulation and the Labour of Invisibility,” 222-23. See also, Amy Goodman and Michael Ratner, “Why Is 
President Bush Maintaining a Ban On Seeing War’s Returning Casualties?” Democracy Now!, 2003, 
https://www.democracynow.org/2003/11/11/why_is_president_bush_maintaining_a. Goodman and Ratner discuss 
the blanket ban on media coverage of honour guard ceremonies of returning bodies of fallen US soldiers to Dover 
from Iraq or Afghanistan. This policy was first litigated by Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney in the lead-up to the 





Part of  the counter-hegemonic strategy of  media artists has thus been to disrupt this 
distribution of  sovereign visibility and invisibility. For example, Josh Begley’s 2017 Metadata App 
sends a push notifications to users’ smartphone every time a US drone strike is reported in the news, 
while James Bridle’s cross-platform project Dronestagram disseminates aerial images detourned from 
google earth of  approximate locations of  ongoing US airstrikes through the mobile feeds of  Twitter 
and Instagram, alongside associated statistical information compiled by the independent UK news 
organization, the Bureau of  Investigative Journalism.496 These interventions aim to disrupt the 
dynamics of  sovereign capture, by making visible and public the lethal, covert warfare waged in the 
Greater Middle East.  
Yet, the same mobile devices used by media artists as a platform to disseminate chilling 
reminders of  the ongoing conflicts waged distantly, further amplify the drone’s appropriation of  
invisibility. The drone’s disseminated network of  technical prostheses extends through the seemingly 
innocuous presence of  cellphones that “watch” their users collecting metadata that tracks purchases, 
locations, and networks of  contacts, registers behavioral anomalies, and “decides” algorithmically 
which devices to target in unilateral strikes. According to the Bureau of  Investigative Journalism, 
drone operators rarely “see” their targets in the conventional sense of  the word, but rather use an 
on-board simulated cell tower that uses geolocation algorithms to lock onto their target’s SIM card, 
forcing their cell phone signal to connect to it.497 Visual surveillance (in the conventional sense of  
the term), has been largely replaced by new deterritorialized methods of  geo-tagging, tracking, and 
electronic surveillance technologies that produce invisibility as part of  military strategy.  
Responding to this situation, Steyerl suggests that Farocki’s “suicide cameras” were not in 
fact destroyed on impact. Rather, the cameras in Gulf  war cruise missile heads exploded into billions 
 
first amendment protections and thus did not guarantee media access. The Obama Administration lifted the blanket 
ban in 2013, restoring press access to the honor guard ceremonies after consultation with the families of the dead.  
496 See James Bridle, “Dronestagram,” 2012, https://jamesbridle.com/works/dronestagram and Josh Begley, 
“Dronestream,” n.d. https://twitter.com/dronestream; “Metadata+,” n.d. http://metadata.joshbegley.com; “After 12 
Rejections, Apple Accepts App That Tracks U.S. Drone Strikes,” The Intercept, March 28, 2017, 
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base-tower transceivers that can force a targeted person’s device to lock onto the NSA’s receiver without their 
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of  optical shards—small cameras with tiny lenses embedded in the cellphones that penetrate 
people’s lives. Steyerl’s haunting proposition: the suicide camera has been transformed into a 
plethora of  “zombie cameras” that fail to die.498 Multiplying the force of  Farocki’s “phantom-
subjective” these living-dead (mort-vivant) machines “live on” or “see on” in a non-localizable 
network of  an-iconic images that fly “through the bones of  the dead and living” in a dystopian 
science-fiction.499 This techno-revenance seeks restoration of  the state through a multitude of  
ghostly eyes that return seeking retribution for the hyper-mediatized spectacle of  9/11, which was 
itself  a symbolic castration or decapitation that aimed not at the head of  state, but rather at its twin 
powers of  economic and iconic imperialism.500 
The drone as “all-powerful photographic apparatus” aims to optimize the visible into an 
“ontopolitological” totality through mechanisms of  imminent and constant surveillance by making 
everything fully present and fully visible—i.e. without shadow, secret, or invisibly. And yet, SECOND 
ANGLE, this desire for “panoptical transparency” is always phantasmatic: the drone’s attempts at 
“instantaneous totalization” are always “quasi-panoptic.”501 When the image becomes an image without 
image, sovereignty exposes its phantasmatic dimensions. In trying to decide what is visible and what 
is not—that is, in trying to exploit spectrality and to craft the divide between the two—this global 
extension of  sovereignty undermines its own attempts at mastery. As discussed in chapter 1, spectrality 
is the quasi-transcendental condition of  possibility and impossibility for any present phenomena; 
 
498 Hito Steyerl, “Medya: Autonomy of Images,” in Astro Noise: A Survival Guide for Living Under Total Surveillance (New 
York, NY: Whitney Museum of American Art, 2016), 162–79. 
499 In “Living On,” Derrida gestures towards a concern with the conjunction of survival and images when he speaks of 
the slippage between “living-on” (sur-vie) and “seeing-on” (sur-vision) and thus to the relation between vision, visuality, 
and what he calls the “jurisdiction” and “problematic of framing” that conditions the urgencies of survival for those 
living and dying under drones (88). 
500 In “Can Images Kill?” Marie-José Mondzain argues that the attacks on the sovereign empire of the gaze catalyzed a 
crisis, inaugurating an iconoclastic regime of invisibility. The attackers hijacked and coordinated its opponents own 
“opto-powers” including the media and bystander screens, to ensure that images of the planes crashing through the 
twin towers were witnessed not only at “ground zero,” but across the globe, multiplying the trauma without end. In 
response to the attacks, the Bush administration called for a “visual fast: the beginning of an invisible war, a purging of 
TV and film programs, no dead bodies on the screen” (21).  As soon as the second Iraq war (2003), images from the 
heads of projectiles were hardly shown, notes Farocki. Farocki, “War Always Finds a Way,” 58. Cf. In The Right to Look, 
Mirzoeff indicates that asymmetric warfare of drone strikes both produces and is a product a crisis of visuality: 
“Visuality itself has today become ‘visible’ at a point of intensification in which it can no longer fully contain that 
which it seeks to visualize” (282). 





spectrality makes possible both the visible and the invisible as its underside. The drone’s spectral optics 
attempt to harness, domesticate, and exploit spectrality when it tries to draw a clear-cut divide between 
visible/invisible. But this is always bound to backfire because spectrality—amplified by technics, the 
synthetic image, virtual space, etc.—always exceeds the ontological oppositions between absence and 
presence, visible and invisible, living and dead (DE 33). The drone always drags along its invisible 
underside of  absence, exposing sovereignty’s phantasmal visibility. How so?   
When the visible image becomes invisible—when it is no longer localizable in an optical 
image—it haunts all of  space with its lethal force. Operative images are everywhere and nowhere: 
like the ghost, one no longer knows exactly where they are.502 They invade the global stage with their 
secreted moves (SM 189). Like its predecessor—the stereoscope—the drone’s iconomics have no 
frame, but rather spread through all of  space as a spectral presence.503 Rather than “localizing” the 
dead in an instantaneous image, this virtual dissemination of  images amplifies spectrality.504 What 
begins then as an attempt to conjure and capitalize on spectrality to protect against death (the supra-
sovereign displacement of  the frontline of  war was first and foremost an attempt to kill without 
being exposed to mortal finitude), ends up exposing sovereignty. The drone’s ghostly schema 
demonstrates that sovereignty is, more than ever, spatially deferred and temporally disseminated. 
This virtualization has consequences in respect to the account of  “seeing-punish” (voir-punir). 
In his 1973 Collège de France lectures on punitive society, Foucault famously argues for the 
 
502 Derrida describes a parallel haunting of space  in his account of the disappearance of the dead in World Trade Center 
bombings in Philosophy in a Time of Terror. 
503 C.f. Buck-Morss, “Visual Empire,” Buck-Morss argues that the icon has no frame—just as in Hardt and Negri’s 
influential account of empire has no frame and the multitude that inhabits it is itself a shadowy icon on the global 
screen, anonymous an amorphous, not yet an alternative to iconocratic domination” (185). 
504 In her discussions of contemporary computer-mediated communication, literary theorist Katherine N. Hayles 
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ontologies—or hauntologies—of the image in the era of digital media and ambient computing, when AI is embedded 
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Hayles calls “noise,” deconstructs the doublet of pattern/randomness, and how moreover this effects the dynamics of 
sovereign capture, are questions I must save for a later date. See Katherine N. Hayles, “Traumas of Code,” Critical 
Inquiry 33, no. 1 (Autumn 2006): 136–57, doi: 10.1086/509749 and “Virtual Bodies and Flickering Signifiers,” October 
66 (1993): 69–91, doi:10.2307/778755. See also Adrian Mackenzie, Cutting Code: Software And Sociality (Peter Lang, 
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“reversal of  the spectacle into surveillance.”505 Continuing our critique of  Foucault’s thesis of  
despectacularization of  punishment, operative images do not eclipse, but virtualize visibility, giving 
rise to a new mode of  the spectacle. In the second year of  the seminars, Derrida recalls that 
“punishment, which is in the end always public, did not become invisible but only changed its form 
and its place of  visibility by becoming virtual or by virtualizing itself  (en se virtualisant)” (DP2 20, my 
emphasis). As we saw in chapter 2, Derrida is implicitly taking aim at Foucault’s historical thesis of  
an epochal shift, on the “threshold of  modernity,” from the paradigm of  sovereignty exercised 
through spectacular displays of  power over death to a biopolitics concerned with the institutional 
management of  life.506  
While Foucault concludes from Bentham’s principle “that power should be visible and 
unverifiable,” that ours is not a society of  spectacle, but of  surveillance and disciplinary power, the 
desire to kill in the name of  some sovereignty survives in the structure of  today’s global warfare, 
which capitalizes on the virtualization of  the spectacle. While Derrida recognizes the “relative 
legitimacy” of  Foucault’s analysis “according to certain limited criteria,” he argues for a more 
nuanced shift to more virtual forms of  visibility. The drone exemplifies a shift in distribution of  the 
visible (and therefore of  the invisible) that extends the virtual field of  the spectacular with decisive 
consequences for the discussion of  sovereignty’s attempts to master death and time (FWT 12).  
 
Electronic Instantaneism, Soft-Montage & the Differential Image  
Sovereignty attempts to assert itself  on the global scene both by controlling visibility and also by 
making invisible: by making things disappear. This account of  the virtualization of  visibility links to 
the deconstruction of  time and the temporal instant in chapter 2. The attempt to control the 
visibility of  war, is also an attempt to control the time of  war. The death penalty involves an attempt 
to deploy machines of  death to foreclose on the future by mastering the divide between life and 
death in a clear-cut instant. We have seen that this instant is always phantasmatic: life is always 
contaminated by death, such that no sovereign “mastery” over death or time is possible. The drone 
penalty similarly asserts mastery over finitude by killing time. As Wills argues, the drone’s “electronic 
 
505 Michel Foucault, The Punitive Society: Lectures at the College De France, 1972-1973, ed. Bernard E Harcourt, trans. Graham 
Burchell (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 23. 





instantaneism” is a phantasmatic idealization that secrets the spatiotemporal relay of  successive 
instants between for example, Nevada and Mogadishu (but also, between the non-linear, 
mushrooming spectral effect of  zombie cameras), directed towards the critical instant of  the 
“surgical” strike.507 As Wills rightly argues, the drone’s instantaneism conceals a relay of  a successive 
series of  “nows.” However, the drone’s temporalizing function can be further complicated through a 
reading of  its machinic phenomenology, which links to my discussion of  stereoscopy.  
Farocki’s double-channel installation will help us expose the phantasmatic dimensions of  the 
drone’s attempts to master death through “real-time” global image processing operations. 
Eye/Machine deploys a double—or stereoscopic—method of  montage to deconstruct the operation 
of  instrumental images. As discussed above, Farocki employs two simultaneous screens in a single 
viewing space: two image streams crisscross one another, aligning at moments and drifting apart at 
others. These double-channel projections multiply reversals of  spatial and temporal orientation: we 
see an aerial view next to a subterranean view; a representational image next to the machine’s 
abstracted perspective of  data analysis (Figure 36). At times, the images double one another with a 
slight temporal delay. Farocki refers to his practice of  using of  divided images as “soft montage.” 
Whereas Sergei Eisenstein’s revolutionary theory of  dialectical montage is characterized by the 
“strict opposition” of  sharp conflictual cuts, Farocki’s soft montage involves a series of  shifting and 
mobile relations between simultaneous projections.508  As opposed to Soviet formalism, soft 
montage allows us to see two things at once, introducing an interpretive flexibility: “One image 
doesn’t take the place of  the previous one,” Farocki notes, “but supplements it.”509 Each image is 
cryptically haunted by others. The supplementary force of  Farocki’s montage further advances a 
hauntological analysis of  technicity and time.510 
What is critical here for the deconstruction of  sovereignty through images of  death, is that 
this method of  montage duplicates the internal structure of  the operational image itself, which can   
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Figure 36. Harun Farocki. Eye/Machine III, 2003. Video still. Photo courtesy of the Harun Farocki Archives. 
 
only perform its task as a bifurcated image. Farocki’s double-channel installation performatively 
demonstrates the image-processing techniques used by intelligent machines. The operational image’s 
software is programmed to collect ongoing sensory information during flight. It is engaged in a 
speculative process that compares available spatiotemporal coordinates of  a landscape to prior 
image-data stored by the computer. In Eye/Machine III, the inter-titles describe this comparative 
functionality: “The missile search-head reads the images. Image processing presents itself. Route 
markers are stored, roads, crossings, bridges, power lines. Lines are highlighted in color to check 
whether they are part of  a stored image.” He continues: “The key to ‘intelligent weapons’ is image 
processing. Images of  the terrain it is to traverse are stored in a rocket. During its flight, it 
photographs the terrain below and compares the two images, the goal image and the actual image, as 
it were.”511  
In an illuminating footnote, Volker Pantenburg aligns this double structure with Aud Sissel 
Hoel and Frank Lindseth’s concept of  the “differential image,” which differs and defers from 
itself.512 The operational image is linked to what is present before the lens, but what is happening in 
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the present, is being compared to past images (retentions) and future projections (protensions) that 
orient and direct its operations. By dint of  their intelligent-processing mechanisms, operative images 
carry within them the memory of  past data and coordinates. These images still consist of  
repeatability: what the machine experiences in the present can be recalled (repeated) and this 
differential iterability or coming back to itself  characteristic of  all identity over time, motivates 
future actions. However—and this is the phantasmatic dimension—the drone tries to calculate this 
difference and in principle resolve it, using the old theorems of  stereoscopic photogrammetry: “the 
ballistic trajectory coincides with the target aircraft at a certain point in time and space, the deadly 
result was achieved by means of  stereoscopic superimposition, in real-time, of  the two flight images on 
the screen.”513 The “resolving power” of  its ideal lens aims to exorcise the distance and delay of  
spectrality by operating the time of  the other’s death, but in doing so, it gives rise to phantasms.514  
This analysis the time of  war demonstrates that the presently visible image is always 
complicated by non-presence. Alluding to the stereoscopic vision that forms the central analogy of  
the optic of  spectrality, Farocki’s phased iterations demonstrate how machines produce the 
appearance of  presence, or what Alan Sekula, in his essay on Edward Steichen’s World War I 
photography, calls “being-there.”515 Writing two decades before Farocki’s theorization of  the 
operative image, Sekula elucidates the convergence of  communications technologies and long-range 
artillery that made possible “bombardment—as well as image recording—at a great distance.” 
Steichen’s photographs prescribed a new model of  forensic vision that image analysts deployed to 
locate and destroy military targets. According to Sekula, “the value of  these aerial images as cues for 
military action depended on their ability to testify to a present state of  affairs.”516 With these 
techniques of  photogrammetry and aerial reconnaissance, Barthes’ having-been-there cedes to the 
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demand of  being-there. Presupposing an epistemological transparency, these technical images claimed 
to be devoid of  rhetorical value, artifice, and interpretation. In a marginal comment—an aside to his 
central effort to define the instrumental image’s tactical function—Sekula proposes that “the dream 
of  ‘instantaneous’ recording, transmission, and repressive response, the premonition of  video 
surveillance emerges from this necessity.”517 Yet, by folding the past and the future back into itself, 
the operative image involves an irreducible spectrality in the very middle of  it. The present is never a 
simple present. Being-there is always a “plupresent” (plus-que-presént)—a present more-than-present that 
deconstructs the actuality of  the same time (meme-temps).”518 Plupresent names a re-inscription of  
presence as an effect of  spectrality, or trace structure, which is here reposed as a mechanistic 
“photogrammatology.”  
I intimated in chapter 1 that the drone is a giant transcontinental spatiotemporal stereoscope: 
the history of  war photography could be traced as the history of  stereoscopy stretching between 
Gardiner’s images of  the Antietam dead on the fault-line of  the Civil War (which was both torn 
asunder and sutured by collodion) and our deconstruction of  the drone’s operative images. This 
“stereohistoriography” would always be anachronistic: I suggested in chapter 1, that stereoscopy was 
displaced by photography in the nineteenth century, because it was considered too deconstructive, but in 
fact its methods were appropriated and instrumentalized in aerial reconnaissance, which 
temporalized its spatial operations (Figure 37). The drone reproduces the binocular disparity that 
nineteenth-century physiology rooted in the observer’s body, by taking two images at a temporal 
interval, which are then reconciled spatially in three-dimensional images used to map the terrain of  
war. The drone pushes this further still by introducing the future into its calculations.  
In short, Farocki’s critical genealogy of  machine vision demonstrates first, that the drone’s 
operationalization of  global surveillance technologies in telepresent kill systems aims to master 
death from a distance without exposing sovereignty to precarity in ground war operations. The 
drone operates optical space to effect ontological security and global control. This is another 
manifestation of  the phantasmatic desire to shore up sovereignty’s ineluctable exposure to death. 
Yet, Farocki’s installation performatively demonstrates that the operative image is always a disjointed   
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Figure 37. Unidentified artist, Stereoscopic photographs. Etching. from Herbert E. Ives, Airplane 
Photography. Philadelphia, PA: J. B. Lippincott Company (1920). 
 
now. Time is “out of  joint,” as Derrida says, quoting Hamlet, while space is displaced (SM 1). Being-
present is “a deranged, dislocated, off  its hinges disproportionate time” that exposes a phantasmatic 
dimensions of  this desire for (tele)presence without distance or delay. 
This re-apparition of  the phantasmatic faith in instantaneity, rearticulates the aporia of  time. 
In chapter 2, I considered the guillotine’s anaesthetizing instant in relation to Aristotle’s account of  
the aporia of  time in Physics IV.519 Recall that for Aristotle, time both is and is not. When time is 
considered in terms of  its divisibility, it is considered in terms of  now (the sequential series of  nows 
for example, unleashed by Obama’s sovereign moment of  decision, in silence and without giving 
reasons, and redirected in reverse, across the vast expanse of  the middle passage where it converges 
in the phantasmatic blink of  the Hellfire missile’s lethal strike). Yet the very now of  time which gives 
time being also robs time of  being, because each now is always (as Farocki’s double-eyed installation 
demonstrates) already past or future. Time is aporetic and cannot be mastered in an ideal instant. 
The drone attempts to calculate and master the time of  war through its operational regime of  
in/visible images, but in its folding of  past, present, and future imaging technologies together, it 
ends up exposing a disjointed and aporetic account of  time.  
 
Automaticity, Act & Audiovisual Capitalism 
This discussion of  the drone’s virtual in/visibility connects to Derrida’s questioning, in the second 
year of  the death penalty seminar, of  the act and nonact, which Derrida links to capitalist violence. 
 




As discussed above, the survival of  the death penalty needs to be understood in terms of  a blurring 
of  a number of  related metaphysical oppositions of  act/nonact, actuality/potentiality, actual/virtual, 
activity/passivity, conscious act/unconscious desire, etc. The drone complicates the notion of  the 
act and related distinctions of  virtual/actual; making/letting die, in a number of  ways.  
First, as we have just seen, the drone’s machinic phenomenology operates via differential 
images that are plupresent. This form of  spectral presence complicates the Aristotelean distinction 
between potentiality (δύναµις, dynamis) and actuality (ἐνέργεια, energeia), as well as the related 
distinctions of  the actual/virtual and passivity/activity.520 The omnipresent threat of  the lingering 
drone reasserts sovereignty by holding death in reserve as a potency to be actualized at any given 
moment. The drone’s operative images can always enact; they bear within themselves the seal of  
death. These ghostly machines of  virtualization further complicate the passive/active distinction; the 
drone’s passive targeting is already an act. The death penalty survives in the post-digital age of  
“audiovisual capitalism” in virtual images that affirm sovereignty by having at their disposal the life 
of  certain foreign subjects (the enemy insurgent and civilian) who are already potentially killed. By 
capitalizing on the hyper-virtualization, the drone extracts surplus data from a distributed sensory 
system, such that even where there is no “act” of  killing everywhere there is a disseminated structure 
that might go into action at any moment (DP2 200). This potential power cannot be opposed, in 
perfect rigor, to the “act” of  killing. The deadly logic of  the drone’s spectral optics is already 
functioning and “in place,” such that even if  Obama (the focus of  Wills’ discussion) or Trump, were 
denied the exception from the law that forbids killing—even if  they stopped dropping bombs—the 
drone penalty would survive in the virtual machinery of  audiovisual-capitalist violence.521 (Recall that 
the techno-scientific structure that supports this spectral presence is a product of  an enormously 
profitable military-capitalist-entertainment complex.)  
 
520 See Aristotle, Physics 184a 9–192b 5. 
521 Derrida uses the term “telefaxilogical capitalism” in “Faxitexture,” 30. “Audiovisual capitalism” is Steyerl’s term. In 
Wretched of the Earth she argues that the politics of representation, with its emphasis on the question of who is 
represented, has been displaced by a new regimes comprised of the deitrius of audiovisual production. The accelerated 
circulation of “poor images” is a sign of “capitalist deterritorialzation,” which adapts dematerialized images to “the 
semioticization of capital” (40-41). Cf. Jodi Dean’s theory of “communicative capitalism” as a specific form of late 
capitalism in which democratic values of access inclusion and participation manifest in the material form of global, 
networked telecommunication technologies, which have led to a deluge of screens and spectacles that fail to deliver 
their emancipatory promise, but rather, foreclose on the political. See Jodi Dean, “Communicative Capitalism: 





Second, this spectral present further blurs the Foucauldian distinction between making and 
letting die. Alongside AIDS or world hunger (two examples cited by Derrida), or the EU’s practice 
of  non-assistance in the Mediterranean, the operative image problematizes the edges of  where an 
act begins and where it ends. The drone disseminates the act through a spectral nervous system for 
which the categorical opposition of  activity (making) and passivity (letting) is inadequate (DP22 
197).  
The drone belongs to the long technological history of  “mechanized instruments of  
execution” from the guillotine through lethal injection designed to “produce and guarantee” 
anonymity for the executioner “who doesn’t himself  kill, not in his own name, who functions like a 
functionary or like an automatic machine without name and without vengeful initiative” (DP2 139). 
Traditionally, these machines of  death are presumed to be passive and mechanistic: “without 
intentional, active, actual, and voluntary conscience” (DP2 199). In Paper Machine, Derrida explains 
the machine’s repetition is destined “to reproduce impassively, imperceptibly, without organ or 
organicity, received commands. In a state of  anesthesia, it would obey or command a calculable 
program without affect or auto-affection, like an indifferent automaton.”522 The machine is without 
desire, intention and spontaneity.  
This presumption of  mechanistic passivity is complicated by these optical war machines. As 
we saw in our genealogy of  visual instrumentality, those condemned to death in unilateral strikes are 
killed via a disseminated network of  virtual images that are theorized as active, autonomous, and 
automatic, and which are themselves deemed responsible for a “ritualized violence” that distributes 
the right to life “in a terribly unequal way,” by making die an incalculable number of  living beings 
(DP2 199). Operative images act and kill ostensibly without human intervention. They have 
commerce amongst themselves: they exchange data, speculate on algorithms, and give one another 
instructions for action. Moving and seeing freely, deciding autonomously, of  their own will, these 
“techno-scientifico-capitalist mechanisms” for the distribution of  death put themselves spontaneously 
into motion—or at least they appear to do so. They appear to act autonomously and automatically 
when they execute a death penalty for which they have served as judicial apparatus, public structure 
of  witnessing and enactment, and official executioner. In other words, operative machines are 
supposed to be the “actors” “doing” the killing.  
 





Yet, the drone’s posthuman agency is a foil for our own “laissez faire” passivity (DP2 199).523 
The drone provides a reassuring alibi that justifies our good conscience: the drone makes die, but we 
simply let die in the name of  global security. When we say that machine’s operativity is responsible 
for killing in a principled and rational way, we displace our own implication in an enormous legacy 
of  capitalist violence. Derrida writes: 
All over the world, close to us, far from us, human machines condemn to die, 
condemn to bringing life to an end, shorten life or cut it short, bring the age of death 
closer, machines that we allow to operate, machines that violate the right to life, the right 
to life of men and women, and that we allow to operate — where is the share of 
passivity and activity, the share that belongs to the act, the share that belongs to 
intentional activity, which, through some philosophical passivity in the service of an 
alibi or denegation, we alone associate with responsibility and guilt, and therefore 
crime? (DP2 199 my emphasis) 
Just as Kant (who did not “act” but who maintained philosophical support for the death penalty) is 
as responsible as Robespierre (who ordered the execution of  thousands by guillotine), so 
responsibility for “surgical strikes” that sear through flesh every other day in famine-struck Yemen, 
extends to all those who allow these machines to operate.  
At stake in this deconstruction of  the act, is the question of  responsibility. Our 
“dénégation” (this translates Freud’s Verneinung) is always already a doubled negation, or a negation 
of  negation: we use the drone’s “automatic autonomy” to deny our own culpability, but this denial is 
also simultaneously, a disguised confirmation of  an unconscious desire or wish for its survival (SM 
192).524 Our “passivity” is already a form of  activity that cannot be acquitted of  these acts of  war. 
 
This final “take” of  the double optic of  spectrality has interrogated tactical systems of  surveillance 
and real-time image processing deployed in the predatory “shadow theatre” (BS2 259) of  US led 
drone strikes in the Greater Middle East. I have critiqued the phantasmatic (but nonetheless real) 
survival of  the death penalty in view of  transformations in post-photographic teletechnologies. This 
analysis has opened a critical dialogue between the question of  the specter and the spectral as it 
 
523 Derrida, Paper Machine, 72, my emphasis. 
524 See Jacques Derrida, “How to Avoid Speaking: Denials,” in Derrida and Negative Theology, ed. Harold G Coward and 
Toby Foshay (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1992), 73–142. Freud’s Verneinung describes a 
process according to which the “content of a repressed image” makes its way in consciousness “on condition that it 
can be negated.” See Sigmund Freud, “Negation,” in The Standard Edition of the  Complete Psychological Works, Vol 10, 




crosses those of  sovereignty, punishment (capital or otherwise), war, technicity, and time, and the 
virtual operativity of  the computer-generated image of  death, which exceeds the ontological 
oppositions between visibility and invisibility, presence and absence, virtual and the actual. The 
spectral logic at work drone warfare attempts to conjure and harness spectrality through the drone’s 
spatiotemporal modes of  techno-punishment. However, these attempts at global mastery expose 
sovereignty’s phantasmatic attempts to master time and finitude by taking life. 
I have supplemented Wills’ reading of  the drone penalty with an explication of  how 
in/visibility is key to understanding the survival of  the death penalty in the drone penalty. The 
deconstructive optic of  spectrality has helped clarify a critique of  the ways operative images 
function at once (1) within the erectile patrimony of  sovereignty as an attempt to harness and 
appropriate spectrality in this global extension of  sovereignty and (2) as a quasi-transcendental  of  
sovereignty’s phantasmal visibility. This “at once” introduces a disjointed time. This discussion of  
the virtual image guided by Farocki’s notion of  the operative image, has revealed how images of  
death are both a technicity that is part of  sovereignty’s institution, and a resource for the 
deconstruction of  sovereignty. In other words, the very operations of  sovereign technicity that 
should ensure ontological security by seeking control the global space-time of  the visible field 
through techno-temporal modes of  punishment end up exposing sovereignty’s phantomatic 
weakness.  The drone supports a constellation of  phantasmatic illusions: that one can control death 
from a distance; that we can kill without danger; that some lives are more valuable than others; that 
there is an objective instant that separates life and death; that the one who controls visibility also 
controls political power over world territories; that making/letting, activity/passivity, act and non-
act.    
Just as the voir punir in the instantaneously instant of  the guillotine, was spaced out as it 
travels through the visual structure of  witnessing necessary to institute sovereign power, so the 
sovereign instant of  decision passes through a virtual network of  in/visible images that both shores 
up sovereignty while exposing its spectral structure. However, the problem I have contended with 
here (and I offer this as a kind of  in/conclusion) is that this network of  mort vivant zombie cameras 
only seems to gain in power by voraciously re-appropriating this spectrality and death. If  for Marx, 




sovereign technicity seems to assimilate spectrality.525 The question then, is if  and how this political 
hauntology of  images of  death could reach some unassimilable limit?526 If  operative images are 
everywhere, past as well as future, tearing apart and killing time, even as they claim to resolve the 
temporal flow of  now moments in a spatiotemporal synthesis that aims more than ever to effect a 
resolution of  the two eyes of  our spectral optic (here multiplied into an incalculable number of  
perspectival sensory points) into a single totalized image. Yet, this stability and pervasiveness is 
precisely the image ipsocratic sovereignty wants to protect of  itself. In other words, I have 
demonstrated the critical diagnostic and quasi-transcendental efficacy of  spectrality, but still yet, a 
future without phantasms—without capitalism and cruelty—is nowhere to be found.  
 
 
525 See Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume 1, trans. Ben Fowkes (Harmondsworth, 1976), 342. For 
an analysis of  Marx’s vampire metaphor see Mark Neocleous, “The Political Economy of the Dead: Marx’s Vampires,” 
History of Political Thought 24, no. 4 (Winter 2003): 668–84, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26220011. 
526 For a discussion of digestion and carnophallogocentrism see Derrida’s interview to Daniel Birnbaum, and Anders 




AFTERWORD: SOVERIGN FUTURES 
The account of spectrality developed across this dissertation has helped me deconstruct the 
historically specific concept of sovereignty, which imagines itself as pure life, cut off from death. 
This concept of  “ipsocratic” sovereignty, which Derrida associates with psychic mastery over death, 
is governed by a double logic: sovereignty is made possible by the alterity of death and time—or 
spectrality—which it nonetheless attempts to repress and control when it “takes life,” by executing 
death penalties (in the plural) with the “numerous apparatuses for legally putting to death that men 
have ingeniously invented, throughout the history of humanity as history of techniques, techniques 
for policing and making war, military techniques,” which are also techniques of visibility and time 
(DP1 2). Yet, these scopic machines of death also amplify death and finitude in ways that expose 
sovereignty’s phantasmatic dimensions.  
These multifarious attempt to “master” death and time gave rise to a number of  subsidiary 
phantasms: of  an objective limit that separates the living from the dead and the concomitant fantasy 
that one can administer and manipulate this limit by delivering a death penalty; the terrorizing 
phantasm that projects death onto blackness, which can then be brought under control in an 
exchange meant to purify and prioritize white life through the visual spectacle of  black death; and 
finally, the phantasm that sovereignty can control the divide between the visible and the invisible by 
delivering death across the telepresent kill systems. Insofar as it is co-constitutive of  sovereignty—
we will never be done with this desire for identity, and thus with phantasms. I have demonstrated 
this historical ineluctability of  the phantasm, all the while still allowing its deconstruction to take 
place.  
The images of  death examined here have raised questions about the status and power of  
images and their responsibility in perpetuating and destabilizing violence across a series of  shifting 
paradigms under which vision and visuality are organized and deployed. My readings of  the visible 
field of  the death penalty and in the era of  analogue photography; mort vivant digital death-worlds of  
antiblack violence; and the post-digital effusion of  operational images deployed in an increasingly 
virtualized global warfare, have drawn out different linkages between political power and the visible 
field. These three cinematic “takes” of the stereo-aporetico-scopic “infrastructure” of spectrality 




desire for life without death and the many historical, geopolitical and technological forms of tarrying 
with death this desire takes), and quasi-transcendental (insofar as it exposes sovereignty’s weaknesses 
and phantasmatic dimensions).  
Taking Life has sought to demonstrate how, in each of  these visual provocations drawn from 
different historical and geopolitical archives, images of  death are constitutive of  sovereignty’s 
possibility and impossibility. This study of the deconstruction of sovereignty through images of 
death has also inadvertently become a study of stereoscopy—both as deconstructive “method” and 
a history of the technological organization of space and time. If for Baudrillard photographic images 
are “not coefficients, but effectors of ideology,” the medium of stereoscopy, as Laura Burd Schaivo 
points out, always effected two ideologies simultaneously: images of  death (broadly construed here 
to encompass multifarious, yet historically determinate technical organizations of  imaging processes 
and techniques) are integral to the institution of  political power; they materialize and thus reassert 
sovereignty over time, all the while simultaneously rendering it perilous by exposing the finitude and 
spectrality that images of  death were mobilized to occlude and “master” through their technical 
machinations. 527 The quasi-transcendental force of deconstruction shows that this double and 
spectral logic is always at work through processes of technicization in multiple contexts, because of 
the differential or spectral constitution of all identity over time. Together these three “takes” of  the 
optic of  spectrality sketch a provisional political hauntology of  images that accounts for both the 
critical operation of  images in the consolidation of  power and their quasi-transcendental exposure 
of  sovereignty’s phantasmaticity.  
These engagements by no means exhaust the efficacy of  the optic. There will always be new 
empirico-transcendental contexts for its deployment. As we saw in chapter 1, there are always a 
plurality of  ghosts. Taking Life has conjured only a few of  sovereignty’s ghosts (of  state killing, 
illegalized migration, warfare, slavery and its afterlives) that haunt our present as much as our 
political futures. This selection has already been a critical act of  inheritance: “Whoever inherits 
chooses one spirit over another” (E 26). But the optic can be deployed in other contexts; it could, in 
other words, invoke other ghosts with their specific historical and geopolitical injunctions. I have 
made a decision to be responsible for some ghosts and not others: “the worst” may be this occlusion, 
 






rather than the inevitable complications of  the returns I have mobilized here in the name of  justice 
for the dead that have “kept company” with photography since its advent.528 
From these counter-histories of  visuality emerges an understanding of  sovereignty that is 
ineluctably exposed to death. We will never be done with finitude. Our relation to death can never 
be done away with, regardless of the machines we deploy to master and kill time. No matter how we 
attempt to appropriate this fundamentally unmasterable limit, it will always return within life. When 
Derrida insists we learn to live with ghosts without exorcism or expulsion he invites us to find 
modes of  living without foreclosing on the persistence alterity and vulnerability—the mortal 
exposure to finitude—that are always a part of  life. Spectrality brings into focus the finitude of 
temporal life, amidst the ineliminability of phantasms. We can neither master nor determine death, 
yet as Derrida writes: “The affirmation of  life doesn’t occur without the thought of  death, without 
the most vigilant, responsible, and even bewailed or obsessive attention to this end that does not 
happen.”529 In this regard, philosophy and images of  death articulate twin project of  learning to live, 





528 Sontag, “Looking at War,” np. 




APPENDIX 1: CURATORIAL PROJECTS 
 
Figure 38. Felipa Cesar and Louis Henderson, Sunstone. 2017. Film still. Photo courtesy of the artists. 
 
Sea of Images 
 
A program of short films exploring the visual geopolitics of oceans. 
 
Slought is pleased to announce Sea of Images, a program of short films that investigates the visual 
geopolitics of oceans, on Thursday, September 14th from 6:30-8pm.530 The program features works 
by artists and researchers including Forensic Oceanography, Emilija Škarnulytė, Ayesha Hameed, 
Filipa César and Louis Henderson that consider the connections between visual technologies of 
maritime surveillance, borders and migration, historical memory and witnessing. Organized in 
 
530 Gwynne Fulton and Ilona Jurkonyte, “Sea of Images: Forensic Oceanography, Emilija Škarnulytė, Ayesha Hameed, 






conjunction with the Concordia-Penn Graduate Student Conference “Counterpublics,” this 
program will launch Slought's new Mediatheque space. Organizer Gwynne Fulton will introduce the 
films, and the screening will be followed by a public discussion. 
The sea has been variously theorized as a blank space outside of time and history and a 
“terra nullius,” or a commons that facilitates movement, but belongs to no one. Roland Barthes 
once described the ocean as a semiological void that “bears no message.”531 This program brings 
together experimental media practices that critically intervene in these interpretations by reframing 
the spatial order of the sea as a historical construct produced and mediated by imaging technologies. 
The works presented in this program explore connections between optical apparatuses of 
surveillance, history and memory, violence and visibility, suggesting a series of overlapping 
questions: What is the forensic status of images? How have technologies of surveillance—from 
modern navigation and cartography through networked satellites and aperture radio—produced the 
sea, rather than merely representing it? How have they been deployed by mobile practices of 
maritime governance to police offshore borders? And how can they be repurposed to bear witness 
to the ocean's subaltern stories? This program considers the sea as a material witness to an archive 
of diasporic memory that spans from the Black Atlantic to the Mediterranean. Defying traditional 
forms of temporality and historiography, these works develop new strategies of visual engagement 
from opacity and fugitivity to abstraction and op-art that help us interpret what Forensic 
Oceanography has called “liquid traces” of these counter-public histories. Deploying image practice 
as an archeological and forensic method, they articulate a submarine resistance to the dominant 
visual order of sovereignty at sea. 
 
Films: 
Forensic Oceanography, Liquid Traces: Left-to-Die-Boat, 2015, 19 min 
Left-to-Die-Boat utilizes rerouted data from government remote-sensing and surveillance technologies 
to visualize, with precision, the deathly trajectories of migration in the Central Mediterranean Sea. 
This forensic reconstruction demonstrates the complex and overlapping jurisdictions at sea that 
allow EU states to evade responsibility for rescuing people in distress. 
 
Emilija Škarnulytė, Sirenomelia, 2017, 6 min 
 




An oneiric, post-documentary work named after a rare congenital deformity called Mermaid 
Syndrome, that traces a mermaid's explorations of a classified cold-war era 25,000m2 
decommissioned NATO submarine base in Arctic Norway. 
 
Ayesha Hameed, A Rough History (of the Destruction of Fingerprints), 2015, 9 min 
A Rough History looks at the coalescence of skin and data in the collection in the EURODAC system 
and in the migrant practice of the destruction of fingerprints. It examines the life and circulation of 
the fingerprint in a speculative history that travels from maritime border checks to early gestures in 
film. 
 
Filipa César and Louis Henderson, Sunstone, 2017 (work in progress), 30 min 
An archeological “Op-Film” that circumnavigates a disorienting dérive of optical technologies of 
cartography, navigation and surveillance, from the material production of Fresnel lighthouse lenses 
to the invention of global navigation satellite systems (GNSS)—the tool that announces the 
































Figure 39. Brett Story, The Prison in Twelve Landscapes, 2016. Film still. Photo courtesy of the artist. 
 
The Prison in Twelve Landscapes: Brett Story 
 
A film program about the hidden geographies of the contemporary prison-industrial complex. 
 
Slought is pleased to announce The Prison in Twelve Landscapes, a film program about the hidden 
geographies of the contemporary prison-industrial complex, on Tuesday, December 12, 2017 from 
6:30-8:30pm in the Mediatheque.532 The program, organized with students in the Department of 
History of Art at the University of Pennsylvania and co-presented with the Reentry Think Tank, will 
begin with a screening of the film, followed by a discussion with director Brett Story, Reentry Think 
Tank fellow Jym Baker, and Toorjo (TJ) Ghose, a scholar of mass incarceration and social work. 
In the United States there are more than two million people in prison, up from only 300,000 
forty years ago. Yet prisons have never felt more far away or more out of sight. Prisons exist 
 
532 Gwynne Fulton,  Fred Schmidt-Arenales, and Department of History of Art at the University of Pennsylvania, “The 






primarily out of sight: not only are they frequently constructed away from population centers, but 
journalists, filmmakers and researchers are increasingly denied access to the world inside their 
walls. The Prison in Twelve Landscapes harnesses the power of cinema in order to highlight the invisible 
presence of the prison. The film pinpoints moments, spaces, and individuals which reveal how 
deeply the prison industrial complex is braided into the relationships, economies and landscapes all 
around us. 
From a California mountainside where female prisoners fight the region's raging wildfires, to 
a congregation of formerly incarcerated chess players in Manhattan who spent their time behind 
bars mastering the game, to an Appalachian coal town betting its future on the promise of prison 
jobs — the film stages scenes where prisons do work and affect lives. Moreover, it poses new 
questions about the necessity and desirability of that work. When we start to examine the prison 
system through spaces that are not prisons, we begin to see how much more entangled it is with 
jobs, with resource extraction, with economic development, with race and with poverty than it is 
with crime. 
 
Brett Story is a writer and independent non-fiction filmmaker based out of Toronto and New York. 
Her first feature-length film, the award-winning Land of Destiny (2010), screened internationally. Her 
journalism and film criticism have appeared in such outlets as CBC Radio, the Nation Magazine, and 
the Toronto Review of Books. She was the recipient of the Documentary Organization of Canada 
Institute’s 2014 New Visions Award, is an alumna of the Berlinale Talents Doc Station (2014) and 
was a nominee for the 2015 Ontario Premier's Awards for Excellence in the Arts. 
 
TJ Ghose’s work focuses on structural interventions in the areas of incarceration, substance use, 
homelessness and HIV. He is currently collaborating with the Department of Health and Mental 
Hygiene, The World Bank, and the UN on initiatives to end AIDS, addressing social drivers of risk 
in marginalized communities. Ghose has served as Chair of the MSW governance committee and 
the Racism and Social Change sequence at Penn. 
 
Jym Baker is an artist, advocate mentor, talk show radio host, and a professional listener. He is 
currently pursuing a degree in social work at the Community College of Philadelphia through their 
PACE program and will be starting at West Chester University in spring 2018. He is a mentor at the 











Figure 40. Tom Laffay, Untitled. Photo courtesy of the artist. 
 
 
#NiUnMuertoMas / #NotOneMoreDeath 
 
A screening series about the Colombian armed conflict and its aftermath. 
 
Slought is pleased to announce #NiUnMuertoMas / #NotOneMoreDeath, a screening series that 
investigates the Colombian armed conflict from the perspective of targeted killings of social leaders, 
on view in the Mediatheque from Friday, September 21 through Friday, September 28, 2018.533 The 
program includes documentary and narrative films by Jorge Mario Betancourt, Yesid Campos, 
Edison Sánchez, Juan José Lozano and Hollman Morris, Margarita Martínez and Miguel Salazar, that 
consider the silencing of community leaders and human rights activists fighting for social justice in 
Colombia. The screening series is presented as part of Slought’s ongoing Photographies of Conflict 
exhibition series in conjunction with the film program They’re Killing Us. 
 






The war in Colombia is officially over, yet it has continued by other means since the 2016 
Peace Agreement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The NGO Somos 
Defensores reports a significant increase in lethal attacks against social leaders in Colombia: at least 311 
human rights defenders, indigenous rights leaders, land restitution and anti-corruption activists have 
been killed in Colombia since the Peace Agreement. One every two days. Colombia is facing a 
humanitarian crisis. Many fear that this will only escalate as right-wing president Ivan Duque, critic 
of the landmark peace accord, takes power. Yet, this kind of organized violence is not new. Attacks 
against social leaders has long been a historical reality in Colombia. 
The Colombian conflict is the longest-standing armed conflict in the Western hemisphere. 
Its range of actors, along with the causes said to fuel it, vary in number and complexity. One aspect 
remains salient to all those who study it: since the 1960s, the armed insurgency has been closely 
correlated with Cold War politics. Marxist-inspired rebel groups emerged in Colombia at a time that 
CIA-backed Operation Condor (1968–1989) was hunting down what Washington regarded as 
political dissidents with communist ideals, as well as any manifestation of anti-establishment 
community organizing, across Latin America. Social leaders, as much as journalists, have since been 
the subject of targeted killings. Violence towards community leaders is not an exception, but the 
rule. This screening series elucidates the long historical antecedents that inform the current crisis, 
including the role of the State in legitimizing paramilitary violence. The films included in the series 
form part of a larger discussion about the practice of silencing community voices, the free press, and 
grassroot movements that have set out to fight for change in Colombia. Countering hegemonic 
State-sanctioned media narratives, these films negotiate questions about witnessing and testimony, 
reconciliation and resistance, as well as the economic and political motivations that fuel the killing of 




Impunity, Juan José Lozano and Hollman Morris, 2009 
An examination of the largest trial against Paramilitary armies accused of killing thousands of 
Colombians. The legal process, designed to attain “peace and justice,” comes to an abrupt halt when 
the political and economic interests in the paramilitary war are uncovered. Are the victims' families 
doomed to stay victims forever, or are they able to fight impunity? 
 




On 2 May 2002, 119 civilians were killed in Bojayá, an Afro-Colombian community in the jungle of 
Chocó, after seeking refuge in the local church. One of the survivors or the massacre reconstructs 
his chance escape in the crossfire between the FARC and the AUC. The documentary portrays the 
current political and social division of Colombia through a community that has chosen forgiveness. 
 
Yover, Edison Sánchez, 2018 
As the first gentle rays of sun shine through the forest, Yover gets up to start his day. He has a busy 
schedule ahead on his delivery bike. His route, though his home town, Bojayá, takes him past 
wooden huts and colourful clothes hung on washing lines. Yover portrays daily life in a village that 
has regained its courage and lust for life after one of the worst tragedies of the Colombian conflict. 
 
Voces del secuestro / Voices of Kidnapping, Ryan McKenna, 2017 
For twenty years, the program Voces del secuestro has allowed family members to send radio 
messages that they hope will reach their loved ones kidnapped in the Amazon jungle. This 
experimental documentary pairs these radio messages with abstract portraits of the Colombian 
landscape. Produced by Becca Blackwood. 
 
Robatierra / Stolen Land, Margarita Martínez and Miguel Salazar, 2010 
In a land where people have known nothing but war, a tightly knit and fiercely proud people, the 
Nasa, fight for the land stolen from their ancestors while fending off the violence encroaching on 
their nation. Their charismatic leader Lucho Acosta is an imposing tactician descended from Indian 
warriors. He knows from experience that violence only breeds more violence. Facing nearly 
insurmountable odds, Lucho’s beliefs are tested to their very core. The future of the Nasa hangs in 
the balance. 
 
No Hubo Tiempo para la Tristeza / There Was No time to Mourn, Jorge Mario Betancourt, 2013 
No Hubo Tiempo para la Tristeza is produced by Colombia’s National Center for Historic Memory. It 
details the findings of their exhaustive report ¡Basta ya! Colombia: Memorias de guerra y dignidad (Enough 
is Enough! Colombia), about the causes and consequences of the war, particularly in regard to 
processes of reparation and reconciliation for victims. It gathers testimonies of citizens—from La 
Chorrera, Bojayá, San Carlos, the banks of the Carare River, Valle Encantado, and Medellín—that 







Figure 41. Tom Laffay, Emily Wright, and Daniel Bustos. Nos están matando, 2018. Film still. Photo courtesy of the artists. 
 
Nos están matando / They’re Killing Us	 
A documentary screening and conversation about the targeting killing of community leaders and 
human rights activists fighting for change in Colombia. 
 
Slought is pleased to announce Nos están matando / They’re Killing Us, documentary film program and 
public conversation about the systematic murder of social leaders in Colombia, on Saturday 
September 29, 2018 from 6:30-8:30pm.534 The film screening will be followed by a discussion with 
filmmakers Emily Wright, Tom Laffay, and Daniel Bustos Echeverry; Afro-descendent social leader 
Héctor Marino Carabalí Charuppi, founder of the community self-protection group La Guardia 
Cimarrona in the department of Cauca; and visual anthropologist and documentary filmmaker 
Alejandro Jaramillo. The program is presented as part of Slought’s ongoing Photographies of Conflict 
 






exhibition series, and is co-presented with CAMRA (Collective for Advancing Multimodal Research 
Arts) at the University of Pennsylvania. 
As the world focuses on the demobilisation of the FARC rebel group, another war is being 
waged in Colombia against social leaders—the very people who are key to building peace and 
shaping the Colombia's future. Since the signing of the peace deal in 2016, more than 300 human 
rights and land defenders have been murdered across the country. Activists are being targeted with 
impunity in the interests of territorial control, extractive mining, and illicit crop cultivation as State 
and paramilitary groups struggle for power in the void left by the FARC. Nos están matando / They’re 
Killing Us, is the cry of social movements across the country in the wake of this violence. 
They’re Killing Us takes us to the department of Cauca, which bears a disproportionate share 
of this violence. The film follows two threatened social leaders: Feliciano Valencia, leader of the 
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